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Abstract 
Interest in qualitative research in psychology has never been stronger, but 
although qualitative research is making inroads into some areas of psychology, it 
is still marginalised within the discipline. Psychological researchers remain 
unconvinced as to the scientific worth of qualitative inquiry. This scepticism is 
due in good part to qualitative approaches not being accompanied by convincing 
arguments or demonstrations of their scientific adequacy. The aim of this thesis 
is to explore the possibility of a broader, scientifically credible role for qualitative 
inquiry in psychology. For this to occur, a scientifically credible basis for 
qualitative research needs to be established, or, if such a scientific basis already 
exists, made more apparent. 
There are three barriers to overcome. First, qualitative writers argue that the key 
barrier to the broader use of qualitative inquiry in psychology is the domination of 
psychology by positivism/empiricism/postpositivism/realism. However, these 
writers generally misunderstand and conflate the nature of positivism, empiricism, 
postpositivism, and realism, because none of these metatheories exclude the use 
of qualitative methodology. Second, the real barrier to qualitative research in 
psychology is the 'quantitative imperative' (Michell, 1990), or the belief credible 
science must involve measurement. This barrier can also be removed by 
demonstrating that being non-quantitative is no restriction to being rigorously 
scientific. Third, an analysis of the history of the relationship between qualitative 
x 
inquiry and psychological science demonstrates the continuing lack of a broadly 
credible metatheoretical framework for qualitative approaches in psychology. 
Of the metatheoretical positions that currently argue over the appropriate role of 
qualitative methodology in psychology, a specific form of scientific realism is 
favoured over radical social constructionism. Scientific realism offers qualitative 
researchers in psychology a scientifically credible metatheory that accepts mind-
independence, epistemic realism, the correspondence theory of truth, 
methodism, but accepts a systematic fallibilism. 
1 
Chapter One 
I ntrod uction 
1.1 The orienting argument 
Interest in qualitative research in the social sciences has never been stronger. 
There are now hundreds of textbooks on qualitative research methods, at least 
fourteen academic journals dedicated to the promotion of qualitative inquiry, and 
extensive discussion of the role of qualitative research in psychology in the 
psychological literature (e.g., Azar, 1999; Banyard & Miller, 1998; Goldman, 
1993; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; Kidd, 2002; Lee, Mitchell & Sablynski, 1999; 
Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; O'Neill, 2002; Reicher, 2000; Rennie, Watson & 
Monteiro, 2000, 2002; Rogers, 2000; Tolman & Brydon, 2001) 1. 
Despite this growing interest, qualitative research in Anglo-American psychology 
however is not a mainstream endeavour. Although the use of qualitative 
methodology in psychology is growing, it still occupies a marginal, specialist role. 
Qualitative oriented articles in mainstream psychology journals are uncommon 
(see Kidd, 2002; Krahn, Hohn & Kime, 1995; Munley et aL, 2002; Rennie et aI., 
2002). Although, there has been a dramatic increase in published qualitative 
research since the 1980s this has occurred mainly in specialist qualitative 
journals (Rennie et aL, 2002). The teaching of qualitative research in 
undergraduate or graduate psychology classes is also rare (Rennie et aI., 2000; 
Smith, 1996; Stoppard, 2002). Some commentators have explored the 
supposition that a "paradigm shift [towards qualitative research in psychology] 
may be underway" (Rennie, et aL, 2002, p. 179), but have concluded that most 
change in favour of qualitative research in psychology has occurred outside the 
mainstream. Institutional resistance to qualitative inquiry from quantitatively 
1 In contrast, qualitative approaches have long since become mainstream in social and cultural 
anthropology, sociology, education, geography, and nursing. 
2 
oriented psychologists is often noted (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 106; Rennie 
et aI., 2002, p. 179), although it is difficult to find clear evidence of the 
mainstream restricting qualitative practice in psychologl, or even criticising 
qualitative practice. 
Qualitative methodology is starting to make genuine inroads into some areas of 
psychology (Banyard & Miller, 1998; Kidd, 2002; Rennie et aI., 2000), but most 
psychological researchers remain unconvinced about the scientific worth of 
qualitative inquiry. This scepticism is due in good part to the fact that qualitative 
approaches are not accompanied by convincing arguments or demonstrations of 
their scientific adequacy (Haig, 2002a). Qualitative research appears to lack a 
scientific warrant that is greater than the word of the qualitative researcher 
(Phillips, 2000). The justification of this scepticism, of course, depends on how 
'scientifically adequate' is characterised. Qualitative psychologists have argued 
that science is too narrowly defined for qualitative research to achieve a broader 
role in psychology (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; Madill et aI., 2000). In the 
qualitative literature, it is widely believed positivistic and/or empiricist metatheory 
(in which the qualitative writers can include postpositivism and realism, or both, in 
either positivism or empiricism) and quantification. dominate psychologists' 
scientific views and form allied barriers to the expansion of qualitative practice 
(e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994). One obvious problem with this view is that 
positivism, empiricism, post positivism , and realism cannot be lumped together as 
a single entity. Positivism and empiricism are antirealist in important respects 
(e.g., neither positivism nor empiricism accept mind independence). However, 
realism is often assumed to be underpinned by either empiricism or positivism 
and/or what is called 'postpositivism' where postpositivism is believed to be 
positivism "in its new postpositivistic clothes" (Guba, 1990, p. 21). Such 
2 Two recent papers that do provide some evidence for mainstream psychology acting to hinder 
qualitative research are Kidd (2002) and Stoppard (2002). Kidd (2002) demonstrates some 
editors of mainstream psychological journals are opposed to qualitative research on 
epistemological grounds, and that the APA manual guidelines for research strongly support a 
quantitative approach to research. Stoppard (2002) shows how a quantitatively oriented 
psychology department implicitly and explicitly opposed the teaching of qualitative methods. 
~ • ~ - - ! 
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positivistic characterisations of the metatheoretical opposition qualitative 
researchers face are erroneous. In large part, qualitative writers misunderstand 
the positions they rail against (Michell, 2003a). Positivism, empiricism, 
postpositivism, and realism are each highly diverse and controversial positions 
that share some attributes yet cannot be presented as a collective position. 
Although realism can be said to be a form of postpositivism, positivism and 
postpositivism are irreconcilable. For example, positivism, particularly logical 
positivism, relies on verification from sense experience. Postpositivism is a 
broad and ill-defined set of positions but it is reasonable to suggest that it is firmly 
anti positivistic in its acceptance of theoretical entities (Phillips, 1990). In the 
same vein, realism, diverse and controversial as it is, accepts that theoretical 
entities, amongst other things, can be independent of us. In this regard, 
positivism is antirealist. 
The qualitative literature is typically mistaken in its views of what positivism, 
empiricism, and some forms of postpositivism, particularly realism, demand of 
qualitative research. Positivism, empiricism, naIve realism, and scientific realism, 
are metatheories that do not exclude qualitative practice. NaIve realism and 
scientific realism can be shown to offer a positive platform for qualitative research 
in psychology (Michell, 2003a). The real opposition to qualitative research in 
psychology is what Michell (1990) calls the 'quantitative imperative'. The 
quantitative imperative is the view that studying something scientifically means 
measuring it. Therefore, measurement is thought to be a necessary part of 
science and non-quantitative methods are considered prescientific (Michell, 
2003a, pp. 6-7). Qualitative researchers have actively blamed psychologists' 
adherence to positivism, empiricism, and forms of postpositivism for their lack of 
reception in psychology, but it is the quantitative imperative that is the more 
significant barrier (Michell, 2003a). Belief in the quantitative imperative has an 
ancient but continuous history (Michell, 2003a), and the belief that the use of 
measurement equals good science runs deep in psychology. Qualitative 
research does not need to overcome positivism, empiricism, and realism to gain 
'I 
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. broad entry into psychology. What it needs to demonstrate is that being non-
quantitative is not a barrier to being rigorously scientific. Neither does qualitative 
research promote its cause by being anti-quantitative. An examination of the 
qualitative-quantitative debate reveals that the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is largely artificial and exaggerated. 
Most psychological researchers continue to resist qualitative methodology in the 
face of vociferous advocacy from the 'qualitative industry' within social science 
(Schwandt, 2000, p. 190). Psychologists tend not to accept qualitative 
methodology as scientifically credible, or they assign it a minor role as an adjunct 
or preliminary to quantitative research. Being non-quantitative does not 
automatically make the research non-scientific, and there are current qualitative 
methods that already satisfy the criteria of validity and reliability involved in 
justifying knowledge claims. In psychology, these include grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Haig, 1996; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992), verbal protocol 
analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993; Green, 1995), and the theory of 
explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1989a, 1992). 
Demonstrating that qualitative research can be scientific is only the first part of 
the argument for a broader role of qualitative inquiry in psychology. There is an 
equal need to supply qualitative research with sCientifically credible metatheory. 
This metatheory needs to be able to accommodate both qualitative and 
quantitative methodology and be able to address the traditional criteria for 
justifying knowledge claims. If such a metatheory already exists, then it needs to 
be made more apparent. For much of the history of the relationship between 
qualitative research and psychology, qualitative inquiry lacked an explicit 
metatheory to facilitate its broader role in psychology. Now there are several 
metatheoretical positions that contribute to the debates over the appropriate role 
of qualitative methodology in psychology. These include many varieties of 
constructionism, of which a strong version of social constructionism will be 
considered in detail; critical theory (for example, Marxism and feminism); realism 
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in a number of forms; the participatory cooperative paradigm (Heron, 1996; 
Heron & Reason, 1997; Reason, 2003); and phenomenology. This thesis will 
argue for a specific form of scientific realism3 to underpin qualitative research in 
psychology. The form of scientific realism that will be presented offers both a 
scientifically credible metatheory, employs the abductive theory of scientific 
method (Haig, 2002b), and a methodologically pluralistic approach. This form of 
scientific realism is proposed as a metatheoretical alternative to social 
constructionism, currently the preferred metatheoretical position for qualitative 
researchers. 
At a broad level, the debates over the role of qualitative research in psychology 
can be represented as expressions of antirealism, often expressed as a form of 
constructionism. Although realists in a general sense are the majority in the 
philosophy of sCience, they are a minority in qualitative methodology. Social 
constructionists dominate the discussion of the role and direction of qualitative 
research in psychology. It is usual for these qualitative antirealists to depict a 
highly limited role, or even no role, for realist-oriented approaches employing 
qualitative methodology in psychology. Many qualitative anti realists see the 
rightful future of qualitative research as eclipsing postpositivist/realist qualitative 
research (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). For the qualitative anti realists, the onus is on 
psychology to broaden its conception of science. A key part of this antirealism is 
the rejection of what is perceived to be the overly rigorous validity criteria 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Rennie, 1995). Rennie (1995) argues that 
subscription to the critieria of the natural sciences "threatens to undermine if not 
destroy what qualitative research has to offer social science" (p. 324), that is, the 
ability to research complex aspects of human life in a holistic manner. 
A core belief of this thesis is that what people say, the insights they offer into their 
own behaviour, and the behaviour of others, can be valuable data, and can be 
3 Na'ive, scientific, and critical realism have been cited as the main forms of realism in qualitative 
psychology (Madill et aI., 2000), and naIve and critical realist views on qualitative research have 
been offered by a number of authors (e.g., Guba, 1990). 
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scientifically researched with or without measurement. The resistance to this 
type of data from psychological researchers combined with the quantitative 
imperative is in need of critical examination. 
There are four parts to the argument in this thesis that qualitative research's 
marginal role in psychology can be overcome. First, to show positivism, 
postpositivism, and in particular, realism, are not exclusive of qualitative practice. 
In particular, forms of realism offer qualitative research a firm platform in 
psychology. Second, that the qualitative-quantitative divide is an artificial 
distinction that can be profitably bridged. Third, the scientific character of non-
quantitative methods is demonstrated, particularly through the application of 
specific validity criteria to justify knowledge claims. Fourth, a form of scientific 
realism is proposed as a credible metatheory, which could facilitate a broader 
role for qualitative research in psychology. This form of scientific realism is 
argued to be superior to Kenneth Gergen's radical social constructionism, and 
Gergen and Gergen's (2000) application of this metatheory to qualitative 
research in psychology. 
The following overview of chapters indicates how the four parts of the argument 
will be considered in the thesis. 
1.2 Overview of the chapters 
A first step in arguing for a broader role for qualitative research in psychology is 
to establish what qualitative inquiry is. Chapter two presents an analysis of how 
the published literature characterises qualitative research. Characterising 
qualitative research is highly contentious with many contradictory views and a 
continuing retrenchment of positions. Equally problematic is the fact that the 
metatheoretical positions underpinning qualitative approaches generally remain 
implicit, with qualitative researchers, like quantitative researchers, not being 
compelled to express their metatheoretical beliefs. Six approaches to conceiving 
qualitative inquiry are presented. Three alternative, supposedly antirealist, 
" 
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characterisations of qualitative research are discussed, followed by qualitative 
realist and 'quantitative' perspectives on the nature of qualitative inquiry. The 
wisdom of avoiding defining qualitative research is also examined. A scientific 
realist characterisation of qualitative inquiry was not found in the published 
literature. Although there are dozens of different qualitative definitions, no 
unifying definition of qualitative research is established. Such a definition would 
be unhelpful in promoting a broader role for qualitative research in psychology 
because it would inevitably favour one of several contradictory metatheoretical 
positions. Instead, some very broad and pluralistic definitions of qualitative 
research are accepted as generally illustrative of qualitative research, albeit with 
an inherent and unproductive bias against realist qualitative inquiry (e.g., Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000, p. 24). 
Qualitative researchers typically define qualitative research by contrasting it with 
quantitative research. Qualitative writing is often characterised explicitly or 
implicitly in anti realist terms and focuses on the active rejection of what is seen 
as positivist, quantitative, or qualitative realist approaches (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000; Gergen & Gergen, 2000). Such characterisations of qualitative research 
do not promote qualitative research in psychology because they strongly favour 
an 'either or' choice of methodology, and fail to recognise the virtues of realist 
approaches to quantitative and qualitative research. An examination of the 
various characterisations shows there are prejudices on both sides of the 
qualitative and quantitative divide. 
How qualitative and quantitative writers have come to this maladaptive 
methodological and metatheoretical situation in is explored in chapter three. This 
chapter provides a brief history of the relationship between qualitative research 
and psychology. Particular attention is paid to the misconception of 
positivism/empiricism/postpositivism/realism and how a quantitative resistance to 
qualitative research has formed in psychology. The history of the relationship 
between qualitative inquiry and psychological science underscores three key 
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points: First, that the metatheoretical and methodological gap between qualitative 
practice and mainstream psychology can, and has often been, overcome. 
Specifically, a characterisation of qualitative research that is not opposed to 
quantitative research is required. Second, the need qualitative writers have to 
present anti realist qualitative inquiry as the only alternative to quantitative 
positivistic or empiricist research is highlighted and can be shown to be both 
erroneous and unproductive. The quantitative imperative is the greater barrier, 
requiring a demonstration that non-quantitative data can be scientific. Third, the 
brief history of the relationship between psychological science and qualitative 
research shows there has been an apparent lack of a scientifically acceptable 
metatheoretical framework within which psychological researchers can use 
qualitative methodology, even though qualitative practice has always been part of 
psychology. 
Chapter four directly examines the qualitative-quantitative debate (OOD). This is 
the controversy over the relative merits and scientific adequacy of quantitative or 
qualitative methodology and their associated metatheories. This is a 
longstanding methodological "paradigms war" (Gage, 1989, p. 4). Unusually for 
a war, it has regularly been pronounced finished (e.g., Patton, 1988; Patton 2002; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), although the debate is far from resolved in 
psychology. An examination of this debate is important for understanding the 
potential of qualitative research to .co-habit with quantitative research in 
p$ychology. However, the OOD is shown to be driven by misconceptions, 
prejudices, and a lack of awareness of what advantages the opposing side offers. 
An analysis of the character of qualitative and quantitative research 
demonstrates that the boundaries between the two approaches are highly blurred 
and often based on value decisions made by both qualitative and quantitative 
researchers. There is a reluctance to consider, even become aware of, the 
virtues of the opposing approaches. In particular, the qualitative understanding 
of positivism/empiricism/postpositivism/realism is often misinformed, whereas 
e_ : _.-i 
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quantitative researchers do not seem aware of the range of possibilities 
qualitative inquiry offers. 
Chapter five examines whether qualitative data can be as valid and reliable as 
quantitative data. Qualitative research needs to demonstrate that being non-
quantitative is not a barrier to being rigorously scientific. Three examples of 
qualitative method currently employed in psychology are examined. These 
methods are grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), verbal protocol analysis 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993), and the theory of explanatory coherence 
(Thagard, 1989a, 1992). These methods are strikingly dissimilar in their 
character, the knowledge areas they investigate, the research traditions they 
have evolved from, and where within psychology they are, and can be, applied. 
However, all three methods successfully meet the traditional criteria of validity 
and reliability for justifying knowledge claims. The three methods also provide 
further bridges across the qualitative-quantitative divide because of their inclusive 
attitudes and procedures toward quantitative data. 
The third concern to arise from the historical discussion in chapter three is the 
need for a scientifically sound metatheoretical position that is fair-minded about 
both qualitative and quantitative methodology. Chapters six and seven examine 
social constructionism and a form of scientific realism, respectively, as the two 
main postempiricist options available to psychological science. These two 
metatheoretical positions are evaluated on their ability to provide a scientifically 
credible epistemology and ontology, promote methodological pluralism, adhere to 
the traditional criteria of research evaluation, and promote a broader role for 
qualitative research in psychology. Chapter six specifically examines the 
influential and strong radical social constructionist position of Kenneth Gergen 
(1973,1978,1985, 1992a & b, 1994a, b, & c, 1999, 2001 a, b, & c), and how this 
position applies to qualitative research (M. Gergen, 1992; Gergen & Gergen, 
1983, 1984, 1986, 1991, 2000; M. Gergen, Chrisler & LoCicero, 1999). 
Ultimately, Kenneth Gergen's metatheoretical position is found to be inadequate, 
'i 
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and Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen's application of this metatheory to 
qualitative inquiry largely underdeveloped. 
In chapter seven, a form of scientific realism to underpin qualitative research in 
psychology is set out in detail, based on specific doctrines: mind-independence, 
epistemic realism incorporating a systematic fallibilism and a collection of validity 
criteria, the correspondence theory of truth, and a strong commitment to 
methodism. The form of scientific realism proposed is based on the work of 
Hooker (1987), Phillips (2000), and Haig (1996, 2002a & b) but is also informed 
by overviews of scientific realism by Boyd (1984, 1996), Greenwood (1987, 1992, 
1998), McMullin (1984), and Sankey (2000). Haig's (2002b) abductive theory of 
method also provides an important framework for qualitative inquiry in 
psychological science. Scientific realism is shown to offer a considerably more 
plausible and credible metatheory to support qualitative research in psychology 
than Gergen's radical social constructionism. 
The overall conclusion is reached that this type of scientific realism supports 
some qualitative methods in psychology (e.g., grounded theory, verbal protocol 
analysis), while helping to make clear that other qualitative methods have yet to 
provide sufficient evidence of their ability to scientifically justify knowledge claims. 
The thesis provides a mandate for a limited number of qualitative methods, but 
the nature and achievement of those methods indicates the potential of 
qualitative research to contribute significantly to psychological science. 
" 
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Chapter Two 
What is Qualitative Research? 
2.1 Overview 
Chapter two examines the controversy over what constitutes qualitative research. 
It is a complex debate with no accepted resolution. The different intellectual 
traditions that populate the qualitative field have given rise to a number of 
metatheoretical stances that co-exist in a state of active disharmony. The aim in 
this chapter is to establish a wide-ranging characterisation of qualitative inquiry. 
This characterisation will provide a basis for understanding the broader potential 
of qualitative research in psychology, and its scientific warrant for making 
knowledge claims. It will also serve to introduce the question of how qualitative 
research relates to a variety of metatheories, including antirealism and realism. It 
will become apparent that the discussion of qualitative and quantitative research 
in the qualitative literature is strongly influenced by prejudices and confusions. In 
particular, qualitative researchers often present their approaches to qualitative 
inquiry as anti positivistic, and antiquantitative, whereas they are more accurately 
characterised as anti realist. Moreover, the anti realist characterisations of 
qualitative research can be strongly challenged partly based on the overlap 
between antirealism and realism, and qualitative and quantitative research. 
The characterisations of qualitative inquiry given within, and outside of, 
psychology are considered in this chapter; although the emphasis is on the 
writings of qualitative psychologists, it is in the literature of related social sciences 
where the nature of qualitative research is most frequently discussed. Six distinct 
approaches to characterising qualitative inquiry are presented. First, three 
different, but supposedly anti realist approaches to understanding qualitative 
inquiry are examined. This is followed by an examination of an approach that 
avoids directly characterising qualitative research. A 'qualitative realist' 
12 
approach to understanding qualitative research is then discussed. The term 
'qualitative realist' refers to qualitative writers who take some form of realist 
perspective on the nature of reality and on what constitutes warrantable 
knowledge. Lastly, there is consideration of what is labelled a 'quantitative' view 
of qualitative research. This view is based on what qualitative writers perceive as 
the quantitative understanding of qualitative inquiry, but it can be shown to be 
oversimplified and largely unsubstantiated. 
2.2 Characterising qualitative research 
Seeking a specific. characterisation of qualitative research is of questionable 
value. Many qualitative authors believe that no coherent paradigm of qualitative 
research exists (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Madill et aI., 2000; Reicher, 2000), 
and therefore that no useful specific characterisation of qualitative inquiry is 
possible or desirable. Such a characterisation can only provide a limited 
conception of the diverse metatheoretical and methodological field of qualitative 
inquiry. 
The large number of specific characterisations of qualitative research in the 
qualitative literature suggests many qualitative writers believe qualitative 
research has a specific nature. However, the inadequacy of these 
characterisations to offer an inclusive and meaningful representation of 
qualitative inquiry suggests otherwise. Where qualitative writers strive to provide 
precise characterisations, , generally in an effort to forward a particular 
metatheoretical or political view, they have given qualitative inquiry an 
impoverished characterisation. 
Some qualitative writers argue fiercely that qualitative research is a distinct and 
definable paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Reason & 
Rowan, 1981). These authors offer multiple characterisations of the qualitative 
field. Their insistence on a separate qualitative paradigm is in part driven by their 
political agenda to promote qualitative research in the face of what they see as a 
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positivist and quantitative hegemony. Other authors argue that qualitative 
research is not inherently separate from quantitative research (e.g., Hammersley, 
1992; Silverman, 2000). Between the positions of a distinct qualitative paradigm 
and no separate qualitative paradigm, there are a multitude of intertwined views 
on the nature of qualitative research. In this regard, Henwood (1996) likens the 
process of psychologists considering qualitative research to entering a maze (p. 
39). Aside from Popper's argument for the rejection of definitions, the existence 
of a variety of intellectual origins, the current metatheoretical debate, and 
diversity of methods, aims, and applications within qualitative research all make 
an adequate unifying characterisation elusive. 
There are literally dozens of different approaches to representing qualitative 
research, and the more closely these characterisations are studied, the greater 
the disagreement and confusion are evident. Most problematic is the habit of 
leaving metatheoretical influences on qualitative research unstated (Madill et aI., 
2000). There is also much confusion in qualitative methodology where the 
different, but related, concerns of metatheory, methodology, and method are run 
together. For example, a characterisations may include an ontological view and 
a specific method, but not an epistemological position or the relevant qualitative 
tradition by which the method is informed. Often methodology, method, and a 
qualitative tradition become inappropriately blurred in a characterisation. Even 
at a single level, for example the level of methods, there can be considerable 
ambiguity. Method mayor may not include data collection or data analysis. For 
some, method is exclusively an interpretive strategy and does not include data 
collection (Giorgi, 1970; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Moustakas, 1990). Others see 
method primarily as data collection (Bryman & Burgess, 1999; Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994), or as a process that includes data collection, analysis, and interpretation 
(Morse, 1994; Silverman, 1993). Some authors even characterise qualitative 
research by a single method. For example, Girden (1996) declares, "Qualitative 
methods are ethnographic and take place in a natural setting" (p. 266). 
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What is clear is that characterisations of qualitative research often assume an 
anti realist perspective with writers in the qualitative literature frequently being 
unaware of this assumption. When qualitative writers argue vehemently against 
positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism, they are in fact more likely to be 
arguing against a form of na'ive realism (Michell, 2003a). In contrast, relatively 
few qualitative methodologists argue in favour of a realist view of the nature and 
role of qualitative research. However, as will be discussed, the gap between 
antirealism and realism is sometimes not as large as is normally presumed. 
Typically, realism is associated with the idea that the world exists independently 
of us, and our efforts to know about it. Methodologically, realism is characterised 
in the qualitative literature as closely aligned with quantitative approaches and 
the need to be objective. Antirealism rejects mind-independence and is said to 
reject realism in all its forms. Very broadly speaking, antirealism holds that reality 
depends on our construction of it, that is, reality and the research process are 
mind dependent. Antirealism tends to be associated with qualitative research, 
constructionism, relativism, the importance of language in the construction of 
reality, and even the denial of reality. However, antirealism and realism both 
-
include a wide range of metatheoretical positions and values, many of which can 
be shown to overlap. This overlap is not well reflected in the qualitative literature, 
but will be regularly highlighted in this chapter. 
Almost all qualitative writers recognise the problems involved in characterising 
qualitative research (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Schwandt, 1997). These 
problems do not prevent qualitative researchers, including those just referenced, 
from attempting specific characterisations. To avoid problems of specific 
characterisations , qualitative researchers employ one or more of the following 
six approaches to characterise qualitative inquiry. This is not a comprehensive 
list but it does provide a reasonable coverage of the discussion of the nature of 
qualitative research. The first three approaches are typically held to be 
anti realist, but in fact overlap somewhat with realist views. The fourth approach 
expresses the view that how some researchers believe it is wisest to avoid 
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specifically characterising qualitative research. This is followed by a qualitative 
realist characterisation of qualitative research, and finally a 'quantitative' view of 
qualitative research as portrayed in the qualitative literature by qualitative 
researchers. The list of approaches to characterising qualitative research is: 
iii Contrasting qualitative research with quantitative research 
• Employing a list of key characteristics of qualitative research 
• Specific characterisations of qualitative research 
• Avoiding the speccific characterisation of qualitative research 
• Qualitatively-oriented realist characterisations of qualitative research 
• The quantitative view of qualitative research in the qualitative literature 
The first three 'anti realist' approaches encapsulate the usual ways in which 
qualitative research is represented. These approaches can also be considered 
as indicators, or even conceptions, of the possible role and benefits of qualitative 
research in psychology. However, these antirealist characterisations are also the 
first of many examples of the artificiality of the distinctions between antirealism 
and realism and qualitative and quantitative research. 
2.2.1 Three 'antirealist' approaches to characterising qualitative research 
Contrasting qualitative research with quantitative research 
The first and most common approach to defining qualitative inquiry is to contrast 
it with quantitative research (e.g., Flick, 2002; Smith, 2003a; Tolich & Davidson, 
1999). Qualitative research has been and continues to be, characterised by 
what it is not, that is, non-quantitative (Silverman, 2001, p. 25). This approach 
raises problems for the role of qualitative research in psychology because it 
tends to characterise qualitative research as anti realist and quantitative research 
as pOSitivist/realist. Qualitative inquiry is, therefore, characterisied as opposing a 
concern with measurement, prediction, control, causal relationships, and what is 
seen in the qualitative literature as 'quantitatively-oriented' metatheory, such as 
positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism, particularly in the form of realism. As 
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Slife and Williams (1995) suggest, "The thrust of qualitative methods is to reject 
the philosophical assumptions of traditional methods" (p. 199). However, this is a 
restrictive approach to defining qualitative inquiry. Qualitative research can and 
is conducted in order to predict and control (see Brink, 1991) and to investigate 
possible causal relationships (see Miles & Huberman, 1994), but only if it is able 
to fully justify its scientific warrant for making knowledge claims as both valid and 
reliable (Brink, 1991, p. 183). To position qualitative methodology against 
quantitative methodology reinforces the belief that qualitative research operates 
from a different metatheoretical position than quantitative research. The goals of 
such a characterisation appear to be both global and specific: the global goal is 
to assert qualitative research as a distinct methodological 'paradigm'; the specific 
goal is to promote qualitative research over quantitative approaches in particular 
research settings, and endeavours to establish qualitative inquiry's irrevocable 
right to be used in those settings. These are settings where a quantitative 
approach would fail to reveal. the subjective meanings that research participants 
give their actions. For example, according to Strauss & Corbin (1990), 
"Qualitative methods can give the intricate details of phenomena that are difficult 
to convey with quantitative methods" (p. 19). 
Quantitative methodology can struggle with the complexity of human 
phenomena, but this is not a reason to overlook its role in this regard. 
Quantitative methodology can offer advantages over qualitative research in 
different research settings, although this is seldom noted in the qualitative 
literature. There are recent attempts at characterising qualitative inquiry without 
immediate reference to quantitative research (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; 
Willig, 2001). However, these definitional discussions tend to revert to the 
pattern of making self-promoting comparisons with quantitative methodology in 
order to advance the role of qualitative research. In psychology, the distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative methodology is widely employed. 
Qualitative methodology has only recently emerged in psychology, and given the 
discipline's emphasis on quantification, it would be both challenging and unusual 
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to characterise qualitative research without recourse to quantitative inquiry 
(Banister et aI., 1994). 
However, a suitably formulated distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
inquiry can have advantages. It allows the placement of issues of research 
practice and method within metatheoretical contexts and offers a iormat to 
consider the pros and cons of each approach (Henwood & Nicholson, 1995, p. 
109). The argument that drawing a qualitative-quantitative distinction can be 
useful receives support from a wide variety of qualitative researchers. For 
example, Smith and Heshusius (1986), Hammersley (1989), Silverman (1993), 
and Denzin and Lincoln, (1994), all argue that the dichotomy of qualitative and 
quantitative research "has led to a greater diversity of approaches and methods 
along with a critical awareness of their relative strengths and weaknesses" 
(Henwood, 1996, pp. 29-30). However, Hammersley (1996) and Silverman 
(2001) also note the dangers of this dichotomy. The qualitative-quantitative 
divide, particularly when it is oversimplified, can be a negative influence on the 
development of methodological pluralism, establishing a broader role for 
qualitative research, and obtaining the benefits of, and developments in, 
quantitative research. The dichotomy can also foster an unhelpful taking of sides 
(Patton, 1990), and it can aid the belief that qualitative research and quantitative 
research are mutually exclusive (Sue, Kurasaki & Srinivasan, 1999). In the 
qualitative literature, there is certainly a strong degree of assumed separation 
between quantitative and qualitative methodology and their metatheoretical 
views. The method of using comparisons to develop theoretical and 
methodological arguments is strongly endorsed. However, the quantitative-
qualitative dichotomy is a comparison that ultimately has a deleterious effect. 
The terms 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' promote an overemphasis on chOOSing 
between methodologies rather than deriving the methodology through addressing 
the research question from a clearly explicated metatheoretical position. 
. ". - ~ 
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The qualitative-quantitative debate has had a greater impact on the 
characterising of qualitative research than any other debate within the qualitative 
literature. A closer examination of this debate in order to explore the potential of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to co-habit in psychology will be 
undertaken in chapter four. 
Employing a list of key characteristics of qualitative research 
A second approach to overcoming the difficulties of characterising qualitative 
research is to present key features that characterise qualitative inquiry (e.g., 
Banister et aI., 1994; Flick, 2002; Maxwell, 1996; Patton, 2002). The key 
features can be as many as twelve (Flick, 2002) or as few as one (Bryman, 
1988). A comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of key features is provided 
below. It is useful to compile such a list in order to examine the individual nature 
of the features; to compare these features briefly with mainstream psychological 
research practice; to highlight the prevailing 'anti realist' components of qualitative 
research; and lastly, to provide a useful background for many of the 
metatheoretical issues to be examined. 
There are also four important qualifications that should be made about the list. 
First, the features are generally considered 'anti realist' in nature although they do 
not stem from a homogeneous metatheoretical position; antirealism is 
epistemologically and onto logically highly diverse. Second, the list contains what 
appears to be a number of strong postmodernist themes, though one should not 
overstate the influence of postmodernism in the qualitative field. Postmodernism 
is only one of a number of influences on qualitative research. It is certainly not 
solely responsible for the current rise in interest in qualitative research (Atkinson, 
Coffey & Delmont, 2001; Morse, 1999a). Third, some of these features could be 
collapsed (e.g., meaning, subjectivity, and reflexivity), and others considerably 
expanded (e.g., constructionism). Fourth, these features can and will be 
challenged from a scientific realist position, here, and in following chapters. 
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Overall, the list does highlight a sense of greater compatibility between the 
putative qualitative and quantitative 'paradigms', and between antirealism and 
realism than is often thought to be the case. 
A list of some of the assumed antirealist characteristics of qualitative research 
from the qualitative literature 
• The active rejection of positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism 
• A focus on accessing 'meaning' 
• A subjective epistemology is paramount 
• The researcher is the primary instrument of qualitative research 
• The importance of reflexivity 
• A constructionist ontology is emphasised 
• Qualitative approaches are better able to study phenomena that are 
too complex or otherwise inappropriate for quantitative methodologies 
• The rejection of the traditional validity criteria of research evaluation in 
favour of the new qualitatively-oriented criteria 
• The acceptance of the 'turn to language' or the 'turn to text' 
• A preference for naturalistic and specific contexts using a flexible, 
emergent methodology 
• A focus on inductive practice and the rejection of the hypothetico-
deductive method of inquiry 
• A commitment to using multiple methods and multiple interpretive 
practices 
• Using qualitative research to build a better world 
The active rejection of positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism: Many 
qualitative researchers consider part of the role of qualitative research is to argue 
against positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism, including realism (Denzin & 
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Lincoln, 2000, p. 8; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Guba, 1990). The dominance of 
quantitative research and 'positivistic' metatheory is seen to form a hegemony 
that needs to be confronted and overcome if qualitative research is to prosper in 
psychology (Burman, 1997). Some of these authors recognise the current 
entrenchment of sides in the qualitative-quantitative debate, and argue for further 
debate and discussion (Gergen, 2001 a; Woolgar, 1996), although others believe, 
"the controversies around foundationalism ... are not likely to be resolved through 
dialogue between paradigm adherents" (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 178). 
Caricatures of positivism, empiricism, and/or postpositivism are often used as 
rhetorical devices in order to present preferred metatheoretical and 
methodological alternatives in the qualitative literature. Gergen (2001 a), a well-
known advocate of postmodernism and radical social constructionism, recently 
conceded, "one might even say that much of the critique of modernism has been 
irresponsible. It has been too much content with bashing existing traditions and 
too little concerned with the repercussions" (p. 807). The virtues of positivism, 
empiricism, and postpositivism, particularly variants of realism, are rarely 
considered. The fact some forms of postpositivism can be argued to be not only 
tolerant but also productive for qualitative research is overlooked by most 
qualitative authors (Michell, 2003a). To philosophers of science, positivism is in 
fact a form of antirealism, but this point is seldom understood in the qualitative 
literature. The tolerance of positivism and postpositivism towards qualitative 
approaches is fully examined in chapter three, and supports the idea that the 
metatheoretical compatibility of qualitative research and forms of postpositivism 
research is considerable. 
Schwandt (2000) goes so far as to suggest that qualitative inquiry is best 
understood as a reformist movement against positivism and quantification, 
although he supports a methodologically flexible and eclectic approach to 
research that does not discount a role for positivism or postpositivism in the 
social sciences. There are realis.t-oriented authors in the qualitative literature 
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who argue against the wholesale rejection of positivist, empiricist, and 
postpositivist-oriented qualitative research (e.g., Hammersley, 1992; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), but they are the exception. It is hard to imagine mainstream 
psychology welcoming qualitative research if it brings with it arguments against 
postpositivism, specifically realism, and quantitative research. Although it is 
frustrating fm qualitative researchers trying to promote qualitative practice in 
academic departments and governmental institutions that are strongly 
quantitatively oriented, the history of the qualitative-quantitative debate suggests 
that attacking quantitative methodology and its associated metatheory is an 
ineffective way to advance qualitative research in psychology. 
A focus on accessing 'meaning': Arguably, the most commonly cited feature of 
qualitative research is its ability to access the subjective 'meaning' that people 
give their lives and experiences (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; Maxwell, 1996; 
Weinberg, 2002). The term 'meaning' is employed by qualitative researchers to 
encompass whatever constitutes the view of those being researched. The 
meaning of the participants is often assumed to drive the ontological perspective 
of the research (assuming the qualitative researcher believes in 'reality'). It is 
stressed that the meaning participants give their social reality should not be 
contaminated by the meaning applied to that social reality by the researcher. It is 
typical for qualitative writers to make the point that the meanings they discern are 
not 'truths' but something with which to create further dialogue. An 'uncovering' 
of participants' meanings, not the creation of meaning by the researcher, is 
assumed by many to be the aim of qualitative research (Van Maanen, 1988). A 
'weak' social constructionist would argue that the research participants generate 
socially constructed meanings. These meanings then interact with the 
researcher's own social construction of the participants' meanings. An impliCit 
assumption of much qualitative inquiry is that meaning is there to be found in all 
human affairs. Qualitative access to meaning is distinguished from what is 
characterised as the 'quantitative process' where the researcher typically focuses 
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on the relationship between variables. Qualitative researchers are often 
portrayed as seeking meanings as opposed to explanations (Moustakas, 1994). 
However, exploring the meanings research participants give their actions and 
attitudes can also be the focus of quantitative research. What is more, qualitative 
researchers do not usually restrict themselves to reporting the participants' 
subjective views without first interpreting them; they help to construct the 
participants' meanings. 
A subjective epistemology is paramount: In qualitative research, the perspectives 
of the researcher, of the participants, and the socio-political context of both are 
typically considered inherently subjective and interactive (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). Arguably, the most important aspect of these three elements is the 
subjective view of the participants. Pidgeon and Henwood (1997) suggest that 
If researchers are to be able to understand people's participation in the social world, they 
must therefore engage in close inspection of how that world is perceived through the eyes of 
the participants themselves - from their own social and phenomenological perspectives. (p. 
251) 
The notion of objectivity is severely attacked in the qualitative literature (e.g., 
Gergen, 2001 a). Objectivity is considered impossible because subjectivity is 
considered impossible to avoid. Subjectivity is usually understood to exert a 
positive influence on the research process, because it enables the awareness of 
processes that influence the research and this creates opportunity to react to 
those influences. Objectivity is held as an unattainable ideal and therefore 
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pointless. Rubin (1981) clearly expresses this attitude as follows, "The quest 
should not be for the fools' gold of objectivity, but for the real gold of self-
awareness. For it is not our subjectivity that entraps us, but our belief that 
somehow we are free of it" (p. 103). The acknowledgement of the inevitability of 
subjectivity is the beginning of the qualitative researchers' focus on subjectivity. 
It is not enough for qualitative researchers to acknowledge that subjectivity is an 
inescapable component of their research. Qualitative researchers should actively 
seek subjectivity throughout their research, and actively minimize its effect on the 
participants and the setting (Peshkin, 1988). Subjectivity is taken as something 
that will improve qualitative research (Lincoln, 1995, p. 283) if researchers 
manage their subjectivity appropriately. Achieving a· critical and productive 
subjectivity is believed to require considerable training and experience (Bloom, 
1996; Peshkin, 1985). 
In the qualitative literature, there is strong support for a subjective epistemology 
(Nisbett, 1974). In the broader methodological and theoretical literature however, 
the objective-subjective debate is far from resolved (Phillips, 2000). This debate 
is not about how to secure objectivity or avoid subjectivity. Instead, it focuses on 
whether objectivity should exist as a research goal to strive for, and, if such a 
goal is not realistic, how subjectivity can best be negotiated. Psychological 
researchers typically stress the need for obtaining epistemological and 
ontological objectivity. This thesis maintains that the goal of avoiding potentially 
confounding biases while striving to maintain objectivity is still highly appropriate 
in qualitative research, even if it is difficult to achieve. Phillips (2000) argues that 
objectivity is a "regulative ideal that underlies all inquiry" (p. 114). Objectivity 
helps us strive for the best possible research, but "does not guarantee truth" 
(Phillips, 2000, p. 114). In effect, the rejection of the worth of objectivity leads to 
the acceptance of any standards of inquiry. If a personal or subjective analysis is 
taken as scientifically equal to an analysis based on extensive and painstaking 
research, it will undermines the worth of social science (Phillips, 2000, p. 123). 
, 
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Neither objectivity nor subjecti,vity provides a clear route to the 'truth', but 
objectivity provides a better standard to follow in aspiring to achieve 'truth'. It is 
acknowledged that knowledge is fallible, and the best research or theory can 
always be reconsidered (Phillips, 1990). 
The rejection of subjectivity is not meant as a criticism of all qualitative 
approaches (some of which can be said to be highly objective in the sense they 
employ painstaking validation and reliability procedures), but rather to stress the 
virtue of being objective in a qualitative setting. Qualitative and quantitative 
researchers typically share the view that there are no absolute truths, even 
though qualitative researchers often incorrectly argue that quantitative 
researchers believe "truth is absolute" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 103-104). The 
scientific realist position adopted in this thesis does not deny that subjectivity 
plays a role in the production of knowledge, but rather that objectivity, for the 
reasons just stated, promotes a better goal for researchers to strive for. 
Research is inevitably value-laden, and the researcher's values can manifest 
themselves in many ways (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983). The acceptance of the 
influence of values is not a genuine point of difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research (Reichardt & Rallis, 1994b). Similarly, the theory-laden ness 
of observation is also accepted by both qualitative researchers and quantitative 
researchers (e.g., Guba, 1990; Manicas & Secord, 1983), although some 
qualitative researchers argue that it is also a point of difference (Guba & Lincoln, 
1989). 
Lastly, objectivity does not only occur at the level of the individual researcher. 
The researcher exists in an objective 'culture', which is as important as the 
researcher's individual striving for objectivity. Popper (1976) encapsulates the 
typical postpositivist account of objectivity as a product of the critical tradition of 
objectivity, as follows: 
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What may be described as scientific objectivity is based solely upon critical tradition which, 
despite resistance, often makes it possible to criticize a dominant dogma. To put it another 
way, the objectivity of science is not a matter of the individual scientists but rather the social 
result of their mutual criticism, of the friendly-hostile division of labour among scientists, of 
their cooperation and also of their competition. For this reason, it depends in part, upon a 
number of social and political circumstances which make criticism possible. (Popper, 1976, 
p.95) 
The researcher is the primary instrument of qualitative research: One of the most 
distinctive features of qualitative inquiry is the reliance on the researcher or 
researchers as the primary instrument of research (Merriam, 1988). This feature 
can allow qualitative approaches flexibility and sensitivity when gathering and 
interpreting data. The qualitative researcher is seen as central to all aspects of 
the research process, anq qualitative researchers typically argue that people are 
the best means for researching other people. The human researcher is assumed 
to, be the only instrument capable of gaining the appropriate insights. It is 
contended that no other instrument has the ability to adapt to the complex and 
reflexive nature of human participants. Qualitative anti realists recognise that the 
influence of the researcher must be continually acknowledged and allowed for 
(this demand for reflexivity is specifically discussed in the next section). 
There is the ever-present potential for biases in the qualitative researcher's 
relationship with participants and in how the researcher seeks to elicit data, but 
the researcher usually cannot, and does not, wish to avoid interacting with the 
participants. Even if there is no direct contact with participants, observation and 
interpretation remain theory-laden. Better to be wholly subjective and allow for it 
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than lose the dynamic powers of the human researcher, it is argued. Ultimately, 
the quality and validity of the research are believed to be determined by the skill 
and experience of the researcher. From this position, each example of 
qualitative research could be said to be unique. Quantitative data collection 
procedures (e.g., questionnaires, inventories) are often rejected, or seen to be of 
secondary importance to qualitative data collection. 
Much of the criticism of qualitative research stems from the fact that the 
researcher is taken to be the main provider of validity. Although the human 
researcher can be a valuable instrument of research, it is reasonable to demand 
of qualitative research that it adopts a source of research evaluation other than, 
or in addition to, the word of the researcher (Madill et aI., 2000). The potential for 
human biases is substantial, particularly given the creative and 'intuitive' 
methodological processes some qualitative researchers emplol. The degree to 
which different qualitative schools attempt to overcome the problems of bias 
varies considerably. Some researchers argue that their subjectivity is a positive 
source of insight, equating their interpretations with art and not science (Eisner, 
1981, p. 9; Finley & Knowles, 1995). Other qualitative approaches have 
developed rigorous and largely transparent procedures to overcome this 
criticism, for example, grounded theory and verbal protocol analysis. Grounded 
theory employs constant case comparison, theoretical memos, negative case 
analysis, theoretical sampling, and theoretical saturation, to help ensure the data 
is rigorously examined (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). The main 
reliability procedure in verbal protocol analysis is in the coding of segments 
where the rate of inter-encoder reliability of two independent encoders is 
expected to exceed 80% (Green, 1998). Validity in verbal protocol analysis is 
based on ensuring participants verbalise their thoughts but do not interpret those 
thoughts as they are verbalised (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). As Phillips (2000) 
notes, no analytical procedures guarantee truth. However, qualitative 
4 For example, the use of intuitive or felt knowledge is strongly advocated by some qualitative 
writers as the best way to understand multiple realities (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
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researchers need to work harder than experimenters to show the credibility of 
their results is based not just on the quality of the researcher's opinion but on the 
quality of the research methods employed to ensure that the research has been 
conducted objectively. 
The importance of reflexivity: Closely related to the importance of subjectivity is 
the recognition of reflexivity. Reflexivity is seen as essential to the understanding 
and practice of qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Reason & Rowan, 
1981). There is now a considerable literature on the topic, and like most 
methodological concepts, reflexivity has a variety of interpretations (Sullivan, 
1999). The focus here is on methodological reflexivity, as opposed to ideological 
or ethnomethodological interpretations. Methodologically, reflexivity demands 
that the qualitative researcher be critically self-aware of his or her subjective 
interpretation of all parts of the research process. The influence of any 
participating agent should be incorporated into the research process, including 
any relevant aspect of the research setting. Schwandt (2001) expresses this 
view on reflexivity: 
Hence, reflexivity can be a means for critically inspecting the entire research process, 
including reflecting on the ways in which a field worker establishes· a social network of 
informants and participants in a study and examining one's personal and theoretical 
commitments to determine how they serve as resources for generating particular data, for 
behaving in particular ways vis-a.-vis respondents and participants, and for developing 
particular interventions. (p. 224) 
The reflexive researcher is self-critical of his or her biases, research peccadilloes, 
and theoretical orientation, but also his or her ontology. The reflexive researcher 
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understands that the research process endeavours to represent the world but 
also is involved in the world (Schwandt, 2001), a position that is endorsed by 
scientific realism. The traditional detached and 'interventionist' style of the 
researcher is rejected as falsely objective (Brydon-Miller, 1997). 
Psychology largely ignores the reflexive nature of its discipline, although the use 
and advocacy of reflexive inquiry is growing (e.g., Parker, 1994). Some 
qualitative realists take exception to what can be seen as the overuse of the 
reflexive perspective in qualitative research. Silverman (1997) criticises what he 
describes as journalistic attempts at authenticity using reflexive qualitative 
research in the guise of social science. He states that using an open-ended 
interview approach does not grant "The elevation of the experiential to the 
authentic" (p. 248). He suggests that, "A subtle confidence trick is being played 
in Romantic sociology's appeal to 'authenticity' and 'openness'" (p. 248). 
Qualitative research often prioritises creativity and reflexive self-expression over 
rigour and theoretical credibility. The application of rigorous social science can 
and should be distinct from less rigorous and philosophically indeterminate forms 
of investigation. However, reflexivity can still be very useful particularly when 
aiding researchers to be aware of biases and confounding influences from 
themselves and any other source. In chapter seven, a specific epistemic criterion 
of 'reflexivity' is proposed as part of a much broader collection of validity criteria 
to facilitate qualitative researchers' taking a formal account of the political 
influences and methodological developments in specific studies. 
A constructionist ontology is emphasised: Broadly characterised 
constructionism5 is currently the dominant ontology in qualitative research and 
among psychologists employing qualitative methods. Within qualitative writing 
5 Constructionism also has many other meanings in other disciplines such as mathematics and 
logic (Schwandt, 2001). 
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constructionism is a label that has an extremely varied use but it is possible to 
discern two main constructionist groupings (Phillips, 2000; Schwandt, 2001). 
First, radical or psychological constructionism emphasises individual cognition 
and the processes of the inner construction of reality (Schwandt, 2001). Here 
knowledge cannot be obtained through the accurate representation of external 
reality, separate from the individual knower (von Glasersfeld, 1995). Second, 
social constructionism, in weak and strong versions emphasises social processes 
and interactions (Schwandt, 2001). Social constructionists argue that knowledge 
cannot directly represent reality, but seek to know how knowledge is constructed 
in specific linguistic and social contexts. Social constructionists emphasise 
language as a functional system that creates social reality through the process of 
social exchange and shared meanings (Gergen, 1985). 
Strong or radical social constructionism can go as far as to deny any ontology at 
all (Gergen, 1994a). The social constructionist qualitative psychologists Pidgeon 
and Henwood (1997) contend that, "Knowledge is always a social production" (p. 
245). Under the strong form of social constructionism, the researcher and 
researched can never elude their constructive histories, and experience cannot 
be directly described (Gergen, 1994a, 2001 a). Such an epistemological 
commitment dictates that research is a co-construction of the researcher and the 
researched in a specific sociohistorical and linguistic context. Valuable 
knowledge, therefore, stems from a dialog based on shared experience (Gergen, 
2001 a). It is common for strong social constructionists to embrace qualitative 
inquiry as the natural methodological extension of their ontology and 
epistemology (e.g., Gergen, 2001 a; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Henwood, 1996), 
because it is assumed to promote subjectivity, reject the traditional validity criteria 
of knowledge claims, employ flexible, emergent research designs that can react 
and adapt to the research situation, promote the unrestricted 'voice' of the 
participants, and, closely study the nature of the participants' language and 
facilitate the expression of that language. The weaker version of social 
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constructionism this does not agree that everything is socially constructed, and 
does not deny an independent reality. This form of social constructionism tends 
to focus on specific social constructions such as 'adulthood', 'private property', 
and 'sexual orientation', demonstrating how each notion is sociohistorically 
dependent, though still real (Schwandt, 2001). 
Within radical social constructionism, a relativist ontology and epistemology have 
become influential. Ontological relativism centres on the idea that "reality is 
determined by our language or conceptual scheme" (Schwandt, 2001, p. 225). 
Epistemological relativism argues that all ideas can only be explained relative to 
their context. Therefore, stated in its extreme form, metatheoretical relativism 
holds all aspects of research will need to be tailored to a specific context and the 
findings of research only apply to that context. However, many qualitative writers 
distance themselves from relativism (e.g., Schwandt, 2000). Relativism is usually 
rejected by psychologists as being self-refuting (Fletcher, 1995), or Simply "futile" 
(Rennie, 1999, p. 4) in the sense that if all aspects of research are relative then 
one cannot evaluate any research. The case for relativism as part of a broader 
radical social constructionist metatheory for qualitative research in psychology is 
examined in chapter six. 
While qualitative psychologists tend to adhere to a social constructionist ontology 
(Gergen, 2001 a; Hayes, 1997; Henwood & Nicholson, 1995), and 
constructionism has certainly been discussed more than realism in psychology in 
recent years, psychological researchers are probably more likely to support some 
form of realist ontology. This thesis will consider a scientific realist ontology as 
part of its proposed metatheoretical platform to support qualitative research in 
psychology. 
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Qualitative approaches are better able to study phenomena that are too complex 
or otherwise inappropriate for quantitative methodologies: Advocates of 
qualitative methodology claim they can better access the individual's perspective 
through intensive interviewing and observation, as opposed to the 'distant', 
'inferential' methods of quantitative methodology (Banister et aI., 1994; Banyard 
& Miller, 1998; Flick, 2002). Qualitative researchers have the advantage of 
interacting with, and adapting to, the social world whereas quantitative 
researchers are believed to be removed from it. The empirical demands of the 
research question can also dictate the use of qualitative methodology. Complex 
and exceptional objects invite a qualitative approach (Smith, 1996). There is a 
need, "to design [qualitative] methods so open that they can do justice to the 
complexity of the object under study" (Flick, 2002, p. 5). In studies where small N 
is unavoidable, qualitative approaches can be of more use, because they will 
provide greater depth of study than quantitative approaches (Flick, 2002). 
Qualitative research is well adapted to investigate complex human phenomena, 
about which quantitative approaches can be less sensitive (Manicas & Secord, 
1983; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994a). However, quantitative methods are more 
appropriate than qualitative methods for other research questions, where for 
example, the incidence or prevalence of a disease in the general population 
needs to be established. Such arguments tend to perpetuate the current 
qualitative-quantitative debate rather than promote its resolution. The use of 
qualitative or quantitative methodologies in place of the other does not 
necessarily overcome the other approach's shortcomings, although qualitative or 
quantitative methods are better suited to certain research situations. It is a 
contention of this thesis that the focus should be on selecting the better of either 
qualitative or quantitative methods, or some complementary combination of both 
(Elliot, 1995), that is based on a clearly articulated metatheoretical position. 
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The rejection of the traditional validity criteria of research evaluation in favour of 
the new qualitatively-oriented criteria: Qualitative researchers generally believe 
that they require more appropriate criteria than the criteria of validity to justify 
their knowledge claims. There is a wide range of alternative criteria available 
(e.g., Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Seale, 1999b). 
Henwood and Pidgeon's (1992) criteria, for example, are based on the "need for 
radically different means of evaluating [qualitative] research" (p. 105). Their new 
criteria include, keeping close to the data; the importance of fit; theory integrated 
at diverse levels of abstraction; reflexivity; documentation; theoretical sampling 
and negative case analysis; sensitivity to negotiated realities; and transferability. 
It is thought the unavoidably unreliable and reflexive human participants cannot 
freely express themselves and stay within the bounds of the traditional validity 
criteria. It is also thought that in psychology, the rigorous emphaSis on the 
validity criteria can be seen to handicap thinking and discovery by preventing 
methods from adapting to changes or events in the conduct of research, or not 
allowing research participants the freedom to express themselves outside the 
research framework (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Rennie, Phillips & Quartaro, 
1988). In response to the perceived need for alternative ways of justifying 
knowledge claims there has been a profusion of new criteria. This is despite the 
fact that qualitative writers have generally failed to adequately say why they do 
not use the traditional validity criteria. However, the alternative criteria have had 
very little impact on mainstream psychology and no significant impact on 
qualitative research, with no single new system gaining sway (Seale, 1999a). 
In the qualitative literature, it has also been proposed that specific criteria should 
relate to the specific metatheoretical position of the qualitative researcher (e.g., 
Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; Madill et aI., 2000). Madill et al (2000) suggests that 
the traditional criteria of research have a place but only when evaluating research 
that has either a naIve or scientific realist metatheory. This means judging 
different qualitative research projects by different criteria. However, unless 
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qualitative researchers can show how they can adhere to validity and reliability, 
the broader use of qualitative research in psychology is unlikely to occur. This 
thesis proposes a return to the traditional validity criteria for qualitative research 
(Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson & Spiers, 2002). The systems of alternative 
criteria that have been developed do not seem to satisfy qualitative or 
quantitative researchers. For example, 'the criterion of 'credibility' proposed by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) is not an effective alternative, because it confuses truth 
with credibility and accepts any research account as potentially scientific (Phillips, 
2000, pp. 181-182). Reliability and validity should not be rejected, for th is 
assumes they are not relevant to qualitative research (Morse, 1999b). It is more 
productive to demonstrate that qualitative research findings can be reliable and 
valid. This argument is discussed in chapter five. 
The acceptance of the 'turn to language' or the 'turn to text': The roles of 
language, and more generally discourse, in determining the construction of reality 
are strongly emphasised in qualitative practice (Gergen, 1992a, 1994b). The 
emphasiS on discourse, or text and language, reflects the influences of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism on these practices. 'Postmodernism' and 
'poststructuralism' are labels for a variety of metatheoretical views. However, 
both positions clearly reject the realist notions of an objective and mind-
independent world (Vollmer, 2000). These pOSitions claim it is not possible to 
access the personal knowledge of the research participants directly (Gergen, 
2001 a; Kvale, 1992). Language and text are the units of reality for 
poststructuralists and postmodernists, and they afford numerous alternative 
interpretations of reality. Reality is socially constructed, meaning is negotiated, 
and 'conversations' are carried out between the researcher and the research 
participants to construct research findings (Kvale, 1992). All social phenomena 
are text (Woolgar, 1988a). A strong interest in a discursive approach (Burman & 
Parker, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1995), including narrative analysis (Gergen & 
Gergen, 1984; Murray, 1997) and conversation analysis (Drew, 2003; Drew & 
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Heritage; 1992), accompanies, and has helped facilitate, the turn to language or 
text. 
The turn to language has received strong criticism from both qualitative realists 
and quantitative researchers (Hammersley, 1996; Krueger, 2002; Vollmer, 2000). 
The focus on language has been seen as taking psychology further away from 
science and empirical methodology (Snow & Morrill, 1995), and can even be 
seen as futile for science (Popper, 1962). This issue is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter six. 
A preference for naturalistic and specific contexts using a flexible, emergent 
methodology: This feature maintains that in qualitative research the subject 
matter under study needs to be approached in its natural surroundings within a 
particular context6 to ensure that the data accurately reflect the views of the 
participants (Bryman, 1988; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 1996). Relatedly, 
the researcher should not control or 'manipulate' the research setting. Van 
Maanen (1983) suggests that 
Qualitative research is interested in everyday activity as defined, enacted, smoothed, and 
made problematic by persons going about their normal routines. Whatever interrupts or 
otherwise disturbs or distorts ordinary lines of action is to be minimized. (p. 199) 
6 The need to ground the research data in a specific identifiable context is often called 
contextualism. Contextualism is sometimes confused with holism, which is a much broader and 
diverse concept. Holism is the view that social phenomena are best studied as wholes 
(Schwandt, 2001). For example, an organisation would be studied in its entirety, including all of 
its individual properties (see Phillips, 1977). 
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Localised, context-specific theory development is preferred, even considered 
critical, to the validity of qualitative research (Weinberg, 2002). To study the 
research question outside its context would be to disturb the contextual meaning 
(Tolman & Bryon-Miller, 1997). Denzin and Lincoln (2000) argue that all settings 
are natural because they are "places where everyday experiences take place. 
The [research] site is constituted through the researcher's interpretive practices" 
(p. 24). This point is concisely expressed in negative terms by saying there are 
no artificial settings. A commitment to such context sensitivity is often 
accompanied by the rejection of generalizing from the context and a focus on the 
'particulars' of the study (Creswell, 1994; Patton, 1990). It is a priority of 
qualitative studies to reflect the particular features of the research context. The 
particulars can only be 'true' of the specific context. However, most qualitative 
authors attempt some form of generalisation from their findings (Morse, 1999c). 
Morse (1999c) argues that qualitative research can also provide generalizable 
findings, although not in the same sense as quantitative research. For example, 
in grounded theory, qualitative research generalises from a theoretically selected 
sample. It is the nature of the sample, deliberately developed to help the theory 
emerge, that ensures the theory is "comprehensive, complete, saturated, and 
accounts for negative cases" (Morse, 1999c, p. 5). The grounded theory can 
then be applied beyond the sample to similar issues, problems, and situations. 
Corbin & Strauss (1990) make a similar point about grounded theory. They 
argue, "The more abstract the concepts, especially the core category, the wider 
the theory's applicability" (p. 15). 
As part of being 'true' to the research context, the qualitative researchers often 
employ a flexible research design that can be adapted to the research setting 
(Patton, 2002). It is expected that the qualitative researcher can adapt to 
unforeseen circumstances and pursue the line of best inquiry. Often the most 
appropriate research design will emanate from the needs of the research once it 
is underway (Guba, 1981). Qualitative researchers tend to support research 
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designs that contain the potential for flexibility in data collection, data analysis, 
and the revision of the research questions. 
The use of naturalistic designs and flexible methodology are not normally part of 
psychological research. The inability to demonstrate experimental control is 
thought to invalidate research findings, while the use of flexible methodology can 
be considered tantamount to cheating. Psychological studies usually require 
clearly specified hypotheses, the description of the measurement procedures, 
and decisions about the subsequent processes of analysis before any data 
collection begins. Some degree of flexibility in experimental design to adjust 
measurement procedures following data collection is permitted but in essence, 
everything is pre-planned. However, quantitative researchers are not 
unconcerned with context. Laboratory experimentalists are very concerned with 
context to ensure conditions are replicable and to control confounding variables 
(Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). In non-experimental settings, the development of 
multivariate statistics (e.g., structural equation modelling, regression-discontinuity 
designs) allows quantitative researchers to better encapsulate contextual factors 
(Sechrest, 1992). 
A focus on inductive practice and the rejection of the hypothetico-deductive 
method of inquiry: An inductive approach to method is privileged over the 
hypothetico-deductive method in qualitative research (Hammersley, 1992). The 
researcher 'listens' to the data without the strictures and expectations of 
predetermined hypotheses and categories. When immersed in the data without 
such constraints, the researcher can better discover key themes and 
relationships. The researcher sifts through data from specific cases and builds 
towards overall findings. Theory and hypotheses grow out of the data facilitating 
an open exploration of phenomena. Induction is a productive, creative, 
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hypothesis-generating process and can be contrasted with the hypothesis testing 
of pre-existing theories common in quantitative approaches (Silverman, 2000). 
This is an oversimplified and incomplete account of qualitative researchers' use 
of induction and rejection of hypothetico-deduction. While qualitative approaches 
seek to avoid a hypothetico-deductive approach to research, they are not always 
inductive in character, just as quantitative approaches, in particular statistics and 
probability theory, can give expression to an inductive approach. Qualitative 
researchers consistently speak against the hypothetico-deductive method, but in 
practice they generally use a combination of deductive and inductive approaches 
(Schwandt, 2001, p. 125). Nor are quantitative researchers solely concerned 
with a hypothetico-deductive approach. Quantitative research can be hypothesis 
generating, for example exploratory factor analysis, and social surveys can just 
be descriptive (Hammersley, 1996). Quantitative psychological researchers can 
also use a combination of deductive and inductive approaches, and abductive 
explanations (Ward, Vertue & Haig, 1999). Abductive reasoning potentially has a 
much greater role in both qualitative and quantitative research than is currently 
the case. Rennie (1999) argues that qualitative research should adopt a 
symbiosis of inductive and abductive reasoning. The combination of induction 
and abduction potentially offers resources for the internal validation of qualitative 
inquiry, thereby making qualitative research more acceptable to mainstream 
psychology (Rennie, 1999, p. 11). 
It is possible to apply abduction far more broadly to qualitative and quantitative 
research in the form of a general theory of abductive method (Haig, 1996, 2002a 
& b, 2003; Ward & Haig, 1997; Ward et aI., 1999). It is important to note that 
Haig's abductive theory of scientific method is underpinned by a scientific realist 
philosophy of science. Based on the scientific realist metatheory, the abductive 
theory of scientific method offers a more complete scientific framework within 
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which researchers can undertake research. This abductive framework can 
incorporate the processes of induction and hypothetico-deduction and allows for 
the use of abductive reasoning to promote the construction of explanatory theory. 
The inductive and hypothetico-deductive approaches do not allow for the 
application of the three forms of reasoning, and therefore have a more limited 
role in research. The abductive theory of scientific method incorporates inductive 
generalisations to explain the movement from data (comprising single pieces of 
observed information) to the detection of phenomena (Le., relatively stable and 
recurrent patterns). Abductive reasoning is then applied to infer causal 
mechanisms that underpin the phenomena. The abductive framework still allows 
for the hypothetico-deductive testing of hypotheses where appropriate to assess 
the theory's empirical worth. However, the abductive appraisal of theories 
through inference to the best explanation is strongly recommended. 
A commitment to using multiple methods and multiple interpretive practices: 
Qualitative writers often note that there is no one best qualitative method (e.g., 
Oenzin & Lincoln, 1994; Flick, 2002). Qualitative approaches to research 
typically use multiple methods and interpretive practices (Banister et aI., 1994; 
Oenzin & Lincoln, 2000). The highly diverse sets of options include ethnography, 
grounded theory, narrative methods, and case studies amongst many others. 
Within the methodological strategies a range of individual methods of data 
collection and data analysis are employed. For example, within a grounded 
theory strategy, interviews, focus groups, and observational research can be 
used in conjunction with conversation and constant comparison analysis. The 
use of two or more qualitative methods to investigate the same research question 
is referred to as methodological triangulation (Oenzin, 1970) and is held to be a 
strong form of validation in the qualitative literature (Flick, 2002). The use of 
triangulated methods is seen as a way to cover the weaknesses involved in using 
only one method. The strategy of triangulation can apply to the use of data 
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collection or analysis methods, in-group techniques, researchers, or even the 
application of multiple theories. 
Approaching a research question via two different data collection methods will 
normally lead to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
Although methodological pluralism is to be valued, the application of multiple 
method strategies can create as many problems as they solve. If contradictory 
findings emerge from different qualitative approaches, or from a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, how are the results to be evaluated or 
compared? Qualitative and quantitative approaches do not share agreed upon 
evaluation criteria. The use of multiple methods potentially complicates the 
interpretation of research findings if the findings from individual methods differ. 
The same argument applies to mixing qualitative and quantitative methodology. 
Rather than validate each other, the qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
may be contradictory and create, rather than resolve, confusion. 
Using qualitative research to build a better world: Some qualitative psychologists 
argue that psychologists should take an active part in the ideological arguments 
over knowledge production (Griffin & Phoenix, 1994; Prilleltensky, 1994; Reason 
& Rowan, 1981; Weisenfeld, 2000), and that qualitative researchers should act to 
foster social progress and provide a voice for minority groups (Banister et aI., 
1994; Tolman & Brydon-Miller, 1997). This socially progressive role is often 
given as a key reason for the promotion and adoption of qualitative methodology 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Reason & Rowan, 1981). Ontological and 
epistemological developments in qualitative research are strongly allied with 
political and moral attitudes about how and why research should be conducted. 
It is commonly argued that most qualitative researchers want to make the world a 
better place through their research (Weisenfeld, 2000). The potentially flexible, 
emic, and subjective, role of the qualitative researcher that focuses on the 
'~-- -~. 
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participants' view of the social world is believed to have the potential to be 
substantially more empowering than quantitative, etic, and 'objective' research. 
In parts of the qualitative literature, the moral and/or the political have become 
more important than the scientific. This view is epitomised by Reason's (1993) 
labelling of qualitative research as a "sacred science,,7 (p. 10). However, such 
labels do not advance the role of qualitative research but instead mystify it by 
introducing a term that could be interpreted as a semi-religious and vague. 
Neither Denzin and Lincoln nor Reason fully characterise what they mean by 
'sacred', although the implication from their writing is that qualitative research 
occupies the moral high ground. Snow and Morrill (1995) note in their critique of 
Denzin and Lincoln's (1994) highly moral argument for qualitative research that, 
"there is little to be gained and much to be lost by making moral claims and 
engaging in moral posturing" (p. 362). Quantitative researchers are regularly 
accused of avoiding the moral arguments involved in the debate over the proper 
role of qualitative and quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8). The 
moral dimension to the methodological debates has not yet helped to clarify the 
role of qualitative research in psychology, which is not to say moral arguments 
lack relevancy. Both Schwandt (2002) and Harre (1986) argue that the 
clarification of the moral nature of scientific communities is highly important to 
resolving many issues in metatheory and methodology. Moreover, psychological 
and qualitative researchers are loath to neglect the social responsibilities of their 
work. In presenting her view that the qualitative research genre can be usefully 
located in action research praxis and the hermeneutical tradition, Hoshmand 
(1999) asserts that, 
7 The expression 'sacred science' although originating with Bateson (1972) has been popularised 
first by Reason (1993) and then by Denzin and Lincoln (1994) and Lincoln and Denzin (2000), 
more particularly as 'the sacred epistemology' or 'sacred discourse' (Lincoln & Denzin, 2000, p. 
1052). 
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The value of a given form of knowledge is to be gauged by its contribution to knowledge, as 
well as by its socio-political role and cultural relevance. The qualitative research genre can 
be located in the communities and practices with which it is associated and can be evaluated 
by the shared purposes and values that inform such practices and their future agendas. (p. 
15) 
Hoshmand's claim is an apt perspective on the moral role of any research. 
Specific characterisations of qualitative research 
A third approach to characterising qualitative research is to provide a specific 
characterisation (e.g., Oenzin & Lincoln, 1994,2000; Elliot et aI., 1999; Patton, 
2002; Schwandt, 1997), or employ another author's particular characterisation 
(e.g., Mertens, 1998; Newman & Benz, 1998). Such characterisations, or use of 
characterisations , are normally recognised for the oversimplifications they can 
introduce, for example, the impossibility of their characterising all qualitative 
inquiry. However, authors generate specific characterisations in any case. 
Inevitably, these characterisations represent a particular metatheoretical view, 
which is usually anti positivist and anti realist. Although there are many attempts 
to characterise qualitative research, a good example of the nature of specific 
qualitative characterisations is Oenzin and Lincoln's (1994) statement: 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach 
to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety 
of empirical materials - case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, 
observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts - that describe routine and problematic 
moments and meanings in individuals' lives. (p. 2) 
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This specific characteriation is strongly biased towards a postmodern 
constructionist view of qualitative inquiry, but in the absence of alternatives, and 
the high profile of Denzin and Lincoln's work, it appears to be the default 
'definition' preferred by a good number of qualitative researchers. Denzin and 
Lincoln's second edition of the Handbook of Qualitative Research (2000), as well 
as being the culmination of qualitative research for postmodern constructionists, 
is an extended attempt to specifically characterise qualitative research. Denzin 
and Lincoln (2000) provide a number of characterisations of qualitative research, 
arguing that qualitative inquiry "is a field of inquiry in its own right" (p. 2). This is 
a position that has been maintained by certain qualitative writers for some time 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), and allows specific 
characterisations of qualitative research to be made. 
There are of course many different types of qualitative characterisations, and 
dozens of examples that could be considered. Some definitions are simple, 
others complex, and many are politically or morally oriented. An apparently 
simple characterisation comes from Kirk and Miller (1986) who state that, 
"Qualitative research has been seen to be naturalistic, ethnographic, and 
participatory" (p. 9). These three attributes are common in characterisations of 
qualitative research but they are not necessarily compatible and could be held to 
represent three different levels of qualitative research: naturalism as a 
metatheory, the research tradition of ethnography, and one form of the 
participatory research method. Similarly, naturalistic could be an attribute of the 
method, participatory could relate to the participatory metatheory, and 
ethnography could inform just the method. Naturalistic approaches and 
ethnographic approaches can also have significant points of conflict. The conflict 
relates to the level of involvement of the researcher in the research process. 
Naturalism would favour the most limited involvement whereas ethnography 
tends to favour deep involvement. 
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An example of a relatively complex characteriation of qualitative research comes 
from Creswell (1998): 
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological 
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a 
complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts 
the study in a natural setting, based on distinct methodologies within traditions of inquiry. (p. 
15) 
Creswell characterises qualitative research in terms of distinct traditions and 
methodologies. Qualitative research is a methodological process, although 
Creswell does not mention a specific data collection method. Several traditions 
operate independently but all provide an evolution of thinking that informs their 
current methodological practices. It is more accurate to suggest that while the 
traditions can, and often do, operate independently, there is also considerable 
overlap between them. The different traditions are not unaware of each other 
and can compete, sometimes with overt rancour. Creswell's characterisation 
also includes a series of specific attributes, including both ethnography and 
naturalism, but its greatest emphasis is on holism. 
An example of a politically oriented definition of qualitative research is provided 
by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), who write "Its [qualitative research] essence is 
twofold: a commitment to some version of the naturalistic interpretative approach 
to its subject matter and an ongoing critique of the politics and methods of 
postpositivism" (p. 10). Following this characterisation , postpositivist 
researchers employing qualitative methods would find themselves in a dilemma 
over whether to criticize themselves before or after conducting qualitative 
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research. Such characterisations are unhelpful. They demonstrate the 
tendency of postmodern constructionists to conflate political opinions with 
epistemological debate (Flick, 2001; Hammersley, 1996; Silverman, 2001). 
Schwandt (1997), in the preface to the Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (1 st 
edition), offers the following less biased, but extremely broad, characterisation· of 
qualitative research: 
Qualitative inquiry ... is a set of multiple practices in which words in methodological and 
philosophical vocabularies acquire different meanings in their use or in particular acts of 
speaking about the meaning of the practice. The different ways of speaking form something 
more like a constellation of contested practices than an integrated, readily surveyable order. 
There are multiple sources and kinds of disputes, but generally they involve different ways of 
conceiving of the aim of qualitative inquiry stemming from different traditions of thought. (p. 
xxiv) 
This characterisation is very open-minded about what qualitative research could 
be it and provides little insight into what qualitative research actually is, although 
Schwandt does introduce this characterisation as an analogy and not a definition. 
An example of a broad pluralistic characterisation of qualitative research that 
aims to encapsulate all of qualitative research comes from Denzin and Lincoln's 
(2000) paraphrase of Nelson, Treichler and Grossberg's (1992, p. 4) 
characterisation of cultural studies: 
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Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes 
counterdisciplinary field. It crosscuts the humanities and the social physical sciences. 
Qualitative research is many things at the same time. It is multiparadigmatic in focus. Its 
practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multimethod approach. They are committed to 
the naturalistic perspective and to the interpretive understanding of human experience. At 
the same time, the field is inherently political and shaped by multiple ethical and political 
positions. Qualitative research embraces two tensions at the same time. On the one hand, it 
is drawn to a broad, interpretive, post experimental, postmodern, feminist and critical 
sensibility. On the other hand, it is drawn to more narrowly defined positivist, humanistic, and 
naturalistic conceptions of human experience and its analysis. Further, these tensions can 
be combined in the same project, bringing both postmodern and naturalistic or both critical 
and humanistic perspectives to bear. (p. 24) 
This characterisation captures the inherent conflict· between opposing 
epistemologies and ontologies in qualitative writing, and clearly represents the 
authors' anti realist, postmodern, and constructionist perspective on social 
science inquiry. 
The characterisations available in the literature on qualitative methodology offer 
little to help facilitate discussion of a broader role for qualitative research within 
psychology. The metatheoretical preferences in these characterisations tend to 
challenge the realist view dominant in mainstream psychological research. 
Whether an anti realist view of qualitative research is as popular as these 
characterisations suggest is difficult to judge accurately. Antirealist qualitative 
writers have considerably more publishing outlets than qualitative realist writers 
have, and are much more vociferous and active in championing their cause. It is 
also difficult to separate the voice of postmodern constructionists from the 
broader constructionist school in qualitative research. It seems that the 
postmodern constructionists represent a relatively small community of 
<,.1 
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researchers. In any case, the pursuit of specific characterisations does not help 
facilitate a balanced understanding of qualitative research, and generally works 
against the promotion of a realist view of qualitative inquiry. 
2.2.2 Refraining from characterising qualitative research 
Some authors, including several qualitative realists, avoid specifically 
characterising qualitative research. There are good reasons for not attempting 
to specifically characterise qualitative inquiry. Any characterisation that 
endeavours to encompass the breadth of qualitative epistemology, ontology, and 
its diverse applications becomes more of a list than a coherent and inSightful 
statement about qualitative methods. Attending to the different philosophical 
positions in qualitative inquiry would result in a characterisation that needs to 
include contradictory metatheories. A specific characterisation would find it 
difficult to avoid presenting a view biased to a particular metatheoretical position. 
Specific characterisations are inherently limiting, and in the complex and 
developing area of qualitative inquiry, broad pluralistic definitions may be the best 
way of conceiving such a protean field (e.g., Oenzin & Lin~oln, 2000, p. 24). 
However, broad pluralistic characterisations do not promote qualitative 
methodology as a scientifically credible pursuit within psychology, especially if 
they discount a role for realist metatheory. 
The Popperian view of definitions discussed briefly at the beginning of this 
chapter fits well with a realist account of qualitative researc,h. Specific 
characterisations generally do not help the discussion of qualitative research. 
The writers who avoid characterisations in the qualitative literature see 
qualitative research as better placed within a series of flexible continua that 
stretch between typical components of qualitative and quantitative methodology 
(for examples of the use of such continua see fig 2.1; also see Bryman, 1988; 
Hammersley, 1992; Hayes, 1997; Shaw & Gould, 2001). These continua 
demonstrate that qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not inherently 
different, but overlap in their practices. Such continua underscore the potential to 
" '-, 
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break down the value-based differences between qualitative and quantitative 
methodology. 
The attitude of the authors who avoid specific characterisations is in keeping 
with the approach of this thesis. While it is tempting to form a scientific realist 
characterisation of qualitative research, this view would inevitably seem to be 
positioned against most alternative characterisations. Arguing about the actual 
and ideal nature of qualitative research offers only a limited way to understand 
qualitative inquiry. It would seem more productive to explore the considerable 
overlap between realist and antirealist conceptions and uses of qualitative 
inquiry. 
2.2.3 Qualitative realist characterisations of qualitative research 
Qualitative realist characterisations of qualitative research are relatively 
uncommon. ,This is partly due to the general avoidance of definitions by 
qualitative realists but is more fully explained by the failure of realist researchers 
to specify their metatheory, as well as the dominance of antirealism in qualitative 
research. Variants of qualitative realism can be tentatively grouped to suggest a 
distinct, though broad, school of realist qualitative inquiry, although this group 
contains metatheoretically diverse views, and constitutes a small minority 
compared to the anti realist school8 . It has been suggested there are three 
distinct realist approaches to qualitative research: na'ive realism, scientific 
realism, and critical realism (Bunge, 1993; Madill et aI., 2000). However, it is 
difficult to find examples of all these forms of realism in the published qualitative 
literature. An examination of psychological databases revealed no examples of 
na'ive realist or scientific realist qualitative research. The well-known qualitative 
8 An example of the minority status of realism in qualitative research comes from two very recent 
qualitative psychology texts (Smith, 2003b, and Carnic, Rhodes & Yardly, 2003) neither of which 
contains any reference to realism. 
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writers Miles and Huberman (1994) support 'transcendental realism9,. Miles and 
Huberman's (1994) transcendental realism in based on the acceptance of mind 
independence which allows them to study invisible social structures and 
processes as real. These social phenomena can be 'transcended' by the 
construction of theories that allow for a world that is constrained and limited by 
our perceptual abilites. This approach could be said to be analogous to scientific 
realism, although their metatheoretical position encompasses a number of 
influences, including pragmatism, and arguably sits better with critical realism. 
The exact nature of na'ive or scientific realism is difficult to specify in any case, 
because both tend to have many different interpretations. However, there are 
aspects of the characterisation of na'ive and scientific realism by Madill et al 
(2000) that can be questioned. Contrary to Madill et ai's (2000) argument, na'ive 
realism does not usually include a correspondence theory of truth (p. 3). Nor 
does scientific realism assert that "scientific method can tap true representations 
of the world" (Madill et aI., 2000, p. 3), although representations can be 
constructed to approximate the world. Scientific realism holds that scientific 
method is best in a scientific context, not that it is the "best mode of inquiry" (p. 3) 
in an unqualified sense. 
The third form of realism noted by Madill and co-workers is critical realism. 
Forms of critical realist qualitative research are somewhat easier to find (e.g., 
Porter, 1993, 2002; Sayer, 2000), although certainly not common and equally 
diverse in their interpretations of 'critical realism'. Critical realism is often 
presented as a 'softer' form of realism, more akin to social constructionism 
(Watkins, 1994). Critical realism is said to recognise the influence of the social 
context, the views of the researcher, and the potential subjectivity in establishing 
knowledge (Bunge, 1993). However, these influences are not discounted in a 
..,1 9 'Transcendental realism' is a term used by Bhaskar (1979). The way Miles and Huberman 
(1994) employ transcendental realism is best expressed in Manicas and Secord (1983). This 
position is also known as the realist theory of science (Bhaskar, 1975) or fallibilist realism 
(Campbell, see Manicas & Secord, 1983), but can also be characterised as scientific realism. 
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scientific realist approach. There are other identifiable variations on a realist 
theme (e.g., Hammersley's, 1992, 'subtle realism', or Lofland's, 1995, 'analytic 
ethnography'), but commonly qualitative realist research is not explicitly 
acknowledged as such by researchers. Lofland's (1995) analytic ethnography is 
a fascinating attempt to reconcile rigorous ethnographic data collection and 
analysis but not to compromise on the value of open and flexible naturalistic 
enquiry. However, Lofland's acceptance of the ability of analytical process to 
present data and analyses as 'true' suggests he could be considered a na'ive 
realist. 
Given the infrequency of qualitative realist research articles and their variable 
and often erroneous interpretation of realism, it is difficult to form a clear view of 
how realism is represented in qualitative research. Hammersley (1996) argues 
that realism is a common approach in qualitative research but his references do 
not support anything beyond a limited qualitative realist profile. However, there 
are still points of commonality amongst qualitative realists that are highly relevant 
to this thesis. These commonalities are: seeking methodological compatibility 
with quantitative research, maintaining the relevance of validity, an interest in 
pragmatism, and an aversion to postmodern constructionist's efforts to treat 
qualitative research as 'sacred'. These commonalities are discussed in turn. 
Qualitative realists tend not to emphasise the limitations of quantitative research 
as a justification for qualitative approaches. Silverman (2001) discusses the 
limitations and strengths of both quantitative methods and qualitative methods. 
He presents these critiques as a platform for intelligently selecting the 
methodology, or the selection of particular qualitative and quantitative methods 
that are best for the research question at hand (Silverman, 2001, pp. 5-37). 
Hammersley's (1992) 'subtle realist' framework for qualitative inquiry challenges 
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the supposed differences between qualitative and quantitative methodology and 
promotes their similarities. Hammersley comes from a sociological ethnographic 
tradition but his work is easily applicable to psychology. Fig 2.1 presents the 
seven continua he uses to represent, and then deconstruct, the supposed 
differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. 
Figure 2.1 Hammersley's seven component meanings of the qualitative-
quantitative distinction (Adapted from Hammersley,1992; p. 160, 
and Hayes, 1997, pp. 4-6). 
1. Qualitative versus Quantitative data 
2. Investigation of natural versus Artificial settings 
3. Focus on meanings versus Behaviour 
4. Adopt natural science model versus Reject natural science 
model 
6. Inductive approach versus Deductive approach 
6. Focus on description versus Focus on prediCtion 
7. Idealism versus Realism 
When closely examined, each apparently strong distinction is revealed as 
substantially less clear-cut. The contrasts come to represent orienting value 
positions and not inherent methodological differences. For example, qualitative 
research is often seen as excluding numbers, but qualitative study can easily use 
the language of quantification and include numbers. Hammersley argues that 
whether words or numbers are used to represent phenomena is not the real 
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issue. When quantitative researchers criticise qualitative researchers' use of 
words rather than numbers, what is usually at issue is precision. They are 
arguing that ethnographers are insufficiently precise in their claims, and that the 
necessary precision requires quantification (Hammersley, 1992, p. 162). 
However, it is difficult to be precise about 'precision'. The use of quantification 
does not necessarily improve precision, and may in fact decrease it. Whereas a 
simple description can exceed the precision of numbers, an argument that is 
accepted by experimentalists (Morgan, 1996, p. 31), the task for psychological 
researchers is not to choose between using words and numbers or between 
precise or imprecise data, but to consider "a range from more to less precise 
data" (Hammersley, 1992, p. 167). Our decisions about what level of precision is 
appropriate for a given claim should depend on the nature of what we are trying 
to describe, on the likely accuracy of our descriptions, or our purposes, and on 
the resources available to us, and less on an ideological commitment to one 
methodological paradigm (Hammersley, 1992, p. 163). What Hammersley helps 
to demonstrate is that definitions for or against quantitative or qualitative research 
are unhelpful, and potentially misleading, because these definitions inevitably 
represent normative positions. Psychology would be better seNed by a view of 
qualitative inquiry that is not opposed to quantitative methodology, a view that is 
contrary to most of the definitional approaches detailed in this chapter. 
Qualitative realists are often influenced by the pragmatic view that there should 
be a strong union between metatheory and research practice. To ensure the 
union is strong, some qualitative realists argue that the choice of metatheory 
should follow the choice of method (Hammersley, 1996; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Silverman, 2001). Hammersley (1996) expresses this view as follows: 
52 
Selection among these [quantitative and qualitative] methods requires judgment according to 
situation and purpose, rather than judgment based on a commitment to one or another 
competing philosophical view of the world and of the nature of inquiry. (p. 164) 
Qualitative realists maintain that the validity criteria are highly relevant to 
qualitative research (Hammersley, 1992, p. 67; Morse, 1999b; Morse et aI., 2002; 
Silverman, 2001, p. 231). The validity criteria are regarded as key evaluative 
criteria regardless of a researcher's metatheoretical preferences, or whether 
qualitative or quantitative methods are employed (Silverman, 2001, p. 233). The 
alternative evaluative criteria proposed by postmodern constructionists (e.g., 
trustworthiness, Lincoln & Guba, 1985) are generally considered poor substitutes 
by qualitative realists on the grounds that validity and reliability are more powerful 
epistemic criteria. 
Lastly, qualitative realists are critical of what they see as the unhelpful attempts 
of the postmodern constructionists, and followers of the partiCipatory cooperative 
approach, to mystify qualitative research (Hammersley, 1996; Sayer, 2000; 
Silverman, 1997; Snow & Morrill, 1995). They are not alone in this criticism, as 
many constructionists also find that depicting qualitative research as the "sacred" 
epistemology further confuses the role of qualitative inquiry (Flick, 2001; Atkinson 
et aI., 2001). 
2.2.4 The quantitative view of qualitative research from the qualitative 
literature 
Given that quantitative research is just as metatheoretically and methodologically 
diverse as qualitative research, it is difficult to offer any unified quantitative view 
of qualitative research. Identifying a representative quantitative position on 
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qualitative inquiry is doubly challenging because quantitative researchers rarely 
comment on qualitative inquiry in the published literature. There are exceptions 
(e.g., Morgan, 1996) although most exceptions are from the evaluation literature, 
which generally favours a methodological pluralism with respect to qualitative and 
quantitative methods (e.g., Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994a; 
Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). In the qualitative literature, it is qualitative researchers 
who generate the main characterisations of qualitative research as seen from a 
'quantitative' perspective. Qualitative writers depict quantitative researchers as 
arguing that qualitative research is best limited to informal, preliminary 
observations, and interviews with participants (Flick, 2002). For example, 
qualitative research might be used in some form' of pilot study, or for the 
preliminary generation of hypotheses, but qualitative research is not considered a 
scientific route to knowledge by itself (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Most quantitative 
textbooks on psychological research methods would support this view (e.g., 
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Heiman, 1995). More recent textbooks do show a considerably greater 
understanding of the relative roles of qualitative and quantitative methods, but it 
is unusual to find a research methods text that offers equal weighting to 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
In claiming to characterise the views of quantitative researchers on the adequacy 
of qualitative research, qualitative researchers express those views but seldom 
reference them. When qualitative researchers do reference quantitative authors, 
the quantitative author might be focusing solely on quantitative research without 
reference to qualitative research, or the reference is out of date or controversial 
in its own field, or the qualitative author does not actually set out to criticise 
qualitative research. An example of these problems comes from Kvale (1996). 
Kvale references and quotes Calder (1977), Kerlinger, (1979), and Mussen, 
Conger and Kagan (1977) to demonstrate that qualitative interview research is 
commonly thought by quantitative researchers to be "without scientific relevance" 
(p. 67). These quantitative authors all appear to be adherents to the quantitative 
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imperative, and Kerlinger in particular seems strikingly dismissive of the 
individual case. However, an examination of each of these authors' writing 
reveals their comments are highly qualified, arguably not now representative of 
their fields of study, and in the case of Calder (1977), actually positive about 
qualitative research, specifically the use of focus groups, in a range of research 
situations 10. Kerlinger (quoted in Kvale, 1996, pp. 66-67) offers exceptions and 
considerable qualification to his argument, and acknowledges that, "the picture I 
am drawing is a bit extreme" (p. 270)11. Mussen et al (1977) have an agenda to 
promote controlled observation and 'objective' measurement in the area of child 
development and personality. They relate the maturity of a science to the degree 
to which observations can be quantified (1977, p. 13). They do, however, accept 
that the use of interviews and observation can be concluded profitably without 
measurement12. Kvale is the exception in that he references quantitative 
researchers. It is typical for qualitative researchers to support their 
representation of the opinions of quantitative researchers with reference to other 
qualitative researchers who hold the same view (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, 
references Huber, 199513, and Denzin, 1997). 'Not surprisingly, the qualitative 
representation of quantitative researchers' attitudes to qualitative research is 
prone to oversimplification, error, and a determination to present quantitative 
research as an opposing force. There is considerable irony in the fact that 
10 Calder (1977) discusses the role of focus groups in qualitative market research. He raises 
questions about the scientific nature of both qualitative and quantitative research, and concludes 
that multi-method approaches are potentially more scientific than solely qualitative or quantitative 
resea.rch projects. The Calder (1977, p. 355) quote used by Kvale (1996, p. 66) is taken out of 
context, and does not reflect the inclusiveness of Calder's methodological argument. 
11 Kerlinger's goes on to suggest there is considerable overlap between 'hard' and 'soft' sciences 
particularly in their inability to predict behaviour (p. 272). 
12 Recently, qualitative studies in child development have become considerably more common 
although they are still controversial (e.g., Geldenhuys, 2001; Gelfand; 2000; Hodge & Kemp, 
2000; Turnball & Carpendale, 2001). 
13 Huber's (1995) Centennial Essay on 'Institutional perspectives on sociology' does not provide 
clear evidence of the resistance to qualitative studies. The essay presents a range of possible 
factors that could contribute to sociology departments struggling in the academic and fiscal 
climate of 1995. Some of these factors could relate to qualitative research but the possible 
relationships are not made explicit. 
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qualitative researchers do not rigorously represent the Verstehen of quantitative 
researchers but instead offer an etic interpretation that appears to approximate a 
claim of objectivity. It would be more helpful to represent the quantitative 
perspective on qualitative inquiry accurately in order to better establish what 
criticisms and potential benefits it contains. 
This analysis of the qualitative portrayal of the quantitative view of qualitative 
inquiry does not suggest that the quantitative imperative is not a barrier for 
qualitative researchers, but serves to point out that how qualitative writers 
currently seek to undermine the quantitative imperative is ill conceived. This 
thesis acknowledges that quantitative researchers tend to hold negative views of 
the value of qualitative research, but these views need verification and 
documentation from the real experiences and opinions of both quantitative and 
qualitative researchers 14, 
The qualitative portrayal of quantitative opinions takes relatively little note of the 
relevant philosophical literature on ontology, epistemology, and methodology. 
Consequently, qualitative researchers typically misunderstand the relationships 
between positivism, empiricism, postpositivism, antirealism, realism, and 
qualitative and quantitative research. For example, Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 
pp. 7-8) blame positivist and postpositivists alike for the attitude of resistance to 
qualitative research. However, identifying positivism, empiricism, and 
postpositivism as barriers to a greater role for qualitative research is incorrect 
because it represents a substantial oversimplification of the relationships 
between these schools of thought and qualitative research (Michell, 2003a; 
Reichardt & Rallis, 1994b; Shadish, 1995b). However, qualitative researchers 
correctly understand that quantitative researchers and the quantitative institutions 
14 For example, see Hutchinson's (2001) account of the considerable challenges faced in 
developing qualitative nursing research in a predominately quantitative environment. 
. j 
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of psychology are unlikely to be readily receptive to qualitative inquiry. The key 
barrier for quantitative researchers is the apparent inability of qualitative research 
to adhere to the traditional validity criteria (Rabinowitz & Weseen, 1997). 
Qualitative researchers, although not qualitative realists, tend to reject the 
traditional evaluative criteria and the metatheoretical views that underpin them 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative researchers generally understand these 
criteria as features of positivism or empiricism. However, the criteria can also be 
seen as helping to guarantee traditional scientific values by ensuring "methods of 
rigorous, critical, logical analysis" (Michell, 2003b, p. 50). In this sense, the 
traditional validity criteria can be. applied to all metatheory and methodology. 
Both Phillips (2000) and Michell (2003a & b) criticise qualitative research not only 
for its set of poor alternative criteria for justifying knowledge claims (e.g., the 
trustworthiness criteria, Lincoln & Guba, 1985), but also for its unnecessary 
attack on traditional scientific values. The real concern is that some qualitative 
researchers in rejecting positivism and quantitative research are also rejecting 
traditional scientific values when there is no need. 
A fuller understanding of the attitudes of quantitative researchers toward 
qualitative inquiry is required. The following points about quantitative attitudes to 
qualitative research have not been empirically verified, but are offered as 
hypotheses that suggest the situation is more complicated than the current image 
of quantitative psychologists barring the access of qualitative researchers to 
psychological institutions. It is likely that quantitative researchers are not fully 
aware of the research possibilities of qualitative methods. For example, relatively 
few quantitative researchers know that verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984/1993), and grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) are qualitative 
methods that are used in psychology, or that both methods are difficult to 
challenge with respect to reliability and validity. Quantitative researchers could 
be understandably dissuaded from qualitative research because of the 
qualitative-quantitative debate and its associated rancour (Rabinowitz & Weseen, 
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1997). In addition, the complexity of metatheoretical considerations within 
qualitative research does not make qualitative research easily accessible 
(Henwood, 1996), nor are qualitative methods straightforward to learn. Certainly 
some psychological researchers are happy to use both qualitative and 
quantitative methods (e.g., Campbell & Ahrens, 1998). Quantitative researchers 
in psychology are clearly concerned that accepting qualitative research will mean 
their discipline will be seen as less scientific. 
2.3 Conclusions 
There is little agreement amongst qualitative researchers on the characterisation 
of their approach to research. Many different points of view coexist in 
disharmony. This does not prevent the characterisation debate from continuing. 
The discussion of the nature of qualitative research is moving in several 
directions at once. Currently relativist, 'neo-realist', and postmodernist and 
poststructuralist, and even post-postmodernist and post-poststructural 
perspectives, can all be said to be evolving (Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Smith & 
Deemer, 2000). The six different approaches to conceptualising qualitative 
research examined in this chapter support the view that a unifying concept of 
qualitative research is neither possible nor desirable. This situation reflects the 
pluralist and contradictory nature of the qualitative field. The conflict over the 
identity of qualitative inquiry stems from the fundamentally different assumptions 
held about science, reality, and the human capacity for objectivity or subjectivity 
in qualitative research. However, qualitative research can be critically accepted 
as a disharmonious family concept, albeit with an acknowledgment of the 
diversity of activities and philosophies undertaken under the qualitative banner, 
and recognition of the many contradictions and debates inspired by qualitative 
inquiry. Moreover, an explicit and unifying conception of qualitative research is 
not necessary to enable its evaluation and promotion by scientific realism. 
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What emerges as important is moving beyond the qualitative-quantitative debate 
to conceive of qualitative and quantitative methodologies as allies, not 
opponents. This need is particularly relevant to psychology. The potential role of 
qualitative methodology in psychology is broadened if it is regarded as being 
generally complementary to quantitative methodology, and there is considerable 
evidence to support the view qualitative and quantitative methodologies share 
blurred borders. The qualitative-quantitative debate would appear to be driven by 
misconceptions and a lack of awareness of the virtues of qualitative research and 
quantitative research and their associated metatheories. In particular, qualitative 
antirealists and quantitative psychologists harbour prejudices about the value of 
each other's methodologies and metatheoretical positions. Qualitative 
postmodern constructionists tend to be prejudiced against positivism, empiricism, 
postpositivism, and realism, particularly given their reluctance to consider the 
virtues of quantitative approaches. Such prejudices do not appear to be based 
on an accurate understanding of these metatheories, although the considerable 
frustrations of dealing with a quantitatively-centred discipline like psychology are 
recognised. Moreover, the emotional polemic surrounding qualitative research 
does not encourage quantitative researchers to explore qualitative approaches 
(Sells, Smith & Sprenkle, 1995). 
There is a need to examine the qualitative-quantitative debate directly in order to 
confirm the belief that there is an overlap between qualitative and quantitative 
methods, methodology, and metatheory. This overlap supports the argument 
that qualitative research has a broader role in psychology, and that it can operate 
within a scientific realist metatheory in conjunction with quantitative approaches. 
The qualitative-quantitative debate is discussed in detail in chapter four. Chapter 
three presents a brief history of the relationship between qualitative research and 
psychology. This chapter is concerned with understanding how some qualitative 
writers have formed their maladaptive approaches to the methodological 
debates, and investigates how quantitative resistance to qualitative research has 
developed in psychology. 
I 
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Chapter Three 
A Brief History of the Relationship between Qualitative 
Research and Psychology 
Psychology is not such an easy science, nor yet such a successful one, that it is sensible to 
dismiss proposed methodological innovations. If resistance to proposed innovations is 
encountered, the way forward lies in looking for its historical and conceptual sources. 
(Michell, 2003a, p. 6) 
3.1 Overview 
Qualitative inquiry and psychological science have a long but unsustained 
relationship (Henwood, 1996). From the late 19th century, multiple intellectual 
and research traditions have evolved giving rise to distinct qualitative schools of 
thought. These traditions have interacted with developments in psychological 
science, resulting in the diminishment of qualitative practice within psychology 
from the 1920s to the 1980s (Ashworth, 2003; Hayes, 1997). It was not until the 
period from the 1960s to the early 1970s that qualitative methodology was 
reconsidered in psychological writing (Allport, 1962/1981; Bannister & Mair, 1968; 
Harre & Secord, 1972). From the late 1980s, the relationship between 
psychology and qualitative research has been actively rekindled, with the rapid 
growth of qualitative research in psychology. Qualitative writers refer to the 
'explosion' in the use of qualitative methods in Anglo-American psychology (e.g., 
Elliot et aI., 1999; Smith, Harre & Van Langenhove, 1995), particularly in Britain. 
However, the relationship between qualitative. research and psychological 
science is far from fulfilled. Although growing in use, qualitative research still 
occupies a marginal and specialist role within psychology. Chapter two 
discussed how qualitative researchers tend to characterise and promote their 
methodology to overcome this restricted role, but with limited success, in 
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psychology. To shed light on the reasons for the restricted role, and to explore 
how the 'quantitative imperative,15 might be dealt with by qualitative researchers, 
the history of the relationship between qualitative research and psychology is 
examined. 
Historical analysis reveals three findings that need further examination if 
qualitative research is to have a broader role in psychology. First, qualitative 
research has lacked, and still lacks, a metatheoretical basis that is broadly 
acceptable to qualitative practitioners and psychological researchers. Second, 
metatheoretical and methodological gaps between qualitative and quantitative 
research are not as large as is normally supposed. These gaps have already 
been bridged by specific qualitative methods that meet the traditional criteria of 
research evaluation (e.g., grounded theory, Glaser & Strauss, 1967; verbal 
protocol analysis, Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In the qualitative literature these 
gaps are perpetuated by caricatures of positivist, postpositivist, and realist 
metatheory (Michell, 2003a), which do not take into account the alternative, 
highly developed views of forms of postpositivism such as scientific realism. 
Third, the greater employment of qualitative methodology is unlikely to be 
achieved by attacking psychology's quantitative culture and promoting qualitative 
methodology as an alternative. The 'quantitative imperative' can be better dealt 
with by demonstrating that non-quantitative data can be scientific (Michell, 
2003b) through the application of qualitative methods that meet the relevant 
evaluative criteria of validity and reliability. 
3.2 The origins of qualitative research in psychology 
At the level of data collection, qualitative research methods have always been 
used in psychology as a preliminary or adjunct to quantitative methods (Flick, 
15 Michell defines the concept of the 'quantitative imperative' as, "the view that studying 
something scientifically means measuring it. Measurement is thought to be a necessary part of 
science and non-quantitative methods are thought to be pre-scientific" (Michell, 2003a, p. 6). 
Michell (2003a) argues that the need for measurement in psychology stems from 
Pythagorean ism, not positivism, as is commonly believed in the qualitative literature. Michell's 
argument regarding the influence of Pythagorean ism is described in gretare details in pages 64-
65. 
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2001). However, the published psychological literature of the late 19th century, 
up to and including the 1920s, shows qualitative methodology, while still creating 
much debate and controversy, was used with the same lack of inhibition as 
quantitative methodology (Hayes, 1997). The practices of the early 
'experimentalists', Fechner, and later Wundt and Bretano, focused on experience 
through self-report (Ashworth, 2003), although Fechner fervently favoured 
quantitative over qualitative practice (Fechner, 1987). Other 'Introspectionists' 
such as Wundt understood qualitative methods to be as scientifically credible as 
quantitative methods (Farr, 1996, Van Langenhove, 1995). James (1890,1902), 
although generally highly critical of the Introspectionists, was not opposed to 
qualitative methodology, arguing that qualitative research aimed to understand 
"the varieties of the humna mind in living action" (1901/1994, p. 114; Rogers, 
2000) 
The methodological and metatheoretical debates that foreshadow the recent re-
emergence of qualitative research in psychology can in part be traced back to the 
late 19th century (Smith, 1989), although there is no clear continuity from the 
writing of Dilthey (1894/1977) and other participants in the Methodenstreit16 to 
the modern qualitative-quantitative debate (Hammersley, 1989; 1996, p.164). 
Dilthey (1894/1977) made the influential distinction between natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). He, and 
many prominent German social thinkers of the late 19th century, argued that the 
natural and human sciences are methodologically distinct. 
Geisteswissenschaften emphasises the need for Verstehen (or 'understanding', 
which in a research context generally refers to the subjective understanding of 
the world by research participants 17). Verstehen, Dilthey argued, should be the 
16 In Dilthey's time, the methodological debate was known as 'Methodenstreit' or argument over 
method. 
17 Verstehen originally and literally means seeking "understanding" in the context of the methods 
of Geisteswissenschaften, and in particular through the use of Nacherleben (where the 
researcher uses his or her imagination to reconstruct the experience of research participants to 
understand the actions of those participants). However, its application and the senses of its use 
have become considerably more complex. For example, Habermas (1971) and Geertz (1983) 
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primary focus of methodology in the human sciences. With Verstehen, human 
behaviour was assumed to be intelligent, creative, and responsive to the 
research process (what could be called 'reflexive' in modern terms), and situated 
in a social context that is too dynamic for the methodological approach of the 
natural sciences (Flick, 2002). Qualitative methods were employed because they 
are flexible enough to allow for the flow of Verstehen. Human behaviour was not 
to be bound by the need to make causal explanations as favoured in the 
quantitatively oriented Naturwissenschaften (Dilthey, 1894/1977; Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 1994). Current qualitative writers often cite the distinction between 
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften as a justification for a separate 
qualitative paradigm (e.g., Rennie, 1995; Smith, 1989). For example, Rennie 
(1995) argues that qualitative research is better suited to the human sciences 
because the qualitative approach allows the researcher to better express their 
"own rhetoric" (p. 325), that is to say, research in the human sciences is a 
personal experience for a researcher best captured by a qualitative approach. 
The notion of Verstehen is frequently promoted as central to modern 
psychological qualitative practice (e.g., Bryman, 1988; Flick, 2002), because it is 
believed to faciliate the expression of the research participants' and the 
researchers' beliefs and reasons for acting as they do. Verstehen is an important 
concept but it does not have to be central to qualitative research in psychology, 
nor is it absent from quantitative research. 
Following the Methodenstreit and Introspectionists, the open practice of 
qualitative research did not change greatly in psychology until the rise of 
Watsonian behaviourism (Ashworth, 2003; Watson, 1913). Behaviourism's 
inherent reductionism and experimentalism, in its initial and later forms, came to 
dominate psychology and was a powerful deterrent to qualitative inquiry (Hayes, 
use Verstehen in different ways to Dilthey, including the absence of any specifc form of 
Nacherleben In qualitative research, 'Verstehen' is a term that now requires a specific 
explanation of how it is being used because it is applied in both very general and specificways. 
For example, Verstehen is commonly used in the sense that research participants can express 
themselves in the way the participants feel will best express their thoughts and feelings. 
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1995; Smith, 1996). The so-called 'cognitive revolution' of the 1960s continued 
to emphasize an idealized model of experimentation in psychology, which acted 
as a deterrent to qualitative practice (Ashworth, 2000). In spite of the extended 
malaise of qualitative research in mainstream psychology from the 1920s 
onwards, there are many examples of the use of what can be construed as 
qualitative methods. Examples include, Freud's (1920) application of 
psychoanalysis; Kelly's role construct repertory grid18 (Bannister & Fransella, 
1971; Kelly, 1955; Smith, 1995); ethogenics (Harre, 1992; Harre & Secord, 
1972); content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980); Ericsson and Simon's verbal 
protocol analYSis (1984), Miles and Huberman's data display model (1984,1994), 
the case study method (Bromley, 1986), grounded theory (Rennie et aI., 1988; 
Haig, 1996; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1995), and more recently, Thagard's (1992) 
theory of explanatory coherence (or TEe). Several notable psychological 
researchers have also argued for a role for qualitative research in psychology. 
Lewin, Erikson, Piaget, and Sherif all supported and used qualitative 
methodology in psychology (Rogers, 2000). For example, Kurt Lewin (1948) 
used qualitative methods in his stUdies of group processes. Allport (1962/1981) 
adjudged that personalities could not be researched by statistics alone. 
However, the prevailing attachment of psychologists to the quantitative 
imperative had al ready become deeply influential in psychological institutions 
(Michell, 1990). In this quantitatively oriented context, qualitative research was 
used as long as it did not violate the traditional criteria of research evaluation, 
which left it with its well-documented preliminary or adjunctive role. 
3.3 The re-emergence of qualitative research in psychology 
The process that led to qualitative research's re-emergence within mainstream 
psychology did not begin until Kuhn's publication (1962/1970) of "The Structure 
18 The repertory grid is included in this list even though it generally produces quantitative data. 
With Smith's 1995 adaptations, it can be phenomenological, idiographic, reflexive, and non-
experimental. The example offered by Smith illustrates an interesting blend of quantitative and 
qualitative practice. Harre (1997) also believes that repertory grids can easily be adapted to 
function as a qualitative method. However, questions about the reliability and validity of the 
repertory grid approach remain, and were recognised by Kelly (1955) when he set out this 
approach. 
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of Scientific Revolutions". Kuhn's work created an intellectual platform that 
allowed movement away from positivism, empiricism, the general belief in 
science, and the quantitative imperative, towards the use of qualitative 
methodology and the promotion of a qualitative imperative (amongst many other 
influences). Although Kuhn's work created great interest amongst psychologists, 
it did little to advance qualitative practice in psychology relative to the 
advancement of qualitative research in other social sciences. However, 
positivism and empiricism became, and still are, metatheoretical ogres to many 
qualitative writers. 
Before continuing with the history of the relationship between qualitative research 
and psychological science, qualitative researchers' misperception of positivism 
and postpositivism needs to be examined. Qualitative writers incorrectly see 
positivism and postpositivism underpinning the quantitative imperative in 
psychology (Michell, 2003a; Phillips, 1990; Shadish, 1995b) 19. Michell (2003a) 
argues that this misrepresents positivism and postpositivism as anti-qualitative 
and that it is in fact the ancient and continuous Pythagorean tradition that created 
and sustains the quantitative imperative. Specifically, the quantitative imperative 
originates with the pre-Socractic Pythagoreans (Huffman, 1999), who argued that 
"all attributes are fundamentally quantitative" (Michell, 2003, p. 7). Michell argues 
that this Pythagorean idea deeply influences western thought, and strongly 
influences psychology today. The development of the quantitative imperative can 
be understood as a minority movement until the seventeenth century. However, 
following Newton, quantitification moved from one of a number of approaches to 
a dominant position in the sciences and the scientists' view of reality. Michell 
quotes Baron Kelvin as the paragon of nineteenth century concern with 
quantitification 
19 Smith (1983) is the exception. He clearly distinguishes between positivism and realism, and 
understands logical positivism as a form of antirealism. Even though widely referenced in the 
qualitative literature, Smith's distinction between positivism and realism does not appear 
influential. However, Smith (1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986) still argues for the incompatibility of 
qualitative and quantitative research. 
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I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in 
numbers you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind. (Thomson, 
1891, pp. 80-81) 
All of which occurred before the advent of positivism. This is not to say positivism 
cannot be logically related to the quantitative imperative, but that the quantitative 
imperative originates from Pythagoreanism not positivism. In psychology, the 
quantitative imperative has become conflated with positivism and postpositivism, 
although neither positivism nor postpositivism excludes qualitative research. 
Michell's (2003a) study of the work of a leading positivist, Rudolph Carnap, on 
the measurement of science shows that while Carnap was strongly in favour of 
quantification, he was also tolerant of alternatives. Carnap (1956) expresses his 
position as follows: 
Let us grant those who work in any specialist field of investigation the freedom to use any 
form of expression which seems useful to them; the work in the field will sooner or later lead 
to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function. Let us be cautious in making 
assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms. (p. 221, 
emphasis in the original) 
There appears to be no anti-qualitative view offered by positivists. While there 
have been many positivists who have strongly supported the quantitative 
imperative, positivism does not provide the outright support for the quantitative 
imperative qualitative writers normally accord it (Michell, 2003a). 
Very few quantitative researchers now adhere to a positivist metatheory, and in 
the literature of the philosophy of science, logical positivism has been 
unfashionable since the late 1940s (Phillips, 1990). What, then, are qualitative 
researchers objecting to, if it is not really positivism? Michell (2003a) suggests 
qualitative writers are opposing na'ive realism (pp. 16-17). This assessment is 
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certainly accurate in the case Michell uses to illustrate his point - Guba & 
Lincoln's (1994) portrayal of positivism. Outside the writing of prominent 
postmodern constructionists20 (Le., Denzin, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; 
Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000), there is little 
further detail to the qualitative critique of 'positivism', but these writings 
consistently present na'ive realism as positivism21 • For example, Guba (1990) 
argues that "positivism is rooted in a realist ontology, that is the belief that there 
exists areality out there, drive by immutable natural laws" (p. 19; emphasis in the 
original). Michell shows that not only is naIve realism not anti-qualitative, but it 
can be shaped as a potentially useful foundation for qualitative research in 
psychology (Michell, 2003a). What this discussion also highlights is the influence 
of the postmodern constructionists on the qualitative view of quantitative 
research. The postmodern constructionists are only one group within the 
extremely broad constructionist school of thought. They often represent what is 
least appealing about constructionism, including support for relativism and a 
tendency to focus on political or moral processes in lieu of ways of obtaining a 
warrant for justifying knowledge claims (Phillips, 2000). For example, Lather's 
(1993) assertion that validity is a historically driven rhetorical construct and as 
such impossible to adhere to. Michell (2003b) suggests that to promote 
qualitative research in psychology, qualitative writers are better advised to try to 
demonstrate that non-quantitative data can be scientific, rather than attacking a 
false metatheoretical opposition and critiquing traditional scientific values such as 
rigour and logical analysis (p. 50). A rejection of traditional scientific values 
diminishes both quantitative and qualitative inquiry, and does not serve to 
effectively promote qualitative research over quantitative research. There is 
much evidence to support the view that non-quantitative data can be scientific, 
not least the data produced by the qualitative methods of grounded theory, verbal 
protocol analysis, and the theory of explanatory coherence. 
20 Also called 'radical social constructionists'. 
21 In the same manner, Lincoln and Guba (2000) equate postpositivism directly with critical 
realism (p. 168). 
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From the time of Kuhn, many metatheoretical positions have become available to 
qualitative researchers in psychology. However, before Kuhn, these researchers 
had no broadly acceptable metatheory to underpin their work, except what was 
perceived as a restrictive form of positivism. Qualitative psychologists now have 
an extensive array of metatheoretical positions, including: numerous variations of 
constructionism, several metatheories based on phenomenology, variants of 
realism, symbolic interactionism, and interpretivism. However, none of these 
metatheories appears able to generally satisfy both the scientific perspectives of 
mainstream psychological researchers and qualitative oriented psychologists. 
Although all the metatheories warrant further consideration, it is scientific realism 
that this thesis advances as the metatheory that can potentially best satisfy both 
camps. 
Returning to the history of qualitative research in psychological science, the 
recent expansion of interest in qualitative methodology has occurred later, and 
more slowly, in Anglo-American psychology than in other social sciences. This is 
largely due to psychology's stronger emphasis on the use of quantitative 
methodology and its closer identification with the natural sciences. Qualitative 
research in British psychology has grown faster than in North American 
psychology (Rennie, 1999), although several British-based qualitative psychology 
texts have a strong North American influence (e.g., Smith, 2003b). While the 
1960s marked the beginning of the greater employment of qualitative research in 
most social SCiences, it was not until the late 1980s to early 1990s that a minority 
of psychologists started to emphasise the use of qualitative methods in 
psychology (including in chronological order, Antaki, 1988; Rennie et aI., 1988; 
Tesch, 1990; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; Burman & Parker, 1993; and, Banister 
et aI., 1994). Earlier attempts were made by some psychological researchers to 
promote qualitative research practice in Britain (e.g., Bannister & Mair, 1968; 
Harre & Secord, 1972), but they had little impact. Richardson (1996) attributes 
the failure of these early attempts to achieve a larger role for qualitative research 
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to the manner of their approach, whereby, they attacked the quantitative tradition 
and its metatheoretical position. The use of a negative approach to promote 
qualitative research in psychology, was, and is, a limited strategy, yet strong 
criticism of positivism, empiricism, and the quantitatively oriented institutions of 
psychology are not hard to find (e.g., Burman, 1997; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Strean, 1998). 
The relationship between qualitative inquiry and psychological science is now 
growing stronger, although only in parts of. psychology. Psychological 
researchers are developing and utilizing an impressive range of qualitative 
approaches, including grounded theory (Rennie et aI., 1988; Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 1995; Rennie, 1998, 2000 Charmaz, 2000, 2003), phenomenological 
analysis (Smith, 1991; Smith & Osborn, 2003), ethnography (Weiss, Marvin & 
Pianta, 1997), case studies (Bromley, 1986), critical emancipatory research (De 
Boer, 1983), the application of hermeneutics (Packer, 1985; Rennie, 1999), 
discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1995; Willig, 2003), focus groups 
(Wilkinson, 1998, 2003), narrative analysis (Gergen & Gergen, 1984; Murray, 
1997; Flick, 2002), ecological psychology (Jacob, 1987), participatory-
cooperative inquiry (Reason & Heron, 1995), verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984, 1993; Green, 1995), conversation analysis (Drew, 2003), and the 
theory of explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992). This is not an exhaustive list. 
For example, there are several more applied qualitative approaches that derive 
from the existential-phenomenological tradition within psychology (see Tesch, 
1990). 
Qualitative research has become most popular in those areas of psychology 
where social issues and professional practice explicitly connect with 
psychological theory (Henwood, 1996). This connection is evident in community 
psychology (Stewart, 2000), health psychology (Lyons, 1999), and clinical and 
counselling psychology, in particular psychotherapy (Elliot, 1995; Rennie 1992). 
For example, Elliot (1995) gives a very useful illustration of where qualitative and 
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quantitative methods can apply to different stages of researching psychotherapy. 
Qualitative inquiry has also found expression in applied social psychology 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Snow, 1999). In postmodern social psychology, 
qualitative methodology has been presented as the best way to explore political 
and moral issues (Weisenfeld, 2000). Weisenfeld (2000) reviews a wide range of 
theoretical works and empirical studies into qualitative research to support her 
case that qualitative research provides a sensitivity to moral and political issues 
that quantitative research cannot match. Postmodern social psychology includes 
further manifestations of qualitative practice including critical social psychology 
(Parker, 1997), and liberation or emancipatory social psychology (Sampson, 
1993; Teo, 1998). Further evidence of qualitative inquiry's infiltration into specific 
areas of psychological research is the strong links between qualitative research 
and sports psychology (e.g., Culver, Gilbert & Trudel, 2003; Sparkes, 2002; 
Stelter, Sparkes & Hunger, 2003). Sparkes et al (2003) argue that the 
multidimensionality of sports psychology requires the flexible, adaptable research 
method that qualitative methodology offers. There are now a variety of textbooks 
which focus on psychology and qualitative research (e.g., in chronological order, 
Banister et aI., 1994; Richardson, 1996; Hayes, 1997; Kopala & Suzuki, 1999; 
Willig, 2001; Flick, 2002; Smith, 2003b; Camic et aI., 2003), at least fourteen 
academic journals dedicated to qualitative research, specific university positions 
for psychological qualitative researchers, and a journal solely for qualitative 
research in psychology that began publication in 200422. 
However, although the adoption of qualitative methodology in psychology is 
growing, it still occupies a marginal and specialist role. Several analyses show 
that qualitatively-oriented articles are uncommon in mainstream psychology 
journals (Kidd, 2002; Krahn, Hohn & Kime, 1995; Morrow & Smith, 2000; Munley 
et aI., 2002; Rennie et aI., 2002). Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the quantity of published qualitative research, but this has occurred 
22 Qualitative Research in Psychology, edited by David Giles, Brendan Gough, and Martin 
Packer, and published by Arnold. 
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mainly in specialist qualitative journals. As Kidd (2002) has shown, there is a 
lack of clarity in the position of the APA and mainstream psychological journals 
about the publication of qualitative research. Journal editors are unsure about 
the criteria they should apply to qualitative submissions, and qualitative 
researchers experience frustration in getting their work recognised and published 
in those journals. The criteria set out by the APA manual does little to encourage 
qualitative inquiry, because it emphasises experimental evidence, mathematics, 
and the avoidance of metaphors and other expressive language (APA, 2001; 
Rogers, 2000, p. 77)23. There is, however, a considerable qualitative literature in 
psychology outside mainstream journals in the form of books, books chapter, and 
instructional texts. The considerable size of this literature appears to be a result 
of the lack of access to mainstream journals (Rennie et aL, 2002). Some 
quantitative textbooks now include more substantial, and less sceptical, chapters 
on qualitative research (e.g., Kazdin, 1998). This is an important development 
because one of the main barriers to the greater use of qualitative research in 
psychology is the lack of awareness by quantitative researchers of qualitative 
methods. 
The teaching of qualitative research in undergraduate or graduate psychology 
classes is uncommon (Camic et aL, 2003; Rennie et aL, 2000; Smith, 1996; 
Stoppard, 2002), although the teaching of qualitative research shows a small 
increase since 1985 (Keeley, Shemberg & Zaynor, 1988; Kopala et aI., 1997). 
Psychology has a much deeper interest in the teaching of methodology than the 
natural sciences, but tends to focus heavily on quantitative approaches (Meehl, 
1978; Perlman & McCann, 1999; Proctor & Capaldi, 2001). Psychology is overtly 
self-conscious about the nature of its methods (Sechrest &. Sidani, 1995) and 
very concerned that the methods it uses be seen as scientific (Michell, 2003b). 
The resistance to the teaching of qualitative research is not a barrier to some. 
23 A recent positive development is the new text, "Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding 
perspectives in methodology and design" by Carnic et al (2003), which was published by the 
APA. That the APA are the publishers of this book is, as the authors note, "one of the most 
striking features of this volume" (p. xiii). 
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Stoppard (2002) documents how she overcame the obstacles to providing a 
graduate course on qualitative methods in a quantitatively oriented psychology 
department. Several qualitative writers note that what training there is in 
qualitative methodology is not of an acceptable standard (e.g., Elliot et aI., 1999; 
Krahn et aI., 1995). 
The main barrier to preventing the widespread incorporation of qualitative 
methods into mainstream psychology is the view that qualitative methodology 
does not seem to represent good science. Most psychological researchers 
appear reluctant to adopt qualitative methodology until proponents of qualitative 
research can demonstrate the existence of evaluative methods that are valid and 
based on a sCientifically credible metatheory. It is reasonable that qualitative 
research be placed under such scrutiny, and that qualitative research is 
evaluated on more than the authority of the researcher (Madill et aI., 2000, p. 2). 
The 'traditional' validity criteria of evaluating knowledge claims do not apply well 
to most qualitative methods (although qualitative methods underpinned by realist 
metatheory are an exception). Manicas (1987), amongst others, has questioned 
whether reliable and objective research is achievable in the social sciences. 
Qualitative researchers working in psychology have expressed the concern that 
the traditional criteria of research evaluation are too restrictive and enforce too 
narrow a view of science by not providing a role for the flexible and subjective 
processes qualitative research can allow for when seeking a better 
understanding of complex human behaviour (e.g., Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; 
Rennie et aI., 1988; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). However, as Banister et al (1994) 
insist, 
Quantitative research preoccupations [e.g. criteria of research evaluation] do need to be 
taken seriously, and if qualitative research needs to refuse questions that are habitually 
posed in the mainstream it must at least explain why it does not address those questions. (p. 
14) 
72 
3.4 Social constructionism and scientific realism as bases for qualitative 
research in psychology 
While qualitative research has historically lacked a clearly articulated 
metatheoretical basis for its wider application in psychology, this is no longer the 
case. There are now many metatheoretical options available to psychologists 
who wish to employ qualitative methodology, although none of these 
metatheories appear broadly acceptable to both mainstream psychology and 
qualitative practitioners. This thesis will explore two metatheoretical options for 
qualitative research in psychology: social constructionism (discussed in detail 
chapter six), and scientific realism (specifically examined in chapter seven). 
Constructionism is an expansive metatheoretical school comprising many 
different versions, of which a large number have been applied in qualitative 
research. Social constructionism is probably the most common metatheoretical 
position of qualitative psychologists (Gergen, 1985). Such is the confidence of 
social constructionists in qualitative research, that they often automatically 
assume their metatheory best fits qualitative practice and vice versa (e.g., 
Henwood & Nicholson, 1995). Gergen (2001 a) claims that postmodernism is the 
progenitor of social constructionism and that the, "unparalleled flourishing of 
[qualitative] methodology" in the social sciences is due to "postmodern dialogues" 
(p. 810). While the social constructionist view of qualitative methodology has 
been considerably more prominent than the realist views in recent years, 
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postmodernism appears to have no greater influence on mainstream psychology 
than it did a decade ago. Indeed, postmodernism may have reached its "high-
water mark" (Porter, 2002, p. 59; Atkinson et aI., 2001). Psychological 
researchers and other social scientists advocating a postmodernist view do tend 
to overstate the influence of this thinking on qualitative researchers within and 
without psychology (Snow & Morrill, 1995). Rennie et al (2002) are more 
accurate in suggesting that, "a path has been cleared for ... [qualitative research] 
in part by the postmodern critique of the modern quest for objective knowledge" 
(p. 179, emphasis added). The strength of the social constructionist position, 
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with some of its proponents' caricaturising of positivism, empiricism, and 
post positivism , obscures both the usefulness, and range (Madill et aI., 2000), of 
alternative metatheoretical approaches to qualitative research, particularly 
realism. The advocacy of postmodernism also tends to move the focus away 
from considering which methods are best for a specific research question, to 
asking whether a qualitative or quantitative methodology should be applied 
(Silverman, 1997; Schwandt, 2000). The promotion of qualitative methodology in 
this manner tends to obscure the benefits and developments in quantitative 
methods (e.g., structural equation modelling, confirmatory and explanatory factor 
analysis, and regression discontinuity designs). 
Although realism is not popular in qualitative research, it is sometimes cited as an 
important metatheoretical approach to qualitative research in psychology 
(Hammersley, 1996; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Madill et aI., 2000), although its 
frequency of use is difficult to ascertain. Realism, like constructionism, has many 
variations. Some authors have distinguished between naIve, SCientific, and 
critical realism (e.g., Bunge, 1993), but the qualitative literature often fails to 
distinguish between realism, positivism, empiricism, and postpositivism. Variants 
of realism must be distinguished from other variants of positivism and elements 
of empiricism in order to overcome misleading accounts of what they can offer 
qualitative research. 
The debate over which metatheoretical positions are most appropriate for 
qualitative research in psychology is a major focus of this thesis. This debate will 
be encountered regularly but it is examined in detail in chapters six and seven. 
Although there are aspects of social constructionism that are appealing, a form of 
scientific realism will be presented as the metatheory that best supports and 
potentially broadens the role of qualitative research in mainstream psychological 
science. 
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3.5 Conciusions 
Psychologists have viewed the recent return of qualitative research to psychology 
with due caution (Haig, 2002a). Generally, psychologists remain to be convinced 
that qualitative methodology can be broadly employed within an acceptable 
metatheoretical position that includes the acceptable criteria for justifying 
knowledge claims. As Henwood (1996) notes, "Much stands to be gained by 
questioning this apparent exclusion of qualitative research from 
psychology ... and, indeed, the apparent exclusion of psychology from qualitative 
research" (p. 25). 
The brief history of the relationship of qualitative research an psychological 
science discussed in this chapter underlines the need for a metatheory for 
qualitative methodology that is appropriate to psychology. However, is it better 
qualitative research accommodates psychological sCience, or that psychology 
joins the considerable list of other social sciences that accommodate qualitative 
inquiry? One aim of this thesis is to provide psychological researchers with a 
justification for using an expanded repertoire of qualitative methods, while also 
ensuring those methods are scientifically acceptable. The onus appears to fall 
more heavily on qualitative research to demonstrate its scientific credentials than 
on psychology to broaden its view of science, although both are to be 
encouraged as positive developments. 
One possible indicator that qualitative researchers and psychologists are not so 
far apart in their views of science is that the current gap between the largely 
realist metatheory of mainstream psychology and the typically social 
constructionist metatheory of qualitative research is encouraged by the incorrect 
assumptions about the nature of their approaches to research on both sides 
(Michell, 2003b)24. This is particularly evident in the belief that positivism, 
empiriCism, and realism only support quantitative, not qualitative, research. More 
practically, the methodological gap between qualitative and quantitative research 
24 Chapters 5, 6 ,and 7 detail the incorrect assumptions in specific detail. 
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has already been bridged by at least three qualitative methods (Le., grounded 
theory, verbal protocol analysis, and the theory of explanatory coherence), all of 
which overcome the assumed inability of qualitative approaches to address the 
validity criteria for evaluating the scientific worth of knowledge. 
What also prevents a fuller and broader relationship between psychology and 
qualitative research is the seeming lack of a metatheory that allows the use of 
either quantitative or qualitative methodology, or a metatheory that allows a 
carefully considered mix of both, but still adheres to the validity criteria for 
justifying knowledge claims. In examining two metatheoretical competitors, 
social constructionism and scientific realism, a specific form of scientific realism 
is presented as the more appropriate position from which psychological 
researchers might employ qualitative methods, and combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods that meet the validity criteria for knowledge evaluation. 
It is equally important to conceptualise qualitative methodology as not being 
implicitly or explicitly opposed to quantitative methodology and its metatheoretical 
positions. The view that qualitative methodology is a better alternative than 
quantitative methodology is unproductive, because it obscures the relative 
strengths of each methodology. Adopting qualitative methods does not 
automatically solve the problems faced by quantitative methods, and it risks 
overlooking positive metatheoretical and methodological developments made by 
quantitative researchers in psychology. The debate over the relative merits, and 
metatheoretical compatibility, of qualitative and quantitative methodology is 
complex and operates on many levels. It is a debate this thesis will need to 
resolve in part if a broader role for qualitative methodology in psychology is to be 
advanced. The qualitative-quantitative debate is discussed in the next chapter. 
The question of how to address the quantitative imperative is examined in 
chapter five, where the focus will be not on attacking the quantitative imperative, 
but showing non-quantitative data can be scientific (Michell, 2003b). 
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Chapter Four 
The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate 
A systematic engagement with this quantitative-qualitative debate does indeed make a 
difference at several related levels. At a general level this issue brings to the forefront the 
epistemological question of what is to count as knowledge. If researchers do not discuss this 
question, they are forfeiting any participation in determining the basis for the authority of their 
knowledge. The point here is that practicing researchers should have as much, if not more, 
to say about this issue as anybody, including philosophers. (Smith, 1983, p. 12) 
4.1 Overview 
The qualitative-quantitative debate (00D)25 is the continuing controversy over 
the relative merits and metatheoretical compatibility of qualitative and quantitative 
inquiry. One view is that these two approaches to research are distinct and 
based on incommensurate metatheories. This chapter will argue for the 
alternative view that there is a significant methodological and metatheoretical 
overlap between qualitative and quantitative research. The existence of a 
substantial overlap supports the position that qualitative and quantitative 
research can be used within the same metatheory, and as complementary 
approaches, in certain research situations. It would help psychologists gain 
access to the benefits of qualitative research if qualitative and quantitative inquiry 
can be shown to be potentially compatible within a scientifically acceptable 
metatheory. However, although the OQD revolves around philosophical or 
methodological arguments, the debate is often prejudiced (Michell, 2003b) and 
driven by rhetoric (Firestone, 1987) (as chapters two and three showed). For 
25 The controversy over the comparative roles and benefits of qualitative and quantitative 
methodology has a number of titles. It is variously known as the 'methodological paradigms 
debate' (Patton, 1988), the 'paradigm wars' (Gage, 1989), the 'quantity-quality debate' (Bryman, 
1988), or the quantitative-qualitative divide (Hammersley, 1996). The 'qualitative-quantitative 
debate' is used in this thesis, because it is probably the most common. 
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example, Lincoln and Guba (2000), in advocating for qualitative research, predict 
"that, if not in our lifetimes, at some later time the dualist idea of an objective 
reality suborned by limited human subjective realities will seem as quaint as flat-
earth theories do to us today". (p. 178) This chapter argues that the way the 
qualitative-quantitative distinction is drawn is often a misleading representation of 
the diverse range of methods and metatheory available to psychological 
researchers (Hammersley, 1996; Oakley, 2000; Shadish, 1995a & b), and a more 
complementary conception their relationship needs to be explored. 
The QQD literature is enormous and is sustained by a wide variety of factors: 
from philosophical and methodological misconceptions and confusions (for 
example, the confusion over what is positivism and what is realism), opposing 
metatheoretical orientations that exaggerate the differences between quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Bavelas, 1995), political and moral agendas (Heap, 
1995; for example, that quantification suppresses the ability of research 
participants to express themselves in the way they would experience as most 
empowering), and variable criteria for evaluating the worth of knowledge claims 
(Krantz, 199526; for example, the trustworthiness criteria of Guba, 1985). Some 
researchers consider the QQD to be vital to the continuing development of 
methodology and metatheory (e.g., Smith & Heshusius, 1986). This thesis 
argues that qualitative and quantitative research are not mutually exclusive 
(Newman & Benz, 1998), that they are not interchangeable, and the one does not 
provide an automatic solution to the problems the other faces. It is also claimed 
that good science embraces methodological pluralism (Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches are potentially compatible on both a 
methods and methodological level, but this can be shown only through careful 
consideration of the internal coherence of the different methods, methodology, 
and metatheory. What is most important is that there is more to gain in 
26 There is an extraordinary range of evaluative criteria that has been proposed as an alternative 
approach to using the standard validity criteria (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Elliot et aI., 2000; 
Seale, 1999b). 
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psychology (for example, access to usefui methods and a variety of 
metatheories) by breaking down the barriers between qualitative and quantitative 
research than in maintaining a dichotomous view of their relationship (Greene & 
Caracelli, 1 997). 
The conflict between the qualitative and quantitative 'paradigms' is unhelpful to 
researchers because it limits their methodological and metatheoretical choice. 
Although it could be argued that opposition to quantitative methodologies has 
helped qualitative researchers develop more and varied methods. There has 
been a remarkable growth in the qualitative methods of data collection and data 
analysis, and qualitatively-oriented metatheory in the last twenty years. 
However, the benefits of these methods are lost to psychology if psychological 
researchers do not have access to them. These benefits include, the flexibility of 
qualitative methods to adapt to 'real world' situations, to allow for complex social 
and cultural factors that a quantitative format is less sensitive to, and to facilitate 
the deeper study of the beliefs people act upon. For qualitative research to be 
more widely employed by psychological researchers, it needs to be characterised 
as less of an opponent to the quantitative practices of psychologists. This is not 
to say qualitative inquiry needs to change itself in order to suit the current 
methodological preferences of psychologists. Rather, it is to acknowledge that it 
is necessary to recognise that some qualitative approaches can attain the worth 
of quantitative methodology. For example, certain qualitative approaches can 
operate without extensive change according to the metatheory of scientific 
realism proposed in this thesis. Qualitative research can be characterised as 
compatible with quantitative methodology without abandoning its identity or 
forsaking its benefits. In this way, qualitative research does not become, "a 
procedural variation of quantitative inquiry" (Smith & Heshusius, 1986, p. 8) but 
provides another extensive set of metatheoretical and methodological ideas for 
psychologists. Psychology can become like other sciences and use quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Sechrest & Sidani, 199527), without the 
marginalisation of qualitative methodology. 
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This chapter examines the main positions in the QQD, and argues for the 
productive commensurability of qualitative and quantitative research through a 
form of 'methodological pragmatism'. Methodological pragmatism supports 
methodological pluralism and allows for considerable metatheoretical flexibility, 
but maintains that researchers should acknowledge their assumptions about 
what counts as knowledge before beginning research, and be consistent in the 
use of those assumptions and the methods that stem from them. The main 
positions on the value of the QQD vary considerably both on the relevance of 
metatheory, and the relationship between metatheory and methods. On the one 
hand, methods have been argued to be more important for epistemology (e.g., 
Howe, 1988), because using the best method (the one that will best access the 
required information) is of greater practical help than whether the researcher 
believes the information generated is social constructed or in some manner an 
approximation of truth. Conversely, epistemology has claimed to be more 
important than methods (e.g., Smith & Heshusius, 1986), because if the 
researcher does not establish what counts as knowledge how can the researcher 
appreciate the quality of his or her findings Before the main positions in the QQD 
are examined, a discussion of the general nature of the QQD is important. This 
discussion of the nature QQD will help identify the misconceptions and 
confusions that prevent greater commensurability between qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
4.2 The nature of the qualitative-quantitative debate 
The QQD has created a huge literature with strong philosophical, methodological, 
personal, political, moral, and ethical currents but it has brought about little 
encouragement of the adoption of both qualitative and quantitative approaches in 
27 Sechrest and Sidani (1995) provide examples from astronomy, evolutionary biology, and 
geology that demonstrate the use of qualitative approaches in the 'natural' sciences. Morgan 
(1996) supplies an example of qualitative research being used in particle physics (p. 31). 
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psychology. For twenty years, there has been active pressure to use qualitative 
approaches in psychology but with no significant effect (Rabinowitz & Weseen, 
1997). It is regularly argued in the QQD literature that the views of the opposing 
sides have become more entrenched (e.g., Hammersley, 1996; Lincoln & Guba, 
1992,2000; Sechrest, 1992; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). There are frequent calls 
for greater methodological pluralism in the social sciences (Kidder & Fine, 1987; 
Krantz, 1995; Patton, 2002; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994a; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998), but these calls are usually predicated on the understanding that 
metatheoretical barriers between qualitative and quantitative inquiry are best 
ignored, or that the research process is driven by the pragmatic selection of 
methods unconnected to metatheoretical concerns. Even though the QQD 
continues, most social sciences are now significantly more methodologically 
pluralist than they were twenty years ago. Psychology is a notable exception. 
In the QQD literature, it is rare for the QQD to be characterised as anything other 
than an oversimplification of the diverse reality of researchers' metatheory and 
practice. The debate is characterised as highly repetitive, ill-tempered, 
philosophically abstract, erroneous, and lacking in concrete suggestions for the 
use of multiple methods (Patton, 2002; Phillips, 1990; Rabinowitz & Weseen, 
1997; Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994b; Shadish, 1995b). Not 
surprisingly, researchers express weariness with the QQD. For example Pawson 
and Tilley (1998) comment, 
Is there anything more to be said about the paradigm wars? .. What one sees is a musty 
stalemate over first principles, which has made no difference to the overall balance of 
evaluation activities. Thus, experimentalists still manipulate and control, realists prefer to 
muse on causal configurations, constructionists choose empathy and negotiation, auditors 
balance costs with benefits, post-modernists lounge playfully in linguistic ellipses, and so on 
and so forth. (pp.73-74) 
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The QQD is conducted on a number of different but related levels, causing 
authors writing on different levels to talk past each other (Bryman, 1988, 1992). 
Authors also tend to place different or implied emphases on how different levels 
interact with the same effect (Bryman, 1988, 1992). For example, the role of 
metatheory is typically discussed without clarifying how the metatheoryrelates to 
methodology and method. A broader confusion is created because the QQD 
"often acts as a lightning conductor for numerous other disagreements about the 
principles and practice of research" (Hammersley, 1996, p. 159). In this sense, 
the QQD has taken on a life of its own, representing wider political and 
philosophical concerns than was first expressed when it began approximately 
forty years ago (Oakley, 200028). This expansion of the QQD has resulted in a 
larger battlefield rather than a resolution of any particular aspect of the debate. 
Several authors have shown the QQD tends to perpetuate misconceptions of the 
philosophy that underpins the combatants' metatheories, particularly with respect 
to positivism and empiricism. The real basis for metatheoretical disagreement is 
substantially smaller than is normally supposed (Michell, 2003a; Phillips, 1990; 
Reichardt & Rallis, 1994b; Shadish, 1995b; for example, important writers on 
both 'sides' reject positivism). Given these problems, it is not surprising that 
there is considerable confusion, and not a small amount of emotion and rancour 
in the QQD. Rabinowitz and Weseen (1997) note that there is almost no 
empirical research into the nature of the QQD, a fact that probably contributes to 
the persistence of the confusions. Rabinowitz and Weseen (1997) interviewed 
twenty PhD students studying psychology (ten qualitatively oriented students and 
ten quantitatively oriented students) to explore attitudes towards the QQD. Their 
analYSis of the opinions of the students supports the concerns highlighted in this 
overview of the QQD literature, namely: that the students felt confused over the 
role of metatheory and how it relates to methodology and methods. They also 
28 Oakley (2000) argues that Cicourel (1964, the concept of 'quantofrenia'), Glaser and Strauss 
(1967, grounded theory) and Garfinkel (1967, the development of ethnomethodology) marked the 
beginning of the QQD. An alternative view is that the 'modern version' of the QQD began with 
Cook and Reichardt's (1979) "Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Evaluation" (Krantz, 1995), 
but this beginning is confined to the QQD within the evaluation and mixed method literatures. 
82 
expressed concern about the politicai expediency of their chosen methodology, 
particularly the qualitative students. Students also reported struggling to achieve 
a balanced understanding of quantitative and qualitative methodologies in a 
quantitatively oriented discipline, acknowledging a lack of understanding of the 
benefits offered by the 'other' methodology29. 
However, the confusions and misconceptions in the QQD need not prevent the 
active examination of this "cacophonic literature" (Rabinowitz & Weseen, 1997, p. 
605), but they do need to be avoided. To better navigate the confusions in the 
QQD, and to facilitate the view that qualitative and quantitative research can be 
commensurate, the main positions in the QQD are set out below. Although, there 
are several existing labels for the main positions, some new terms are introduced 
to identify positions that have become conflated. 
4.3 The main positions in the qualitative-quantitative debate 
There are two main positions in the QQD, and each position has two versions 
(see figure 4.1). The first position can be called 'fundamental differences,3o. This 
position holds that qualitative and quantitative methodologies are fundamentally 
different at all levels including the metatheoreticallevel. Within the fundamental 
differences position, it is possible to distinguish two versions. One version is 
respectful of the differences between qualitative and quantitative methodology 
while maintaining they are incommensurable (Smith, 1996). This position can be 
labelled the 'concurrent paradigms' view31 . The second version is more common 
and is typically called the 'competing paradigms' view (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). Here qualitative and quantitative approaches are fully incommensurate, 
and the two methodologies compete as if there should be only one dominant 
29 Rabinowitz and Weseen (1997) balked at the prospect of interviewing academic staff about the 
QQD, because they were concerned that the staff may have become set in their methodological 
ways, preferring the potentially 'developing' methodological attitudes of PhD students. 
30 Also known as the 'incompatibility thesis' (Howe, 1988), the 'purist' position (Rossman & 
Wilson, 1985), and 'methodological imperialism' (Howe, 1992). 
31 Also known as 'disjunctive eclecticism' (Howe, 1992). 
methodology. In both forms of the fundamental differences view, metatheory 
dictates both the methodology and methods to be employed. 
Fundamental 
differences 
Competing 
paradigms 
Concurrent 
paradigms 
Methodological 
pragmatism 
NaIve 
pragmatism 
Situational 
pragmatism 
Fig 4.1 The main positions in the QQD 
The second main position in the QQD can be called 'methodological 
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pragmatism', which also has two distinguishable variants. The methodological 
pragmatic position is the norm in the evaluation research and mixed methods 
literatures (Patton, 1987; Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), 
and tends to be supported in certain forms by qualitative realists (e.g., 
Hammersley, 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2000). Methodological 
pragmatists share the view that qualitative and quantitative methodologies can be 
commensurate at the levels of methodology and methods. However, the role of 
metatheory in methodological pragmatism varies. Under the first variation, 'na'ive 
pragmatism,32, metatheory can be ignored as an impractical obstacle in seeking 
answers to research questions (Patton, 2002; Watts, 1992). The second 
variation of methodological pragmatism is 'situational pragmatism,33. This 
32 This naive pragmatic approach is similar to the 'situational' approach (Hathaway, 1995), the 
'technical' position (Bryman, 1988), the 'autonomy thesis' (Reichardt & Cook, 1979), Howe's 
(1988) 'compatibility thesis', and Rossman and Wilson's (1985) 'pragmatic' position. 
33 Situational pragmatism is similar to Hammersley's (1996) 'methodological eclecticism', Howe's 
(1988) 'methodological compatibilism', and Firestone's (1987) 'pragmatist' position, but is 
distinguished by its greater emphasis on the role of metatheory in determining the methodology 
and methods employed. 
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approach maintains a role for metatheory but the choice of methods comes first, 
thus ensuring the appropriate methods are selected unencumbered by 
metatheoretical restraints (e.g., Hammersley, 1996; Shadish, 1995a). Under 
situational pragmatism, methods are not taken to represent metatheoretical 
positions (Bryman, 1992). For example, the use of grounded theory, or any 
qualitative method, not does dictate that the researcher should follow a social 
constructionist metatheory, rather than, say, a realist metatheory. 
The two main positions in the 000, fundamental differences and methodological 
pragmatism, are examined next. A third position, which is based on 
methodological pragmatism, is also presented. This position argues for the 
employment of both qualitative and quantitative methodology but from a clearly 
explicated and more consistent metatheoretical stance that takes full congruence 
of the task of selecting the appropriate methods. 
4.3.1 The fundamental differences view of the qualitative-quantitative 
debate 
Competing paradigms position 
This form of the fundamental differences view argues that qualitative and 
quantitative research are incompatible. The methodologies are said to compete 
with each other from opposing metatheoretical positions on the nature of reality 
and how reality is to be researched (e.g., Guba, 1987, 1996; Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Reason & Rowan, 1981; Smith & Heshusius, 1986). 
One methodological 'paradigm' is said to preclude the other (Guba, 1987). 
Researchers are advised to pick one methodology, because it is impossible to 
employ both (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The main barrier between the paradigms is 
held to be at the level of metatheory not methods, because metatheoretical 
incompatibility is said to override methods compatibility. Smith and Heshusius 
(1986) and Guba (1987, 199634) accept the idea that qualitative and quantitative 
34 Guba's fluctuates in his advocacy of the 'one methodology' position. For example, Guba 
(1996) concedes that there are possible "intermediate positions" on some dimensions between 
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research can be compatible on a methods level, but warn that this compatibility is 
misleading. The different conceptions and ways of researching reality employed 
by qualitative and quantitative researchers ensure that, whatever methods are 
used, different world-views are being acted upon, thus ensuring the 
incompatibility of qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
The competing paradigms view has grown to include many other factors such as 
ethical, political, and ideological issues. It seems to be a rallying point for those 
who wish to change what they see as the quantitative-oriented nature of most 
research institutions. Support for the competing paradigms position is common 
in the qualitative literature, coming particularly from postmodern constructionists, 
although it does not enjoy unified support from qualitative researchers. 
Qualitative postmodern constructionists tend to play up the competing paradigms 
view (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). For example, Lincoln 
and Guba (2000) argue that "commensurability between positivist and 
postpositivist worldviews is not possible". (p. 169)Whereas qualitative realists 
(e.g., Bryman 2001; Hammersley, 1996; Silverman, 2000) play down the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research. For example, 
Hammersley (1996) argues that there is no "stark constrast" between the types of 
data qualitative and quantitative researchers deal with, but a difference in the 
degree of precision, structure and contextualisation required by each 
methodology (p. 164). The competing paradigms view is neither supported nor 
rejected in the quantitatively-oriented literature. This literature generally avoids 
discussion of methodological paradigms and world-views (Reichardt & Cook, 
1979). It is certainly easier for quantitative researchers to ignore the QQD 
because they enjoy a significant power and resource advantage over qualitative 
researchers (Rabinowitz & WeseE1n, 1997). 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, before reasserting that the ontological incompatibility 
between the two methodologies cannot be overcome (1996, p. 46). 
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Concurrent paradigms position 
The 'concurrent paradigms' view sees the two methodologies as incompatible but 
argues that there is little to be gained by each criticising the other. It is 
maintained that the choice is between two respected alternatives and depends 
on the researcher's personal taste as to which is employed (Hammersley, 1996). 
Qualitative and quantitative research are taken to suit different questions (Smith, 
1989), and the researcher needs to stay within the bounds of one paradigm. 
Although not commensurate, the qualitative and quantitative paradigms are each 
seen as internally coherent. The researcher is expected to apply a metatheory, 
methodology, methods, and evaluation criteria that cohere within a 
methodological paradigm (Madill et aI., 2000). The metatheoretical position of 
the researcher dictates the choice of both methodology and methods. The key 
difference between qualitative and quantitative research is held to be at the level 
of metatheory, but no two neatly opposing metatheories represent qualitative and 
quantitative research. However, many followers of the concurrent paradigms 
view (and the competing paradigms view) convey the impression that this is so. 
For example, Smith (1984) argues that quantitative research is aligned to a 
realist perspective (Smith most likely intends this as a na"ive realist position) and 
qualitative research is wedded to an idealist metatheory. It is possible to discern 
a range of opposing metatheoretical debates in the QQD. For example, 
Hammersley (1996) suggests that both versions of the fundamental differences 
view understand the quantitative and qualitative paradigms to be contrasted in 
respect of realism versus idealism, naturalism versus anti-naturalism, and 
deductivism versus inductivism. In addition, the terms 'realism', 'idealism', and 
'naturalism' contain such a diversity of philosophical meanings they cannot be 
readily applied without considerable clarification of what form they are taking, and 
what influence they are generating on quantitative and qualitative methodology 
respectively. A broader, and perhaps more accurate, metatheoretical 
representation of the QQD would be to take realism as the metatheory of 
quantitative research and antirealism as the metatheory of qualitative research, 
although again there are quantitative researchers who are antirealists and 
qualitative researchers who are realists (e.g., Hammersley, 1992; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Porter, 2002; Sayer, 2000; Silverman, 2001; Snow & Morrill, 
1995). 
A critique of the fundamental differences view 
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The major problem with both versions of the fundamental differences argument is 
that the differences between qualitative and quantitative methodology are not 
clear-cut. Although the two methodologies can be argued to be distinct, their 
boundaries are in fact highly blurred. A number of authors have demonstrated 
this at metatheoretical, methodological, and methods levels (e.g., Bryman, 1988, 
1992; Hammersley, 1992, 1996; Howe, 1988, 1992; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995; 
Shaw & Gould, 2001). Thus, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms is a question of degrees not kind. Hammersley (1996) suggests, 
There are, however, some serious problems with this 'paradigm' view of the relationship 
between quantitative and qualitative research. For one thing, if we look at research today in 
the human sciences, we find that much of it does not fall neatly into one or other of these two 
categories. There are multiple methodological dimensions on which research varies: these 
do not lie in parallel, and each involves a range of positions, not just two. (p. 160) 
Furthermore, to suggest that either qualitative or quantitative approaches are 
internally coherent would be to greatly oversimplify the diversity of research that 
each contains. As the earlier discussion of the question 'What is qualitative 
research?' emphasised, qualitative research is far from internally coherent with 
its multitude of opposed and contradictory metatheories. Quantitative 
methodology would seem to enjoy greater internal coherence than qualitative 
methodology, although it nevertheless contains a highly diverse range of 
metatheoretical ideas and methods. 
The qualitative literature provides several characterisations of the supposed 
differences between quantitative and qualitative research, which also serve to 
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illustrate the many levels of the QQD (see Hammersley, 1992; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Oakley, 2000; Tolich & Davidson, 1999; Shaw & Gould, 2001). Bryman's 
(1988) discussion of the differences between quantitative and qualitative 
research demonstrates that these differences can be greatly reduced, and can be 
further reduced beyond Bryman's analysis. For example, one dimension in 
Bryman's analysis is 'The role of qualitative research'. Bryman (1988) notes that 
the main role for qualitative research within quantitative research is preparatory 
because "quantitative researchers rarely totally deny the utility of qualitative 
research" (p. 94). Qualitative research is used to generate ideas and 
hypotheses, explore a topic in a less structured way, or act as a creative prelude 
to the main quantitative event. This restricted view of qualitative research is what 
most qualitative writers rail against, because it is seen as regarding qualitative 
work as second rate and not justifiable in its own right. However, in some 
research contexts quantitative research can be seen as preparatory to qualitative 
research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). For example, a quantitative sUNey may be 
used to identify a range of health concerns in a demographic group (e.g., the 
exercise regimes of 58-year-old men), but in-depth inteNiewing may then be 
used to explore the nature of the specific health concerns (e.g., snacking, 
attitudes to exerCise, body image, time spent watching movies, and knee 
injuries). 
Alternatively, according to Bryman (1988), the qualitative view of the role of 
qualitative research focuses on ways to explore actors' subjective interpretations, 
although in fact this is only one function that potential qualitative research can 
perform. Moreover, partiCipants' interpretations are not excluded from 
quantitative inquiry. Quantitative researchers use different methods to establish 
how people attribute meanings and motives to their actions. For example, 
quantitative researchers in cognitive psychology are deeply concerned with such 
matters. It is also true that qualitative research does not act universally or solely 
to represent the views of its research participants. The interpretation and views 
of the researcher are just as important. One might well ask how qualitative 
.. ! 
researchers are to provide recommendations and future hypotheses if they do 
not interpret the views of their participants? 
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Outside the comparative tables (Le., Bryman's, 1988; Hammersley, 1992; Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985; Oakley, 2000) the differences between qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms are generally exaggerated and the similarities overlooked. These 
tables highlight the considerable overlap between supposedly distinct qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. They also emphasise the need to consider the 
QQD on multiple levels if feasible ways to use mixed methods are to be found, 
and multiple confusions avoided. An approach that does not artificially separate 
qualitative and quantitative research has a lot to recommend. This possibility is 
now examined. 
4.3.2 The methodologically pragmatic view of the qualitative-quantitative 
debate 
Methodological pragmatism generally views the differences between quantitative 
and qualitative methodology to concern only technical issues, and maintains that 
if technical problems can be overcome, all methods are available to the 
researcher (Bryman, 1988). On this view, the metatheoretical differences 
between qualitative and quantitative research are either ignored or considered 
secondary to the selection of methods. On the pragmatic view, qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies and methods can work together (either sequentially or 
concurrently) if the nature of the research question and context favour this as the 
appropriate approach. Hammersley (1996) suggests that qualitative and 
quantitative methods are currently used together in three ways: as 
complementary (Le., to augment the ability of the other to gain research insights), 
facilitative (Le., to create hypotheses for each other), and to promote triangulation 
(Le., each will overcome or limit the deficiencies of the other). Mixed qualitative 
and quantitative methods are applied depending on the skills and experience of 
the researcher, the timeframe, the overall aim of the study, and the resources 
available. There are also two versions of methodological pragmatism, which are 
90 
separated by the different roles they assign metatheory. The first version is 
na'ive pragmatism, which largely rejects the role of metatheory. The second 
version is situational pragmatism, which makes metatheory dependent on the 
choice of methods. A distinction is not usually made between the two types of 
methodological pragmatism, but it is helpful to do so given the very different role 
for metatheory in each version. 
Nai've pragmatism 
The na'ive pragmatist approach is driven by the need to select the most 
appropriate methods for the research context. Na'ive pragmatism holds that 
metatheory does not meaningfully influence the choice and composition of the 
appropriate methodology and methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Watts, 
1992). For example, Patton (2002) recommends that using qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and mixed methods, tactically to answer specific research 
questions without recourse to "deep epistemological reflection" (p. 69). Patton 
does not explicate why it is favourable to avoid epistemological reflections, 
although such a statement is in keeping with his well-known utilisation-focused 
approach to evaluation, which places a heavy emphasis on the utility of the 
information generated in the evaluation. In the hurly burly of the research, Patton 
rejects the role of metatheory as an unnecessary abstraction that does little to 
help, and much to restrict, the researcher already operating under the constraints 
of time, budget, and the pursuit of the best line of inquiry. While it is accepted 
that utility is a vital component of evaluation research, and helps focus the 
tactical selection of methods, it does not necessarily preclude epistemological 
considerations. From a na'ive pragmatic pOint of view, the QQD is over (e.g., 
Patton, 1990, 1997; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Salomon, 1991). This view is 
commonly based on the belief that most social scientists accept the use of a 
mixed methods approach where qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
employed in the same study (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). In this regard, Patton 
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(2002) comments, "While one may still encounter people who rigidly confess 
allegiance to only quantitative or qualitative methods, most practitioners appear 
to have become eclectic and pragmatic" (p. 71). However, if a methodological 
detente does exist, some of the intellectual combatants have not been informed 
(e.g., Becker, 1996; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The paradigm battles seem to be 
continuing in a number of fields, including methodological papers in qualitative 
research journals. Those authors who argue for the end of the QQD are most 
evident in the mixed method or evaluation literature. In psychology, the QQD has 
yet to be properly engaged. 
Situational pragmatism 
Situational pragmatism understands qualitative and quantitative research to be 
commensurate, but unlike na·ive 'pragmatism believes that there is an important 
role for metatheory. However, situational pragmatism maintains that metatheory 
should follow the pragmatic needs of the research context. Methods are chosen 
first and metatheory is applied later in the data analysis or interpretation phases, 
depending on the methods used. Shadish (1995a) describes his view of this 
approach: 
Long ago in evaluation, both qualitative and quantitative theorists (and those in between) 
seemed to reach agreement that the methods we choose to use in evaluation do not depend 
in any direct or deterministic way on the philosophy of science we happen to endorse (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1982; Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Smith, 1986). In fact, it seems more likely that in 
many (perhaps most) cases the methods preceded the philosophy, and we added the 
philosophy as we tried to understand, explain and justify why we chose the methods we did. 
(p. 74) 
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What is more, the metatheory applied after data collection may vary from 
research context to research context depending on the methods employed. 
Situational pragmatism avoids the 'linear' approach of the fundamental 
differences view (where metatheory leads to methodology which leads to 
methods) and operates philosophically on a case-by-case basis or context-by-
context basis. Seale (1999a), for example, says, "I regard research as a craft 
skill, relatively autonomous from the requirement that some people seem to want 
to impose that it reflect some thoroughly consistent relationship with a 
philosophical or methodological position" (p. 17). The value of metatheories are 
still recognised but seen as "resources for thinking rather than problems to be 
solved" (Seale, 1999a, p. 25). Situational pragmatism receives widespread 
support in the qualitative literature (e.g., Hammersley, 1996; Kvale, 1996; Seale, 
1999a). For example, Hammersley (1996) argues that methods are best 
selected before consideration is given to the metatheory in order that the 
researcher be most sensitive to the nature of the research context. 
A critique of methodological pragmatism 
There are two main criticisms of the methodological pragmatist's approach. First, 
the relatively weak or, absence of a role for metatheory, and second, the 
uncritical use of mixed methods. Na"ive pragmatism directly questions the 
relevance of metatheory in research, whereas situational pragmatism relegates 
the importance of metatheory and makes it dependent on method choice and 
research context. Without question, the qualitative researcher 'on the ground' is 
often forced to compromise (for example, half the sample may suddenly no 
longer be available due to unforseen circumstances), as is the experimental 
researcher, but this does not automatically lead to the need to reject or devalue 
metatheory. Metatheory's role is important because it provides a wide range of 
benefits. It allows researchers to acknowledge their assumptions about what 
counts as knowledge and be consistent in those assumptions and the methods 
that stem from them. Metatheory strongly influences how one should employ 
appropriate research strategies and the interpretation of the conclusions that 
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result from research. Metatheory also provides the criteria for evaluation of 
research. It serves to guide the focus of the research, whether, for example, the 
research is looking for causal patterns, or the Verstehen of research participants. 
Relegating the metatheory, or applying it retrospectively, limits our ability to 
understand how the research is to be applied and how to interpret its results35 . 
The second main criticism of methodological pragmatism is its potentially 
uncritical use of mixed methods. It is accepted that employing a mixed methods 
approach generally leads to a better quality of research, and this thesis does not 
seek to contradict that understanding. A mixed methods strategy allows the 
researcher to approach a research issue in multiple ways, increasing the 
likelihood of understanding the issue. Mixed methods provides research 
participants different ways of expressing themselves, and generates the 
opportunity to analyse data in potentially more revealing ways. The ability of 
qualitaitve and quantitative research to 'build' on each other as part of a single 
research design is a another very strong methodolicial benefit of a mixed 
methods approach. 
However, it is worth noting that using qualitative and quantitative methods 
together can beg several questions that typically go unconsidered. Methods can 
be seen to carry metatheoretical and methodological imperatives that are difficult 
to ignore. For example, using an interview-based approach and an experimental 
design in the same study may raise the question of the compatibility of the search 
for Verstehen and causality. Furthermore, the question of what criteria of 
evaluation should be applied to mixed method studies might also arise. Typically 
in the qualitative literature the traditional criteria of research evaluation are not 
seen as readily applicable to qualitative research (Madill et al., 2000), although 
this thesis sees this view as an underestimation of the validation worth of some 
qualitative methods. There are many alternative qualitative-oriented criteria 
35 The arguments for the role of metatheory are expanded upon in detail in chapters six and 
seven. 
94 
available, but it would seem to be metatheoretically contradictory to apply 
different kinds of criteria to different methods in the same study. If the 
quantitative component is evaluated using criteria based around validity, and the 
qualitative component employs the criteria of dependability and credibility it would 
be difficult to integrate the research's findings, and offer a coherent interpretation. 
A point to be made here is that a study may be improved by the use of mixed 
methods but it may also be hindered or confused by using mixed methods (Shaw 
& Gould, 2001). The qualitative and quantitative findings may not agree, and 
may even contradict each other. It is possible for either qualitative or quantitative 
research to lose effectiveness if mixed with the other. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods should not be assumed to be compatible. Often it is 
incorrectly taken for granted that quantitative and qualitative methods will 
automatically overcome each other's weaknesses (Carey, 1993; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie,1998). However, as Bryman (1988,1992) convincingly argues, a careful 
blending of qualitative and quantitative methodology in specific research 
situations generally improves the quality of the research. 
There is a considerable and convincing literature that argues for the effective use 
of mixed methods. For example, Silverman (1985), Patton (1990), and Miles and 
Huberman (1994) demonstrate the concurrent use of qualitative and quantitative 
research. Reicher and Emler (1986) use a quantitative method to improve the 
power of qualitative interviews. Under Miles and Hubermans' (1994) 
transcendental realism, qualitative and quantitative methods are taken to work 
together under the traditional criteria of research evaluation, without limiting the 
role of qualitative research. Thus, although the application of mixed methods is 
generally helpful, this thesis choses to raise the issue that a mixed method 
approach is not an automatic improvement to the research design. 
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4.4 Conclusions: Possible resolutions to the qualitative-quantitative 
debate 
Neither of the two forms of the fundamental differences view, nor the two forms of 
methodological pragmatism, present a convincing approach to the QQD. The 
fundamental differences view does not stand up to scrutiny because there is a 
significant overlap in the methodology and metatheory of qualitative and 
quantitative research. Methodological pragmatism brings qualitative and 
quantitative research together by devaluing metatheory, or making it secondary , 
to the practical problems of implementing research. Atkinson, Delamont, and 
Hammersley (1988) suggest that a better approach is to recognise that the 
qualitative-quantitative distinction does not reflect the "untidy realities of real 
scholars" (p. 243), and is a "poor methodological guide" (Hammersley, 1996, p. 
173). Hammersley (1996) suggests that the diversity of method, methodology, 
and metatheory used by researchers is better reflected by focusing on five 
aspects of research rather than adhering to a qualitative or quantitative position. 
These five aspects include formulating the problems, selecting the cases, 
producing the data, analysing the data, and communicating the findings. With 
each of these five aspects, the researcher is encouraged to consider the range of 
methods, methodologies, and metatheories that are appropriate. Hammersley 
hopes a focus on these questions will stimulate researchers to move freely 
between the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, whilst attending to the 
practicalities of research. 
Hammersley is clear that the quantitative-qualitative distinction cannot simply be 
rejected, because we have no viable alternatives to these terms. However, 
Dreher (1994) suggests that the terms 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' be 
discarded, at least in the context of research proposals, because they offer an 
overly simple classification of research that detracts from the need to specify data 
collection, data analysis, and procedures for validity. It may be, as Krantz (1995) 
argues, that some aspects of the QQD are not resolvable because the QQD is 
driven more by the social psychological nature of scientific controversy than by 
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any metatheoretical reflection. Therefore, Krantz argues, researchers should aim 
to be tolerant of methodological pluralism and different metatheoretical positions, 
rather than strive to resolve the QQD. 
The evaluation literature has focused on the QQD for considerably longer than 
psychology has. That literature has reached a position that firmly accepts 
methodological pluralism (Greene, 2001; House, 2001; Pawson & Tilley, 2001). 
The practice of evaluation is now strongly characterised by qualitative as well as 
quantitative approaches, and the advent of qualitative methods is seen as one of 
the most worthwhile developments in the discipline (Shadish, 1995a). This is not 
to say the evaluation literature is free of the QQD, but evaluation research does 
make fulsome use of qualitative approaches (Mark, 2002). Other social 
sciences, such as anthropology and sociology have largely worked through the 
QQD to the point where, although some of the key issues have not been fully 
resolved, the value of methodological pluralism has been endorsed as more 
important than the debate itself. 
The same outcome may eventuate in psychology, although psychology has thus 
far shown itself to be considerably more resistant to qualitative research than 
other social sciences. However, this thesis suggests that there is another 
approach to resolving the QQD. In the language of the QQD, this thesis 
recommends a form of situational pragmatism, but in effect it aims to achieve 
Hammersley's (1996) goal of greater movement between qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, and also to stress the need for the transparent 
explication of the following: the metatheoretical position of the researcher; the 
relationships and congruence between the metatheory, methodology, and 
method to be employed; and a specification of the strategies being used to 
ensure rigour, and, that the appropriate evaluative criteria that are employed 
(Caelli, Ray & Mill, 2003). The idea, and in some cases plea, that researchers 
set out their metatheoretical views before, or as they are choosing, their 
methodology and methods is regularly made in the qualitative literature (e.g., 
Oenzin & Lincoln, 199436), but few qualitative researchers have responded to it 
(Madill et aI., 2000). 
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Researchers need to make the reasons for their choice of methodology and 
methods explicit, and clarify how the methodology and methods relate to the 
metatheory so those who read their work can better understand and judge the 
quality and intent of the research. This approach does not restrict the 
researcher's open consideration of different methods, methodology, and 
metatheory, but specifically requires the researcher to consider the coherence of 
metatheory, methodology, and methods in his or her approach. For example, the 
researcher may adopt a scientific realist metatheory, employ a qualitative 
methodology centred on grounded theory, and use face-to-face interviews 
augmented with observational data. The metatheory, methodology, and methods 
may need to be mutually adjusted during the research or as a consequence of it, 
and these processes should be reported and made overt. As part of the 
metatheoretical, methodological, and methods 'package' the researcher also 
needs to state what evaluative criteria are being employed, and by what 
strategies rigour is being maintained. To continue the example from above, the 
evaluative criteria employed in the grounded theory research could be the validity 
and reliability criteria, which would be met through the strategies of constant 
comparison analYSis, negative case analysis, theoretical sampling, saturation, 
and theoretical memos, although other procedures such as member checks 
might also be relevant. 
This approach is similar to that recommended by Hammersley (1996) and Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994) in that it aims for the more formal consideration of metatheory 
and its relationship with methodology and methods. However, it most closely 
36 Denzin and Lincoln (1994) set out five phases in the research process: locating oneself in the 
research area, and the broader historic and psychosocial context of the research; choosing a 
theoretical paradigm to inform and guide the study; selecting a strategy of inquiry to link that 
paradigm to the empirical world; selecting data collection and analysis methods; and, the art of 
interpretation (pp. 12-15). 
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approximates Caelli et al (2003) because it also includes a focus on strategies to 
ensure rigour. Contrary to Hammersley's (1996) suggestion, it would seem 
impractical to reconsider metatheory, methodology, and methods at each of his 
five different points. The best time for researchers to make their metatheoretical 
positions known is before the research design is implemented. This role for 
metatheory suggests a broad revision to research practice, because very few 
researchers explicitly state their metatheoretical positions either before or after 
the research is carried out. However, one danger with this approach is the 
potential for the occurrence of a form of retrospective relativism, whereby 
researchers tailor their metatheory to be consistent with the choice of methods or 
the nature of the findings. It is suggested that researchers are likely to have 
relatively consistent views on metatheory, although researchers may need to 
adapt these views if a particular research study demands it. It would seem highly 
unlikely that researchers would adopt a postmodern constructionist position one 
week, and then a scientific realist view the next. 
To utilise the benefits of qualitative and quantitative methodology in the same 
study, the chosen metatheory must to be able to accommodate both qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies. It is argued in chapter seven that scientific 
realism can allow for both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. As part of 
this metatheoretical approach, the validity criteria of research evaluation would 
be applied to both methodologies. The argument that qualitative methodologies 
cannot, or should try not, to adhere to the validity criteria is rejected based on the 
evidence of three qualitative methods that meet these criteria. These methods 
are grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson 
& Simon, 1984/1993), and the theory of explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1989a, 
1992). In the next chapter, these methods are examined in order to demonstrate 
that qualitative data can be scientifically evaluated. These methods also offer not 
one, but three, independently constructed bridges that connect qualitative 
methodology to quantitative, mainstream research in psychology. As such these 
methods stand as empirical evidence for the view that the QQO is artificial. 
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Chapter Five 
Qualitative Data can be Scientific 
One matter that motivates an interest in qualitative, research methods in psychology is the 
conviction that what people say (including what they say about their mental lives) is an 
important form of data, but a form that does not neatly fit the quantitative imperative. In this 
conviction, constructionists and na'ive realists are alike united. What divides them are 
philosophical considerations about the relationship between what is said and reality. 
Constructionists believe that here there is an unbridgeable hiatus: what is said cannot ever 
express just the way things really are. Realists disagree. They believe that there is no hiatus 
here: sometimes things may be just as we say they are. (Michell, 2003a, p. 21) 
5.1 Overview 
In order to demonstrate that qualitative research can be as scientific as 
quantitative research, and to provide further evidence that the putative 
qualitative-quantitative divide can be bridged, three examples of qualitative 
method are examined in this chapter. The methods are grounded theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967), verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993), and 
the theory of explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1989a, 1992). These methods 
are strikingly dissimilar in their character, the knowledge areas they investigate, 
the research traditions they have evolved from, and the places within psychology 
where they are properly located, and applied. However, all three methods 
successfully use the validity and reliability criteria for knowledge claims. 
Validity and reliability each have two important components: internal and external 
validity and internal and external reliability respectively. Internal validity can be 
understood as a criterion that indirectly approximates 'truth'. 'Truth' is 
characterised as a correspondence between language and the world that can 
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never be attained but "functions as a guiding ideal for science" (Haig, 2002a, p. 
457). Truth itself cannot be directly accessed, but by using internal validity, truth 
can be indirectly indicated (Haig, 2002a, p. 457). Broadly defined, external 
validity is concerned with the extent to which the research's specific findings can 
be appropriately generalized. Often the quality of the external validity will relate 
to the effectiveness of the study's sampling procedures. There are two different 
views of sampling. First, in quantitative research an empirical-statistical 
approach to sampling yields generalisations that are often based on 
representative samples. Characteristics of the sample are generalised to a 
relevant population based on statistical inferences that the population will share 
similar characteristics (Schwandt, 2001). Second, in qualitative studies, a 
theoretical-analytic approach to external validity is usually preferred, most 
obviously in grounded theory, where sampling is based on the sample's 
relevance to the theory under development. For example, in a study assessing 
the impact on the lifestyle of a patient group of a diagnosis of very high LDL 
cholesterol, concomitant with Type I diabetes, hypertension, and central obesity 
greater than 46 inches, the grounded theory sample will comprise only people 
with this condition. Representativeness is seen as less important than obtaining 
a sample that helps evaluate the researcher's theory or hypothesis (Morse, 1991, 
1999c; Schwandt, 2001). For example, the working hypothesis may be that such 
patients do no si,9nificantly change their lifestyles as a consequence of such a 
diagnosis. The findings of the grounded theory are then taken to be 
generalisable to other situations where similar conditions exist (Morse, 1999c) -
in this case, patients with this collection of risk factors 
One component of reliability, internal reliability, is characterised in this thesis as 
"the degree of consistency wi,th which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions" 
(Hammersley, 1992, p. 67). Reliab,ility also refers to the situation where a 
different researcher uses the same methods in a different study to obtain the 
same or similar results (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982, p. 35). This part of reliability 
. , 
,- 'I 
101 
can be calied 'replicability', 'reproducibility', or 'external reliability'. Replication is 
a challenging goal for qualitative research (Morgan, 1996). There are multiple 
procedures to promote the ability of other researchers to replicate qualitative 
studies (e.g., audit trails, memoing, comprehensive documentation), but 
replication is a criterion that even rigorous qualitative methods struggle to meet 
(LeCompte & Goetz, 1982), unless key procedures provide the research 
community with documentation of a clear procedural path, and even then, the 
task of fully'replicating a qualitative study could be too complex to be feasible 
Qualitative methods are as potentially scientific as quantitative methods if they 
meet the criteria of validity and reliability. Equally, quantitative research methods 
are not seen as having a "golden key" that automatically accesses reliability and 
validity (Silverman, 2000, p. 176). Like qualitative research methods, they need 
to be employed rigorously and with skill to meet these criteria. Fielding and 
Fielding (1986) note that "Whether the data collected are quantifiable or 
qualitative, the issue of the warrant for their inferences must be confronted" (p. 
12). If a number of disparate qualitative methods can be shown to adhere to 
validity and reliability criteria in the same manner as quantitative methods, then 
those qualitative approaches procedures can be argued to be as scientific as 
quantitative research. However, this is not to say that all qualitative methods are 
therefore legitimised. Indeed, unlike the three qualitative methods examined in 
this thesis, other qualitative methods (such as the focus group method, and 
narrative methods) appear to lack the rigour needed to meet validity and 
reliability criteria. 
The argument that qualitative researchers use validity and reliability criteria for 
knowledge claims presupposes that these criteria are the most appropriate for 
qualitative methods. This is not currently a popular view in the qualitative 
literature, where considerable attention is given to developing alternative criteria 
for qualitative research (e.g., Guba, 1981; Leininger, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985), in order that qualitative research can fully employ what are seen as its 
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strengths in flexible, adaptive methods, empowering the respondent to express 
themselves as the respondent would most prefer to, and take into consideration 
the subjective experiences and insights of the researcher. More controversially, 
this thesis argues that the three qualitative methods to be examined should aim 
to meet the validity and reliability criteria. In the qualitative literature, it is 
generally believed qualitative methods fail if evaluated by the validity and 
reliability criteria. Therefore, the qualitative 'paradigm' is seen as distinct from 
quantitative inquiry and requiring different evaluative criteria. Consequently, 
there has been a remarkable proliferation of alternative criteria with which to 
evaluate knowledge claims made by qualitative researchers, but no alternative 
set of criteria has been widely adopted (Seale, 1999a). Moreover, qualitative 
researchers have not been able to explain their inability to address the supposed 
inappropriateness of the traditional validity criteria (Banister et aI., 1994). The 
problem of how to assess the adequacy of qualitative work is unresolved with no 
foreseeable resolution in the near future (Angen, 2000; Oenzin & Lincoln, 2000; 
Schwandt, 199637). Advocates'of relativism have proposed that each 
metatheoretical position should employ its own 'native' criteria. This 'horses for 
courses' approach raises a range of problems, not the least of which is how one 
might compare the knowledge claims of different positions. 
This thesis argues that qualitative research is best served by returning to the use 
of the criteria of validity (Morse et aI., .2002)38, because the validity criteria 
(including reliability) are stronger criteria than any alternative criteria proposed for 
qualitative research. It is further suggested that the application of these criteria 
should also promote the greater use of qualitative research within psychology. 
Qualitative researchers do face a special challenge in demonstrating to their 
37 Schwandt (1996) argues that the debate about criteriology is not productive. He suggests that 
social inquiry needs to be undertaken not by using any criteria, but employing a "guiding ideal" 
and a "set of enabling conditions" (pp. 63-64). This ideal and the enabling conditions is thought to 
promote a practical and pragmatic postfoundational philosophy that will help researchers to 
"exercise moral and political judgment" (see Schwandt, 2002, p. 94). 
38 Other qualitative commentators have advocated qualitative research should never discard the 
validity criteria (e.g., Hammersley, 1998, pp. 67-68; Silverman, 2000, p. 175). 
readership and themselves that their conclusions are the result of critical and 
rigorous investigation, and are not merely anecdotal (Silverman, 2000). 
However, qualitative research can adhere to the criteria of validity through the 
use of a number of rigorous and systematic procedures that have been 
developed by qualitative researchers (e.g., constant comparison analysis, 
negative case analysis, theoretical sampling). 
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Madill et al (2000; see also Sparkes, 2001; cf. Henwood, 1996; Reicher, 2000) 
recently offered a different view on the use of alternative and traditional validity 
criteria in qualitative research. They argued that the traditional evaluative criteria 
for knowledge claims are appropriate in qualitative research if the researcher 
employs a scientific realist or na'ive realist metatheory. Madill et al (2000) 
proposed that alternative qualitative criteria (e.g., credibility, dependability) are 
more appropriate for constructionist-oriented qualitative research. This thesis 
does not support this relativistic approach because Madill et ai's argument 
supports the development of separate metatheoretical and methodological 
camps, and does not allow comparative evaluation of research studies and their 
findings. 
In chapter seven it is suggested that the criteria of validity and reliability used in 
quantitative research should be augmented by further criteria. Under the doctrine 
of epistemic realism proposed in chapter seven, Kuhn's (1977) criteria of theory 
evaluation (Le., accuracy, consistency, scope, Simplicity, and fruitfulness) are 
included in validity considerations. The role of Kuhn's criteria in evaluating 
knowledge claims are discussed in chapter seven. 
Grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and the theory of explanatory 
coherence will each be examined in order to establish their ability to meet the 
criteria of validity and reliability. First, however, the question of why qualitative 
researchers tend to reject the traditional criteria of validity and reliability in favour 
of new alternative criteria is specifically examined, and contrasted with the 
position of this thesis that the criteria of validity and reliability are still highly 
relevant to qualitative research. 
5.2 Qualitative researchers' rejection of reliability and validity 
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The importance of the validity criteria in the qualitative criteriology literature has 
slowly but steadily eroded over the last twenty years (Morse et aI., 2002). The 
diminishment of the importance of these criteria is usually based on the view that 
reliability and validity are too narrowly defined to be appropriate for qualitative 
research (e.g., Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Kirk & Miller, 1986; LeCompte & Goetz, 
1982; Reason & Rowan, 1981; Whittemore, Chase & Mandie, 2001)39. Reliability 
and validity are assumed to represent both a quantitative and a positivistic 
outlook (Angen, 2000; Charmaz, 2000; Schwandt, 2002). In such an outlook, 
measurable and high correlations between scores, raters, or different occasions 
are required to claim reliability. Validity requires measures such as strong 
positive correlations in the form of validity coefficients between, for example, test 
scores and some external criterion (e.g., a correlation between an IQ test and 
university grades). Because qualitative research does not usually measure 
attributes, it is assumed by many qualitative researchers to be unable to provide 
support in the form of reliability and validitlo. Therefore, the qualitative literature 
strongly tends towards the view that reliability and validity need to be redefined to 
allow for what is seen as the flexible and creative benefits of employing 
qualitative approaches (Agar, 1986; Kirk & Miller, 1986; LeCompte & Goetz, 
1982). Hence the profusion of alternative qualitative criteria. 
Furthermore, metatheories that are supported in the qualitative literature (e.g., 
postmodernism, social constructionism) tend to reject the ideas that underpin the 
validity criteria. These metatheories reject the use of reliability and validity 
39 Qualitative researchers in Europe and the United Kingdom are more likely to use reliability and 
validity compared to qualitative researchers in North America. In North America, the use of the 
alternative evaluative criteria is more usual (Morse et aI., 2002; Silverman, 2000). 
40 There are however important exceptions, for example, verbal protocol analysis measures inter-
coder reliability to assess the reliability of its encoding process (Green, 1995). 
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because they are assumed to be dependent on a concrete and stable view of 
'truth' (Le., there is a reality out there to be discovered, and it can be consistently 
discovered). Qualitative researchers often discount this view of 'truth' because 
they assume it does not allow for different realities and the idiosyncratic 
construction of reality by researchers and research participants. For example, 
Bernstein (1983) supports this position in his claim that, "there is no permanent, 
ahistorical framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature 
of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness" (p. 8). In the 
qualitative criteriology literature, the supposedly quantitative criteria of reliability 
and validity are taken as the criteria of positivistic thinking (Altheide & Johnson, 
1994), and therefore to be avoided (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Again, qualitative 
writers overlook the decline of positivism and other forms of empiricism and the 
evolution of the postpositivist/empiricist alternatives in response to the justifiable 
criticisms of positivism/empiricism. However, as Seale (1999a) suggests that, in 
relation to the role of the traditional evaluative criteria, 'We do not have to 
abandon skills developed under one paradigm because another paradigm has 
come along" (p. 466). 
Qualitative researchers have proposed, and continue to seek, alternative criteria 
to reliability and validity that are believed to be more appropriate for their 
research. Arguably, the most well known of the alternative criteria is Lincoln and 
Guba's (1985) notion of 'trustworthiness,41 which comprises four criteria -
'credibility', 'transferability', 'dependability', and 'confirmability,42 - to which the 
'authenticity' criteria have been added (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 
1986)43. As is typical of the early statements of alternative criteria, Lincoln and 
41 Lincoln and Guba's (1985) concept of 'trustworthiness' is intended as a synonym for rigour. 
42 'Transferability' and 'dependability' were originally 'fittingness' and 'auditability' respectively 
(Morse et aI., 2002). 
43 The authenticity criteria are, 'fairness', 'ontological authenticity', 'educative authenticity', 
'catalytic authenticity', and 'tactical authenticity' (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1986). 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) introduced these criteria because they did not "parallel" the traditional 
criteria, as did the trustworthiness criteria, but reflected a constructionist approach to research, 
and in particular, research using case studies. 
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Guba's (1985) criteria approximate the traditional criteria of reliability 
(dependability), internal validity (credibility), external validity (transferability), and 
objectivity (confirmability). Since Lincoln and Guba's (1985) introduction of the 
trustworthiness criteria, the multitude of alternative criteria that have been 
proposed has not helped resolve qualitative research's inability to satisfactorily 
provide a justification for rejecting the validity criteria. This is a point some 
qualitative writers openly accept (e.g., Banister et aI., 1994) arguing that this is 
because there is no clear argument that has emerged that justifies the rejection 
of the validity criteria. However, postmodernist writers have sought to promote 
the relativistic idea that each metatheory should have its own evaluative criteria 
(Seale, 1999a). Whittemore et al (2001) describe Lincoln and Guba's promotion 
of alternative criteria, as starting a process that has led to an "epistemological 
quagmire" in qualitative research (p. 523). There is now a remarkable range of 
different and opposing pOSitions on the nature and place of evaluative criteria 
within qualitative research (Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Seale, 1999b). Seale 
(1999a) argues that it is the nature of qualitative research to value flexibility and 
creativity, and that this is strongly at odds with the perception of quantitative 
researchers always setting and adhering to the same set of evaluative criteria (p. 
467). It is generally accepted in the qualitative research literature that the 
struggle to find appropriate criteria continues (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Seale, 1999b). 
By contrast, this thesis suggests that the criteria of validity are still highly relevant 
to qualitative research. The use of validity criteria offers the best way forward for 
qualitative research to resolve the criteriology debate, to legitimise qualitative 
research, and to ensure its rigour. 
Additionally, the 'internal' search for reliability and validity by the researcher 
during the research should be stressed. With the gradual rejection of the validity 
criteria by qualitative researchers there has been a steady shift towards the 
evaluation of completed research by external agents employing procedures such 
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as audit trials, member checks, and peer reviews (Morse et aI., 2002). Morse et 
al (2002) describe the need to employ rigour-enhancing 'mechanisms' within the 
qualitative process: 
These mechanisms are woven into every step of the inquiry to construct a solid product 
(Creswell, 1998; Kvale, 1989) by identifying and correcting errors before they are built in to 
the developing model and before they subvert the analysis ... Data are systematically 
checked, focus is maintained, and the fit of data and the conceptual work of analysis and 
interpretation are monitored and confirmed constantly. Verification strategies help the 
researcher identify when to continue, stop or modify the research process in order to achieve 
reliabtHty and validity and ensure rigour. (pp. 9-10) 
The criteria of trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), for example, promote 
strategies that attempt to evaluate rigour (e.g., member checks) but these do not 
necessarily ensure rigour (see Morse et aI., 2002, pp. 8-9). Member checks, also 
known as respondent validation, involves some form of feedback to the 
respondent by the researcher as to what the respondent's issues are, and what 
his or her interpretation is. Therefore, the respondent, not the researcher, 
becomes the arbiter of the quality of the information. In this situation problems 
may arise, for example, he respondent'may, or may not, understand the 
researcher's interpretation Qualitative researchers also need to ensure that the 
onus for rigour lies with the researcher as part of a critical peer group and not just 
with an external agent. The researcher is best placed to act to handle validity 
issues as they arise, and should not have to rely on others for the impetus to act. 
In the last part of this section, several arguments are made in support of the view 
that qualitative researchers are better served by using the validity criteria. First, 
the progress of science is aided by a critical community of scientists who broadly 
agree on the evaluation criteria to be applied to research (Hammersley, 1992; 
Popper, 1962). The validity criteria are the best candidates for criteria that can 
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be applied by all researchers. It is reasonable to suggest that quantitative 
researchers share a more or less common view of what constitutes validity 
(although this concept has its own share of controversy). Alternatively, the 
availability of a large number of qualitative criteria has the affect of relativising 
judgments about research, which in turn helps to maintain largely artificial 
distinctions between qualitative and quantitative research. If qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to research, and individual qualitative methods, have 
their own tailored criteria, then it is an enormous task to see how knowledge 
claims can be compared within qualitative research, or judged across qualitative 
and quantitative studies. The quantitative operationalisation of reliability and 
validity typically requires certain measurement procedures, but the respective 
values that underpin reliability (Le., stability, consistency) and validity (Le., 
epistemic worth), can be applied in a way that meets the needs of qualitative 
research without the use of measurement procedures (Morse, 1999b). Aside 
from the issue of measurement, qualitative researchers will promote their 
methods more effectively by arguing that qualitative methods are similar to 
quantitative methods on the grounds that they can be reliable and valid. The 
wide range of procedural checks, cross-examinations of data, and record keeping 
in some qualitative methods makes them strong candidates to confer validity on 
knowledge claims. 
Some of the many procedures used to ensure rigour and promote validity and 
reliability in qualitative research are the following: constant case comparison, 
memoing, negative case analysis, inter-encoder checks/agreement, audit trails, 
respondent validation (or member checks), peer debriefing, deviant case 
analysis, persistent observation, investigator responsiveness, peer 
analysis/review, checking for researcher effects, full transcription, theoretical 
sampling (and/or sampling adequacy), adhering to the refutability principle, 
progressive subjectivity, structural corroboration, rigorous fieldnote conventions, 
tabulations, and category saturation (and/or comprehensive data treatment) 
(Bloor, 1983; Clavarino, Najman & Silverman, 1995; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
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Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982, 1989; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984; Morse, 1991; Morse et aL, 2002; Schwandt & Halpern, 
1989; Silverman, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1990}. When the most systematic and 
rigorous qualitative and quantitative methods are compared, it is not easy to 
discern which type is the more rigorous (Azar, 1999). 
Typically, in the qualitative literature triangulation also is offered as a procedure 
for promoting validity (e.g., Denzin, 1978; Gliner, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 
1984). However, in this thesis triangulation is not enthusiastically recommended 
for qualitative research as a rigour-enhancing procedure because it is an iII-
understood methodological double-edged sword. Triangulation can just as easily 
reduce the level of validity as increase it (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). Using two 
data collection methods (the most common form of triangulation in qualitative 
research) to research the same issue may provide consistent and 
complementary findings. Alternatively, the outcome may be two sets of 
contradictory findings that present two different versions of the research issue. 
The discussion of triangulation in the qualitative literature tends to be enthusiastic 
about its genuine potential virtues, for example, greater and more diverse insight, 
coverage of the weaker elements of the other method, without noting its potential 
disadvantages. 
As part of this argument to promote shared evaluative criteria (Forbes et aL, 
1999), the use of the same terminology for criteria as mainstream science is 
more than a cosmetic change. Sharing the same terminology should encourage 
greater interaction in the use of qualitative and quantitative methods between 
qualitative and quantitative researchers, and should serve to promote the funding 
of qualitative research by enhancing the scientific legitimacy of qualitative 
research (Morse et aL, 2002). 
The second argument in favour of the use of the validity criteria by qualitative 
researchers' is that the new qualitative criteria are weaker and different versions 
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of reliability and validity. Phillips (2000) demonstrates the weakness of the new 
criteria when he compares 'credibility' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 301) with 
validity. Credibility is shown to be a weaker concept than validity because of its 
uncritical acceptance of any research under certain circumstances. This 
argument is discussed in detail in section 5.4. 
Third, the alternative criteria have not helped resolve the legitimation crisis in 
qualitative research (see Denzin, 1997), and do not appear to have promoted the 
use of qualitative research in psychology. Using the validity criteria should help 
in the promotion of qualitative research in psychology, where the validity criteria 
are typicaly accepted, and may help to defuse the legitimation crisis. Fourth, by 
emphasising the alternative criteria, qualitative researchers have inadvertently 
supported the view that qualitative research is unconcerned with reliability and 
validity, and even the idea that qualitative research is inherently unreliable and 
invalid (Morse, 1999b; Morse et aI., 2002, p. 4). Qualitative researchers need to 
reclaim reliability and validity to dispel this myth. Lastly, re-employing the validity 
criteria helps emphasize the desirability of using strategies that promote rigour 
during the research process (e.g., negative case analysis) rather than after the 
research (e.g., an audit trial) when problems can be identified but not resolved 
(Morse et aI., 2002). 
5.3 Grounded theory 
The first qualitative method to be assessed for its ability to make reliable and 
valid knowledge claims is grounded theory. The origins of grounded theory and 
its different interpretations are first characterised, followed by a detailed 
introduction to grounded theory's research procedures. This extensive 
background will enable an informed judgment to be made on grounded theory's 
capacity to employ the criteria of validity and reliability. 
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5.3.1 The origins of grounded theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) originally developed grounded theory (GT) as an 
alternative qualitative approach to the dominant hypothetico-deductive, 
quantitative methods employed to investigate the 'great man' sociological 
theories of the time (Haig, 1996). In contrast to these quantitative hypothetico-
deductive approaches, the key aim of GT is held to be the inductive generation of 
theory by 'everyday' researchers in order to understand empirical phenomena 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). GT also aims to legitimise qualitative research through 
the systematic application of rigorous procedures that allow the development of 
theory grounded in data (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). GT provides an 
original and comprehensive approach to generating theories that goes beyond 
the scope of data collection and analysis methods. Since 1967, GT has 
continued to be developed, thus reinforcing its stature as a rigorously systematic 
set of inductive, and latterly deductive, procedures to explain data44 (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p. 24). 
GT can be understood as a specific form of method. However, GT can be 
understood as a methodology, a general scientific method, and a form of 
substantive theory which result from GT research (Haig, 1996; B. D. Haig, 
personal communication, July 15, 2003). GT also allows for the complementary 
use of both qualitative and quantitative research (Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss, 1987). Neither Glaser nor Strauss sees a problem with mixing 
qualitative and quantitative research in GT. In fact, the first GT study was 
quantitative in nature (Glaser, 1964). 
5.3.2 Grounded theory and psychology 
GT has many applications in psychology, primarily in the areas of applied 
psychology, including, clinical psychology (e.g., Borrill & IIjon-Foreman, 1996; 
Wiersma, 2003), psychotherapy (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Bolger, 1999), 
44 The issue of whether GT produces a theory that explains data or a theory that merely describes 
data will be considered in this chapter. 
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psychological medicine (e.g., Green, Galvin & Horne, 2003; Wilson, Hutchinson 
& Holzemer, 2002), industrial and organisational psychology (e.g., Crook & 
Kumar, 1998; Halme, 2002), community psychology (e.g., Pilowsky, 1993), and 
health psychology (e.g., ?wanson & Chenitz, 1993; Sque & Payne, 1996). There 
are recent examples of studies that combine a qualitative GT approach with other 
quantitative methods (e.g., Borrayo & Jenkins, 2003; Melville, Wall & Anderson, 
2002; see Morgan & Stewart, 2002), but a literature search has been unable to 
find examples of qualitative and quantitative GT methods used within the one 
study. Henwood & Pidgeon (2001) is a partial exception. They integrate 
qualitative and quantitative procedures within a focus group approach but only 
apply an adapted grounded theory methodology to their data analysis procedures 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 2001). 
5.3.3 The different interpretations of grounded theory 
The original framework of GT has undergone separate development and 
clarification by Glaser (1978,1992,1998, 2002a & b), and Strauss and Corbin 
(Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998). Glaser and Strauss and 
Corbin no longer agree on the best account of GT, and this has resulted in two 
distinct versions of the methodology (Stern, 1994). These Glaserian and 
Straussian versions of GT have markedly different views on some aspects of the 
GT research process, and the relevance of the traditional criteria of research 
evaluation. However, both versions of GT do share many similarities (e.g., the 
use of constant comparison analysis, theoretical sampling, and theoretical 
memos). In either form, GT is currently the most complete qualitative method 
available to social scientists, and arguably, the most commonly employed 
(Denzin, 1994)45. 
45 A number of writers have noted that often only parts of GT are used in qualitative studies but 
the researchers still claim their approach is GT (e.g., Alvesson & Sk6ldberg, 2000). This practice 
provides a potentially misleading impression of the frequency of the use of GT. Even a cursory 
glance at the social science databases confirms the considerable variation in the degree of the 
application of GT procedures. 
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Glaser and Strauss and Corbin appear to make little, if any, use of 
methodological developments in the philosophy of science (Haig, 1996), and tend 
to view GT with an instrumentalist's philosophical detachment46 (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). What they say about their philosophical 
leanings does not amount to a clear position in spite of the pragmatic and 
symbolic interactionist origins of GT. Corbin and Strauss (1990) acknowledge 
that GT is underpinned by pragmatism (in particular, Dewey, 1925, 1937, and 
Mead, 1917,1934; see Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 5; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 
279) and symbolic interactionism (based on Park & Burgess, 1921; Hughes, 
1971; and Blumer, 1969; see Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 5). However, Corbin 
and Strauss (1990) stress a researcher does not need to agree with pragmatism 
or symbolic interaction ism in order to employ GT. Strauss and Corbin (1994) 
claim to specifically reject positivism, although their unusual understanding of 
positivism is contained in their comment, "A theory is not the formulation of some 
discovered aspect of a preexisiting reality "out there"" (p. 279). Following 
Addelson (1990), Strauss and Corbin (1994) stress a fallible, temporally limited, 
perspectivism. That is, the perspective of the researcher strongly influences the 
interpretation of the grounded theory (e.g., a researcher's values will play an 
inevitable role in the interpretation of data), but that this theory is inevitably fallible 
(i.e., no theory can be said to be error free), and will be reinterpreted and 
qualified over time and by other researchers (e.g., what is understood as the 
correct treatment for the cardiovascular condition Metabolic Syndrome is likely to 
be very different in twenty years time; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, pp. 279-281). The 
roles of historical and social contexts are also recognised. For example, very 
wealthy Torontoians could be said to differ in their perspective on Canada's 
relatively open immigration policy compared to the view of 'boat people' from the 
Dominician Republic. Likewise, a 15th century perspective on the need to 
politically enfranchise women would be greatly different from a modern 
46 Strauss and Corbin's instrumentalism is in line with Dewey's pragmatic view of instrumentalism 
(Rennie, 1998). Strauss and Corbin's instrumentalism can be seen as the view that the 
warranted assertability of research and research concepts lies in their ability to appropriately 
guide our actions in the world (Schwandt, 2001). 
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perspective (in many countries). In this respect Strauss maintains that "[the 
universe's] phenomena should be partly determinable via naturalistic analysis, 
including the phenomenon of men [and women] participating in the construction 
of the structures which shape their lives" (Strauss, 1987, p. 123). Charmaz 
(2000) notes that the metatheoretical position of Strauss and Corbin has become 
increasingly "theoretically diffuse" (p. 512). 
Outside the writing of Glaser and Strauss and Corbin, there are several other 
interpretations of GT. Generally, these views are responses to the considerable 
antirealist criticisms of GT for its so-called 'positivistic' nature (Charmaz, 2000). 
The different metatheoretical interpretations of GT by Rennie (1998, 2000), 
Charmaz (1990,1995,2000), and Henwood and Pidgeon (1992,1994; 1995, 
2003; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997), try to place GT in a metatheoretical position 
between realism and relativism (Rennie, 2000, p. 482), between 
positivism/empiricism/postpositivism and postmodernism (Charmaz, 2000, p. 
510, p. 525), or between realism and constructionism (Henwood & Pidgeon, 
2003, p. 134) respectively. Alternatively, Haig (1996) reconstructs GT in 
scientific realist methodological terms; arguing that scientific realism has 
responded to its anti realist critics and developed into more viable forms within 
which GT can operate. These four alternative approaches to the use of GT will 
be briefly introduced. 
Charmaz (1990, 1995, 2000) argues for a constructionist approach to GT on the 
grounds that the grounded theory should be seen as a construction by the 
researcher and not the reflection of an objective reality (Le., where an external 
and real world is assumed and the GT is 'discovered,)47. Charmaz (2000) argues 
that, "Postmodernism can inform realist study of experience rather than simply 
serve as justification for abandoning it" (2000, p. 528, emphasis in the original). 
47 Charmaz (2000) contrasts her constructionist view of GT with 'objectivist' GT, which she 
characterises as accepting "the positivistic assumption of an external world that can be described, 
analyzed, explained, and predicted: truth, but with a small t' (p. 524). In the context of her article, 
Charmaz equates objectivism with realism. 
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For Charmaz, postmodernism has highlighted what realism needs to do to put its 
house in order. This involves "forc[ing] renewed awareness of our relationships 
with and representation of subjects" (p. 528), and a greater appreciation of the 
influence of psychosocial and historical factors on the interpretation of data. 
Charmaz wants grounded theorists of all persuasions to address the issue of 
reflexivity in their research. 
Henwood and Pidgeon (1992, 1994, 1995, 2003; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997) 
also propose a constructionist revision of GT. One of their key reasons for 
advocating constructionism is the need to address Hammersley's (1989, 1996) 
'dilemma of qualitative method'. Hammersley's dilemma is his concurrent 
commitment in qualitative research to the use of rigorous scientific processes and 
the creative and interpretive investigation of data. Henwood and Pidgeon 
suggest the resolution to this dilemma lies with a form of constructionism. 
Henwood and Pidgeon (2003), like Charmaz, strongly support the view that 
"[t]heory cannot simply emerge from or reflect data, because interpretation and 
analysis is always conducted within some preexisiting conceptual framework 
brought to the task by the analyst" (p. 134). 
Rennie (1998, 2000) applies a phenomenological, pragmatic, and inductive 
hermeneutical approach to GT that he calls 'methodical hermeneutics'. Rennie 
also draws on C. S. Peirce's theory of inference and the 'new rhetoric' (defined 
as "the art of persuading an audience to a point of view"; Rennie, 2000, p. 491), 
to further support his pOSition. Rennie's approach to GT primarily aims at 
resolving the tension between relativism and realism in GT (Rennie, 2000, p. 
482) in order to make GT more acceptable to a broader range of researchers. 
This approach is similar to both Charmaz's and Henwood and Pidgeon's 
approaches. All three approaches aim to retain both the systematic rigour and 
the creative interpretation in GT. However, unlike the other two interpretations, 
Rennie strongly rejects relativism. 
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Haig (1996) argues that scientific realism can also offer an alternative basis for 
GT. Scientific realism accepts the need for scientific rigour, and does not 
exclude the benefits of being creative and flexible as part of empirical research. 
With scientific realism, the application of procedures to promote rigour does not 
necessarily restrict the researcher's interpretation. Haig's (1996) application of 
his abductive account of scientific method provides a promising framework for the 
use of grounded theory within a scientific realist metatheory. 
There is no single way of applying GT, and it is unlikely that there will ever be a 
standard form of GT (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 151). The GT literature 
provides a large and rapidly expanding body of work that reflects Glaser and 
Strauss's (1967) original wish that GT be applied creatively and flexibly, and 
supports Charmaz's (2000) opinion that the understanding of GT should be 
contested. An examination of articles in the GT literature provides substantial 
evidence for the diverse and somewhat piecemeal application of GT (Stern, 
1994). For example, there are 'abbreviated' and 'full' forms of GT. The former 
only applies selective coding in order to meet time or financial resource 
constraints (Glaser, 1992; Willig, 2001). For example, if the data collection 
method involved 25 interviews, only 15 of those interviews may be fully and 
formally analysed. However, abbreviated studies do generally follow the same 
set of GT procedures as the full version but do not employ open coding. 
Grounded theories can also be categorised as 'substantive' or 'formal' (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Substantive theories are developed for 
a substantive or empirical area (e.g., how should emergency medical teams 
provide care for severely injured patients?). Formal theories are developed for a 
formal or conceptual area (e.g., what is chronic pain?). The grounded theory 
procedures can lead to either type of theory, but normally a formal GT stems 
from a substantive GT (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). The distinction between 
SUbstantive and formal GT appears somewhat arbitrary and essentially refers to 
lower levels (Le., substantive) and higher levels (Le., formal) of generality within 
different grounded theories (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000, pp. 30-31). 
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5.3.4 The GT research process 
Before considering GT's ability to meet the criteria of reliability and validity, the 
GT research process will be characterised with reference to both Glaserian and 
Straussian versions and, where relevant, the four alternative metatheoretical 
views briefly noted above. This characterisation follows the typical GT 
procedural path of focusing on the GT's area of study, data collection, constant 
comparison analysis and coding, theoretical memoing, negative case analysis 
and theoretical sampling, leading to category saturation. The problems GT faces 
by describing but not explaining its data, and its confusing procedural terminology 
and literature, are then discussed. 
Focusing the GT's area of study 
GT research studies do not share a common understanding of how 
circumscribed the area of study should be. Typically, GT starts with a relatively 
open research question or area of interest that does not burden the research with 
assumptions about the phenomena under study (e.g., what are patients' 
experiences when being comforted whilst in acute pain? Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 
pp.37-40). Some users of GT prefer to begin with a specific set of research 
objectives but give themselves the freedom to then ignore or adapt those 
objectives. Both the Glaserian and Straussian versions of GT allow for the 
expansion or narrowing of the research area during the research if such change 
is judged appropriate. Overall, Strauss and Corbin (1998) have a more 
prescriptive position than Glaser. Strauss and Corbin argue that researchers can 
begin by explicitly raising specific questions of interest at the outset in order to 
guide the GT process. Glaser (1992) strongly believes that a researcher should 
avoid preconceived ideas and hypotheses, and undertake GT with "the abstract 
wonderment of what is going on" (p. 22). Glaser wants researchers to avoid 
contaminating data analysis by employing hypotheses from sources outside the 
data under study, although Glaser and Strauss (1967) accepted from the outset 
that the researcher was not a tabula rasa. Glaser (1992) argues that the existing 
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literature in the research area under study can be utilised, but not until the 
researcher reaches the end of the analysis process and is in the latter stages of 
constructing the grounded theory. 
It is argued in this thesis that it is questionable to ignore the ideas of other 
researchers at the beginning of a research study. Researchers learn from the 
mistakes and successes of other researchers, and, potentially science is 
advanced through critical peer revision. Cutliffe (2000) states that the grounded 
theorist should consider the relevant literature before beginning a GT process 
because it "helps ... conceptual density, enhances the richness of concept 
development, and subsequently the process of theory development" (p. 1481) . 
. Whilst the Straussian version does not wish to restrict the GT process with 
presuppositions, it has evolved to be more lenient towards the creation and 
verification of hypotheses and the role of questions at the start of and throughout 
the analysis process (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This Straussian approach is 
more in line with the recent trend in qualitative research that supports a 'neither 
too loose nor too restrictive' view of initial question setting (Henwood & Pidgeon, 
2003). The Strauss ian and Glaserian versions of GT have clearly separated on 
the question of how focused the initial area of interest needs to be. Whatever the 
research area or questions to be addressed, Henwood and Pidgeon (1995; 
Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997) sensibly emphasise the need for "setting realizable 
goals" in GT, particularly for researchers inexperienced with this approach. 
Research goals can be set to put intelligent and practical limitations on the GT, 
lest the researchers create overwhelming amounts of data, or try to address a 
research area that is too broad or complex. 
From a realist tradition, Haig (1996) argues that GT can be profitably cast as a 
problem-solving endeavour (p. 282). Haig's (1996) suggested abductive 
framework offers a more scientifically cohesive and robust approach to 
researching problems in GT than either the Glaserian or the Straussian versions. 
Haig's maintains that conventional GT contains misunderstandings about the 
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scientific framing of research problems. These include conceptualizing methods 
and problems as different parts of the research project, establishing methods 
before the 'problem', and understanding problems as temporal phases of 
research (Haig, 1987, 1996). Both Glaser and Strauss see problem-solving as a 
key method of focusing GT. Glaser (1992, p. 4) emphasizes that problem-solving 
plays a critical role in directing the GT research process. Specifically, the 
detailed formulation of the problem can become a vital first step in the GT 
process because it guides the construction of the research approach based on its 
own formulation (Haig, 1996, pp. 282-283). 
Haig (1996) argues that the abductive account of method offers a better 
approach to the selection and formulation of problems within GT. He deploys the 
constraint-composition account of problems within the abductive theory of 
method because it allows the researcher to "explain how inquiry is possible, and 
at the same time provide guidance for the conduct of research" (p. 282). 
Formulating the problem will greatly improve the ability of the researcher to· 
formulate a solution to the problem. However, in Glaserian GT, and usually in 
Straussian GT, the method comes before the formulation of the problem, which 
emerges during data analysis (Brooks, 1997). Therefore, Haig's reconstruction 
of the role of problems in GT may appear prescriptive in the Glaserian version, 
but could be used in the Straussian approach. An initial statement of the problem 
does not have to be understood as prescriptive but as facilitative. The 
formulation of a research problem allows for the problem to be thoroughly 
developed through the use of GT procedures; the problem formulation does not 
determine the structure of the GT. Based on Haig;s reconstruction of GT, Brooks 
(1997) notes "by thus ignoring the importance of the problem definition in 
researching the solution, Glaser and Strauss's methodology displays a 
misconception about the nature of scientific research" (p. 3D). 
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Data col/ection in GT 
Once the area, objective, or problem of interest is established, the grounded 
theorist can collect data through a wide selection of possible methods. Writers 
on GT do not normally prescribe what data collection methods should be used. 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches can both be accommodated, although 
GT almost always employs a qualitative approach to research (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). Generally, grounded theorists do not have much to say about specific 
data collection methods, a disinterest that borders on neglect. This may be 
because GT is dominated by a rigorous and innovative combination of data 
analysis methods. A relatively small number of in-depth, face-te-face interviews 
(N = 10-25) tends to be the most common method (Creswell, 1998), although 
there are many possible data collection methods that can, and have been, 
applied - for example, focus groups (e.g., Green, 1997; Henwood & Pidgeon, 
2001; Poorman, 2002), in-depth interviews (e.g., Abrahamsson, Berggren, 
Hallberg & Carlsson, 2002; Wilson et aI., 2002), semi-structured interviews (e.g., 
Giacobbi, Hausenblas, Fallon & Hall, 2003; McVey, Madill & Fielding, 2001; 
Timlin-Scalera, Ponte rotto , Blumberg & Jackson, 2003) participant observations 
(e.g., Kimle & Damhorst, 1997), and text analysis (e.g., Pierce, 2000; see Schou 
& Hewison, 1998). Grounded theorists may prefer to limit their data collection 
strategies to lessen the complexities of the data analysis. Although this tendency 
is diminishing with many recent studies using multiple data collection methods 
(e.g., Friedlander, Heatherington & Maars, 2000; Karp & Tanarugsacheck, 2000). 
Constant comparison and open, axial, theoretical, and selective coding 
In GT, data collection immediately leads to data analysis. Data collection and 
data analysis are best characterised as concurrent and interactive activities that 
proceed until the categories that have formed are saturated. As the data 
collection and data analysis begins, the researcher groups data (for Glaser 
'incidents' are grouped) that share similar characteristics through the application 
of the process of constant comparison analysis that codes the data into 
categories. Constant comparison analysis means the researcher constantly 
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compares the similarities and differences in the data within and between the 
emerging categories. The comparison can be between any data that the 
researcher deems important, for example, between actions, times, people, and 
situations (e.g., the number of times a nurse comforts a patient, what form or 
forms of comfort are used, who else offers comfort etc). Constant comparison 
analysis is a rigorous and continuous process that aims to account for all the data 
and the relationships between the data. It also helps to keep the researcher 
focused on building a theory from the relationships within the data, and ground 
the theory. 
For Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) and Glaser (1978, 1992) the first of the 
three coding processes within constant comparison analysis is open coding. In 
Straussian GT, open coding begins with conceptualising data to form concepts 
that are then labelled. Glaser prefers to describe open coding as the 
identification of incidents, which are conceptualised into subcategories and 
categories. For Strauss and Corbin concepts are then grouped to form 
categories, which are in turn named. Categories are further developed as data 
analysis continues and categories become more complex. Each category will 
have a list of stated properties. A category can also be 'dimensionalized'. 
Dimensionalizing is the placement of the category onto a range of dimensional 
continua in order to assess the scope of a category. Each category can have a 
'dimensional profile' of several continua. 
Open coding is essentially the progressively more specific and accurate labelling 
of concepts that evolve into denser categories, moving from initially broad and 
descriptive concept labels or codes to highly analytical codes. It can be 
considered the most important and basic procedure in GT because it clearly and 
specifically grounds the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Open coding can be as 
specific as word-by-word or as broad as interview-by-interview, but is usually 
undertaken line-by-line. Glaser (1978) argues that line-by-line coding is a very 
important procedure, because it forces the researcher to stay close to the data, 
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and helps keep the researcher in touch with the participants' views. Glaser 
rejects what he sees as the over conceptualisation of data by Strauss and Corbin 
who suggest that coding each word can be appropriate (Glaser, 2002a, calls this 
"conceptual foppery", p. 11). If a researcher attempts to code every word or 
incident, the data analysis may become unmanageable (see Brooks, 1997, p. 
20). The selective application of such a fine level of analysis is a better strategy. 
This is probably how Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) intended the finer open 
coding to be used (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 72-73). Although neither 
Strauss nor Corbin have chosen to respond to Glaser's many vivid criticisms of 
their coding processes, they do make it clear that they do not intend their version 
of GT to be as prescriptive as Glaser and others such as Charmaz (2000) 
forcefully assert it to be. In this regard, Strauss and Corbin (1998) note, ''We 
know that readers will treat the material in this book as items on a smorgasbord 
table from which they can choose, reject, and ignore according to their own 
"tastes" - and rightly so" (pp. 8-9). In relation to their data analysis procedures, 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest, "These procedures were designed not to be 
followed dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers 
as they deem appropriate" (p. 13). However, it is typical of Strauss and Corbin's 
writing to stress flexibility but then to place what seems greater stress on specific 
procedural prescriptions. 
A further consideration is Glaser's (1998) declaration that GT interviews should 
not be transcribed or even taped. He recommends this approach in order that 
the researcher can avoid being caught up in the minutiae of data. Researchers 
can better see the 'big picture' or the important 'patterns' in the data if they are 
not troubled with detailed transcripts. Glaser suggests that researchers can rely 
on their memories for the critical data (Glaser, 1996). This recommendation is 
not at odds with Glaser's recommendation for line-by-line analysis, because it is 
the data that have been recalled that are to be analysed line-by-line. This thesis 
accepts the qualitative researchers' need to be careful about the levels of data 
they generate, and, as Strauss and Corbin suggest, researchers need to apply a 
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fine level of analysis selectively. However, not to transcribe or even tape 
interviews is a highly questionable practice. Qualitative researchers need to be 
able to demonstrate exactly from where they generated their findings for their 
research to be considered valid and reliable. Exposing their data collection and 
analysis to the frailties of human memory threatens the prosecution of rigorous 
qualitative research. 
Following open coding, Strauss and Corbin (1990) apply axial coding. Axial 
coding aims to make discoveries and connections between subcategories and 
categories, and between categories and categories, usually by using a coding 
paradigm (also known as a 'paradigm model'). These connections help the 
researcher build towards a theory (e.g., connections between the categories of 
verbal comfort and physical comfort). Significantly, Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
suggest that the grounded theorist use both inductive and deductive thinking to 
aid the axial coding process (p. 111). The coding paradigm employed in axial 
coding aims to identify the conditions or subcategories that give rise to each 
category (Le., the context, action/interaction strategies, causal conditions, 
intervening conditions, phenomenon, and consequences of each category, 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 99-108). Strauss and Corbin suggest that the coding 
paradigm should focus on the themes of 'process' and 'change' (see Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, pp. 143-157). Glaser does not use axial coding through coding 
paradigms, preferring to engage in 'theoretical coding', which aims at coding the 
relationship between categories without recourse to superimposed coding 
frameworks. 
Strauss (1987) initially recommended using a coding paradigm to help the 
researcher investigate how categories related to their data, but coding paradigms 
can have the affect of alerting researchers to other relationships in the data. 
Coding paradigms do have the virtue of helping the researcher establish what 
categories or category is most important in the identification of the emerging 
theory. Glaser (1992), amongst others, disagrees with the imposition of a pre-
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constructed coding paradigm. He questions why the constructs of 'process' and 
'change' should be assumed to be relevant and given priority by Strauss and 
Corbin. Glaser (1992) argues that a coding paradigm may be relevant but only 
when this is indicated by the data. There are many coding paradigms that can be 
helpful (Glaser, 1978, notes 18 families of codes), but in keeping with the original 
inductive intent of GT, the data are the most likely source for a coding paradigm. 
Melia (1996) describes the concerns with Straussian coding prescriptions as 
follows: "I always have a nagging doubt that the procedures are getting in the 
way; the technical tail is beginning to wag the theoretical dog" (p. 376). Glaserian 
grounded theorists fear that by relying too heavily on procedural prescriptions the 
flexibility of the GT process will be lost. 
The next step in the data analysis process for both Glaser and Strauss and 
Corbin is selective coding. Selective coding is the refinement or 'delimiting' of the 
categories into a more parsimonious set of categories, and establishing the 
relationships between those categories. As a result, selective coding should 
generate a core category that systematically relates to all other categories. 
Strauss (1987, p. 36) provides criteria for the selection of the core category. As 
part of the selective coding process, the categories that require further refinement 
and development are improved (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p 116). Glaser (1978, 
1992), and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) argue that the core category is 
critical to the emergence of GT. Alternatively, aiming for a core category can be 
unhelpful as, for instance, when a coding paradigm arbitrarily prioritises 'process' 
and 'change' data. The data analysis may result in a core category but it may 
alternatively result in several competing categories that are juxtaposed. This 
does not mean the GT was undertaken incorrectly, but that the inability to reach a 
core category may better reflect the nature of the area under research. 
Enlarging the role of theoretical memoing in GT 
This thesis argues that even as the research objectives, research area, or 
research problem are being discussed an initial and important part of the GT 
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approach is making theoretical memos. This is not to be confused with 
theoretical coding. The view that theoretical coding should begin at the same as 
the research begins enlarges the typical account of the role of theoretical memos. 
Memos usually provide a systematic record of, and aid to, the movement from 
data to conceptualising categories, and are normally placed within the constant 
comparison analysis process. Alternatively, theoretical memoing can be seen as 
the recording of any aspect of the study that significantly affects the generation of 
the theory, from the coding of a category to the reconsideration of the research 
area, to disagreements between researchers48 , or the specific conceptualising of 
a theory. Memos can be written about anything that the researcher believes is 
important in the development of the theory. The need for memoing continues 
throughout the data collection and analysis in order to record the process and 
nature of the theory's generation. The detail and form of a memo are whatever 
are most useful to the researcher, but it should be able to be related back to the 
date and data from which it arose. 
Strauss & Corbin (1990, pp. 197-223) provide for a range of non-theoretical 
memos as well as theoretical memos, including: code notes (Le., notes on open, 
axial, and selective coding); theoretical notes (Le., notes that contain all 
information about the categories and categorizing, including theoretically 
sensitising and summarising memos (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 197); 
operational notes (Le., notes on any operational aspect of the research but also 
any ideas that may relate to the research); diagrams of relationships between 
concepts; and, logic diagrams of relationships between categories. This range of 
memos and diagrams would seem to cover any note or memo contingency. 
However, the researcher needs to prioritise' memoing, and it is argued in this 
48 Glaser (1998) believes that grounding theory is a solitary process, and the involvement of more 
than one researcher will lead to arguments. This thesis argues that the use of multiple 
researchers in a GT study may lead to arguments, but on balance, it will also significantly improve 
the quality of the research. I have been unable to find an expression of opinion by Strauss and 
Corbin on the use of multiple researchers in GT. The number of authors that are typically 
involved in any given published GT study suggests that the 'team' approach to GT analysis may 
be common. 
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thesis argues that the priority is best placed on theoretical memos as soon as the 
research process begins. If the theory is to be validated at the end of data 
analysis, the path to its construction needs to be clear, not distributed across 
several memo/note/diagram options. The other memo options are still useful but 
do not have the same priority as theoretical memos49• 
GT researchers typically see the role of theoretical memos as specific and 
discrete. For example, Charmaz (2000) sees theoretical memoing as, "the 
intermediate step between coding and the first draft of the completed 
analysis ... to spark our thinking and encourage us to look at our data and codes 
in new ways" (p. 517). This thesis argues that theoretical memoing is better 
employed to record the whole process of theory generation and that it therefore, 
cannot be restricted to one part of the research process, such as coding or 
categorizing. 
Negative case analysis and theoretical sampling 
Another key part of the constant comparison and coding process is negative case 
analysis. As comparing and coding continues, and as categories form and are 
revised through further analysis and data collection, researchers are directed to 
look for negative cases that are at odds with the categories, or for the links that 
have been made between categories (e.g., a form of verbal comforting that has 
typically been effective, but in a specific situation has been found to be strikingly 
ineffective). Negative case analysis helps account for the data, but of equal 
importance it prompts the revision of existing categories by making the 
researcher reconsider why the categories were formed. 
In a similar sense, theoretical sampling aims to instigate a process that results in 
checking and reconsidering categories through further selective data collection. 
Theoretical sampling usually aims to test the emerging theory, and tends to be 
employed when the coding and categorising are fairly advanced, although further 
49 Memoing of all kinds has an important role in the potential replication of the GT. 
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sampling can be used wherever there is a need50. For example, the need for 
sampling can arise early in GT if the researchers find themselves needing to 
expand their research area (e.g., the study of comforting of patients in acute pain 
may need to incorporate post-operative patients as well as patients from 
emergency rooms). 
Category saturation 
When the data are fully accounted for, and no new codes are required or new 
categories can be found, and all new data can be coded into existing categories, 
then the categories are said to be 'saturated' and the data analysis and collection 
can conclude (e.g., all forms of comforting are accounted for). However, 
theoretical saturation is normally a goal to strive for rather than something that 
can be practically attained in GT. Typically, most of the data are coded and 
categorised, but not all. Some data will not be relevant to the research study. In 
any case, Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Charmaz (2000) believe the resulting 
grounded theory is only provisional and subject to further scrutiny and 
development. The saturated and linked categories are the basis for the 
grounded theory that emerges. The core category that underpins the other 
categories serves as the main basis for the grounded theory. The final grounding 
of the theory occurs when the theory is checked "by laying out the theory in 
memos diagrammatically or narratively" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 133). 
5.3.5 Does GT explain or just describe data? 
An issue in GT methodology that requires examination is whether the resulting 
GT explains the data it is grounded in, or merely describes them. In the original 
formulation, Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue for an inductive approach to the 
50 There are four forms of sampling in GT. The first three types relate to a type of coding. 'Open 
sampling' operates during open coding, 'relational and variational sampling' relates to axial 
coding and 'discriminate sampling' is tied to selective coding (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 
175-193). Theoretical sampling then follows, and can be defined as, "sampling on the basis of 
concepts that have proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 
p. 176). 
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'discovery' of theory. In this approach the researcher cannot be a tabula rasa 
otherwise the researcher could not offer a perspective on the data (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, p. 3)51. Glaser (1992) then argues for an inductive approach 
solely aimed at discovering, but never testing, hypotheses. Strauss and Corbin's 
(1998) position evolves to where they believe it is more productive to use 
inductive and deductive approaches to verify as well as discover hypotheses. 
However, the exact nature of the inductive inferences (or discoveries) and the 
deductive inferences, are not clarified in either the Glaserian or the Strauss ian 
versions (Haig, 1996). This leaves a substantial question mark over precisely 
how the grounded theory emerges (Dey, 1999, p. 104). 
Typically, constant comparison analysis is offered as the process by which 
inductive and deductive inferences lead to the discovery of theory. However, in 
the ambiguous, dense, and abstract world of GT concepts, reference to the 
constant comparison procedures does not really clarify the mechanism of theory 
generation. There is no inferential mechanism explicitly highlighted in Glaser's 
writing on induction and theory generation. Glaser (2002a) argues that 
conceptual ising is the key process in the movement from data to patterns to 
categories and the emerging theory. However, what Glaser means by 
"conceptualising", and how it is to be used, is not clear. Unless the movement 
from data to theory involves something other than induction, Glaser would appear 
to offering only an account of descriptive inference about the data (8. D. Haig, 
personal communication, July 15, 2003). Similarly, Strauss and Corbin have not 
clarified the inferential mechanism of theory generation, although unlike Glaser 
they promote the selective use of deduction as well as induction. Therefore, the 
Straussian version can offer a theory that verifies as well as describes the data, 
but their grounded theory does not explain the data. 
51 Glaser and Strauss (1967) go as far as to suggest that the researcher uses his or her own 
"lived" and "personal" experience to gain a perspective on the data (p. 67, p. 252). 
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One solution to the 'problem of the missing inferential mechanism' in the 
generation of GT is to employ an abductive approach to inquiry (Haig, 1996), 
which can productively encompass both inductive and deductive inferences, and 
provide the explanatory inference for moving from data patterns or phenomena to 
theory. Haig argues for this approach using his abductive account of scientific 
method (Haig, 1996, 2002b). From Haig's (1996) application of the abductive 
method to GT, data are transformed into phenomena through inductive 
generalisations, but the explanatory move from phenomena to underlying causal 
mechanisms is characterised as abductive. From the underlying causal 
mechanisms a model or theory can be built. This abductive process better 
characterises the grounded theorist's 'discovery' of key categories or the core 
category that underpins the formulation of the grounded theory than does 
inductive method. 
5.3.6 Confusion over GT terminology and procedures 
The data analysis and data collection processes in GT are not well understood 
(Alvesson & Sk6ldberg, 2000; Charmaz, 2000; Dey, 1999). There are a number 
of reasons for this. The original GT text "The Discovery of Grounded Theory" 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) contained many ambiguities (Dey, 1999, p. 44), and 
clarification from Strauss and Glaser was slow to appear (Stern, 1994). The later 
works on GT by Glaser and Strauss and Corbin did not fully clarify the data 
analysis procedures and this further complicates the understanding of some 
procedures. The terms 'category/categorising', 'codes/coding', 
'concepts/conceptualising', 'incidents', 'data', 'phenomena', and 'patterns' tend to 
be conflated, and are not always used in the same ways in the Glaserian and 
Straussian versions, or by others who write about GT. At no point are the 
fundamental concepts of 'data' and/or 'incidents' defined in the earlier or later 
works of Glaser or Strauss and Corbin (Alvesson & Sk6ldberg, 2000, p. 20). 
What is more, the originators of GT tend to use interchangeable terms such as 
the 'coding paradigm' and the 'paradigm model', which refer to the same analysis 
procedure, but do not clarify whether these terms refer to the same procedure 
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(see Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser's dense, abstract, and at times bewildering 
writing style does not help matters (Bryant, 2003; Charmaz, 2000. p. 512). 
Strauss and Corbin have also become somewhat eclectic in their metatheoretical 
position. They appear to incorporate elements of na'ive realism, constructionism, 
and relativism in their explanations of GT (Charmaz, 2000). 
Perhaps in an attempt to remedy this problem, Strauss (1987), and Strauss and 
Corbin (1990, 1998), have become more prescriptive about how coding is to be 
undertaken, although they offer caveats to employ their prescriptions flexibly. 
New procedures such as dimensionalizing, using a coding paradigm, and the 
conditional matrix52 have been introduced to aid or sensitise the researcher in the 
analysis process and to the emerging theory. These new analysis prescriptions 
have served to further separate the Glaserian and Strauss ian versions of GT. 
Dey (1999, p. 44) raises the issue of whether anyone can confidently use GT 
given the confusion over the data analysis procedures. Certainly, this confusion 
explains much of the diversity in the application of GT. However, methods are 
rarely static, and are developed and refined as a matter of course. In their 
analysis of the efficacy of GT, Alvesson and Sk61dberg (2000) conclude that the 
many criticisms that have been raised about GT suggest that 
The further development and reformulation of grounded theory seems called for, building on a 
looser coupling to data and a more reflective focus upon the empirical material, combined 
with a bolder approach to the research process both in its foundations and theoretically. (p. 
34) 
Alvesson and Sk61dberg cite Haig's (1996) initial reconstruction of GT as an 
example of what users of GT need to consider developing a more scientific 
framework for GT. Rennie (1998, 2000) also offers a carefully articulated 
approach to GT that, although based on a different research tradition and 
52 A 'conditional matrix' aims to theoretically sensitise the researcher to potentially influential 
constructs such as ethnicity, power, gender, and socioeconomic status in the analysis process. 
metatheory than Haig's, provides another constructive attempt to resolve GT's 
outstanding issues. This is not to say GT does not currently offer a valuable 
approach, but, as Strauss and Corbin (1994) suggest, 
No doubt we will always prefer the later versions of grounded theory that are closest to or 
elaborate our own, but a child once launched is very much subject to a combination of its 
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origins and the evolving contingencies of life. Can it be otherwise with a methodology? (p. 
283) 
5.4 The ability of GT to meet the criteria of reliability and validity 
In the qualitative literature, the criteria of validity and reliability are not strongly 
associated with GT. This is due to two factors: the ambiguous relationship 
between Straussian GT and any system of evaluative criteria and the low profile 
and specialist nature of the criteria proposed in Glaserian GT. Originally, Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) suggested GT should meet three criteria, 'fit', 'relevance', and 
'work'. The traditional criteria of evaluation were not considered the most 
appropriate for GT because of the flexible nature of qualitative research (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967, p. 224). Glaser (1978,1992) later added 'modifiability' and the 
criterion of fit came to include the idea of 'grab' (now known as the criterion 'fit 
and grab'). Strauss and Corbin (1990,1998), and Corbin and Strauss (1990), 
make no further mention of the original or expanded criteria for GT proposed by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), and further developed by Glaser. Nor do Strauss and 
Corbin specifically relate GT to the traditional ~riteria, or any form of the 
'trustworthiness' criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), but they note that all such 
criteria are important. Instead they prefer to supplement the traditional and 
alternative criteria with two sets of additional criteria, specifically aimed at first, 
the adequacy of the research process, and second, the empirical grounding of 
studies (see Corbin & Strauss, 1990, pp. 16-20; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 252-
257; 1998, pp. 268-274). 
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Whilst Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) note reliability and validity are important 
goals of GT (e.g., 1998, p. 265), they are wary of "the more positivistic 
interpretations" (p. 266) of the traditional evaluative criteria and believe the 
traditional criteria have value but "require redefinition to fit the realities of 
qualitative research and the complexities of the social phenomena that we seek 
to understand" (p. 266). Unfortunately the nature of these redefinitions is not 
specified. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that each method or "mode of 
discovery" should generate its own "standards and procedures of achieving 
them" (p. 266). In this sense, the use of GT dictates the use of evaluative criteria 
specific to GT, but Strauss and Corbin do not mean to exclude any traditional or 
alternative criteria. The grounded theorist can, therefore, employ Glaser's 
criteria, any of the alternative criteria with Strauss and Corbin's (1990, 1998) 
specific GT supplements, or the traditional evaluative criteria with the same 
supplements. With their typically ambiguous emphasis on procedural'flexibility, 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) initially argue for the flexible use of evaluative criteria, 
noting that any evaluative criteria are no more than "guidelines" that should not 
be "hard and fast evaluative rules" (p. 20). However, they then place a much 
greater emphasis on researchers adhering to the "major criteria" of GT "unless 
there are exceptional reasons for not doing so" (p. 20). It is assumed that the 
major GT criteria referred to are the validity criteria (e.g., reliability) or any of the 
better-known alternative evaluative criteria (e.g., credibility), to which can be 
added the supplemental criteria proposed by Strauss and Corbin. 
This thesis suggests that GT can meet the criteria of validity without redefinition. 
It is important to note that validity and reliability are stronger concepts than the 
alternative criteria developed to redefine or replace them. For example, Glaser's 
criterion of 'fit and grab' is very similar to the concept of 'credibility', to which the 
corresponding traditional criterion is 'internal validity'. Fit can be described as 
how well the data fits the theory, and if the theory accurately represents the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 3). Grab relates to how relevant the theory is to the 
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people or substantive area under study53 (Chenitz & Swanson, 1986). To fulfil 
the 'grab' aspect of the criterion, the study's participants and other researchers 
should recognise the grounded theory that has emerged as fitting their own 
understanding of the area (Rennie et aI., 1988). Glaser believes that the rigour of 
the GT process ensures that the criterion of fit and grab will be automatically met 
(1978, 1992). It is not clear which GT procedures contribute directly to meeting 
the fit and grab criterion or whether it is the interaction of all of the GT procedures 
that satisfies the criterion. However, no data collection and analysis procedure 
can guarantee anything, although the use of rigorous procedures can of course 
promote the quality of findings. 
Fit and grab is analogous to Guba and Lincoln's notion of credibility (1982, 1989; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The above description of fit and grab could be a 
description of credibility, as it is usually understood. Credibility is intended to 
represent the 'truth value' of qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1982), and 
procedures are employed to ensure the 'truth value' is satisfied. The key 
procedure is 'member checks', where the data and their interpretations are 
checked with the research participants, or a selection of research participants, to 
ensure those who supplied the data believe that the research findings accurately 
reflect their input. Guba and Lincoln (1982) describe member checks as the 
"backbone of satisfying the truth value criterion" (p. 110). However, it is doubtful 
that member checks can be the key validating procedure for qualitative research. 
Democratic consensus can hardly be a guarantee of 'truth value'. Neither can it 
offer a solid foundation for the accuracy of the data or its interpretation. Member 
checks can be a useful procedure whereby researchers can reassess their 
interpretation, particularly in ethnography where an emic stance is common, but 
basing the research's internal validity on the opinion of the participants is a 
dubious procedure. As Phillips (2000) puts it, 
53 Grab overlaps considerably with Glaser's criterion of 'relevance'. 
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Guba and Lincoln are paying the price, here, of misidentifying truth with credibility. Credibility 
is a scandalously weak and inappropriate surrogate for truth or veracity - under appropriate 
circumstances any nonsense at all can be judged as "credible". (pp. 181-182) 
In an earlier paper, Guba (1981) applies member checks in two ways, both as an 
evaluative procedure and as a procedure to be regularly used during the 
research (see, pp. 85-86). While this broader use of member checks makes the 
procedure more useful, it does not overcome Phillips' criticism. 
The traditional criterion that is most similar to fit and grab and credibility is 
internal validity, which is normally understood as a criterion that indirectly 
approximates 'truth'. To strive for internal validity in research is to strive for 
research findings that 'truthfully' represent the reality under study. In scientific 
realism, reality cannot be accurately represented, but can be approximated. 
'Truth' cannot be guaranteed through research procedures, but serves as a 
regulative ideal that it is important to strive for (Phillips, 2000, p. 184). GT is 
improved if undertaken with the goal of achieving internal validity, because this 
criterion better represents the goal of truth than fit and grab or credibility. GT can 
maximise its ability to meet the criterion of internal validity, as well as the criteria 
of external validity and internal and external reliability, by the systematic 
application of multiple rigour-enhancing procedures (Morse et aI., 2002). The 
specific procedures to help GT meet the criteria of validity and reliability are set 
out below. It should be noted that validity and reliability are closely related 
concerns and the procedures to be presented often apply to both criteria. 
The procedures that are suggested in this thesis to meet the traditional criteria of 
validity in a GT approach are: constant case comparison (with a specific 
emphasis on justifying the categorisation of codes); memoing (in particular, 
memos that signal the origin of ideas for theory); negative case analysis (an 
essential procedure and one that can be productively applied in any qualitative 
research); respondent validation, or member checks (as part of the research 
135 
process but not as an evaluative procedure); peer analysis (this procedure is best 
understood as discussing one's interpretative 'logic' with other grounded theorists 
during the GT process); using full transcriptions54; theoretical sampling, and/or 
sampling adequacy (which is Morse et ai's., 2002, somewhat broader definition of 
rigorous theoretical sampling procedures for qualitative research, and is vital to 
meet the criterion of external validity); rigorous fieldnote conventions (sometimes 
overlooked in GT, or perhaps overshadowed by other procedures, but essential 
as the Chicago School and Blumer (1969) convincingly demonstrated); category 
saturation (with the acceptance that some of the data generated will always be 
irrelevant to the research area); and, comprehensive documentation (a key 
procedure if other researchers wish to replicate a study). 
This might seem to be a superfluity of procedures but each is genuinely useful. If 
GT is to be undertaken in its 'full' form, then these procedures will be part of a 
proper research commitment. Additional procedures can be applied, and may be 
essential, to promote reliability. For example, the use of inter-coder reliability 
checks could be profitably applied to GT. The usual and well-documented rigour-
enhancing procedures in GT include constant case comparison, memoing, 
theoretical sampling, negative case analysis, and category saturation. The 
additions to this set of procedures made above may not be crucial to ensuring GT 
is valid and reliable, but promote a higher standard of rigour in GT. GT does not 
guarantee reliability and validity, because no method can, but does provide a 
system that rigorously and transparently strives for reliability and validity through 
multiple rigour-enhancing procedures. 
5.5 Verbal protocol analysis 
Verbal protocol analysiS (VPA), also known as 'protOcol analysis', or 'think-aloud 
research', is the second qualitative method to be examined in order to determine 
whether it can meet the validity criteria and bridge the qualitative-quantitative 
54 Glaser (1998) does not believe that transcription is important, but this thesis considers it vital to 
be able to demonstrate where in the data the important insights were gleaned. 
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divide. The nature of VPA is briefly characterised in order to provide sufficient 
background for the consideration of its ability to provide a warrant for scientific 
knowledge claims. VPA is a very different method from GT, but, as will be 
shown, it also provides a good example of a rigorous and systematic qualitative 
method that does useful work in psychological research. 
5.5.1 The nature of VPA 
VPA can be characterised as an experimental and qualitative approach to 
eliciting and analysing verbal data as a way of understanding how people think 
(Ericsson, 2001). VPA is a complex, highly prescriptive approach to generating 
and analysing verbal data (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984/1993). It is also 
underpinned by an explicit and validated information processing theory of the 
verbalization of thought (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1979; Ericsson & Simon, 
1980,1984/1993). The combination of the VPA method, in conjunction with its 
accompanying theory of information processing and verbalization, provides 
researchers with a scientific framework to reliably understand the cognitive 
processes that underlie verbalizations. As will be seen, however, VPA is a 
method that assists in the detection of phenomena. 
The nature of VPA is a response by its originators, Newell, Ericsson, and Simon, 
to the need to develop a method that uses verbal data in a scientifically reputable 
way. Ericsson and Simon's (1984/1993) texts on VPA are in large part 
comprehensive and scholarly justifications for the scientific worth of VPA. 
Ericsson and Simon (1984/1993) maintain that their use of verbal data upholds 
scientific values. They assert, 'Whether one can and should trust subjects' 
verbal reports is not a matter of faith but an empirical issue on a par with the 
issue of validating other types of behavior like eye fixations or motor behavior" (p. 
9). Ericsson and Simon (1993) understand verbal behavior as recordable 
behaviour that can be researched like any other behaviour. They maintain 
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The cognitive processes that generate verbalizations are a subset of the cognitive processes 
that generate any kind of recordable response or behaviour. Hence, we would look for the 
same kind of "mechanical" and complete process description of verbal behaviour as of other 
kinds of behaviour, and we would not accept magical or privileged processes as explanations 
for verbalizations. (p. 9) 
The meta theoretical stance of VPA 
Although Ericsson and Simon do not specifically state a metatheoretical position 
in relation to VPA, it is possible to characterise their position as realist. Ericsson 
and Simon (1993) strongly support the empirical gathering of observable data, 
from which unobservable, underlying mechanisms can be inferred. They are 
deeply concerned with meeting the validity criteria for knowledge claims and 
devote much of the first and revised editions of their text to this goal (see 
"Protocol Analysis", 1984; 1993). 
Simon's writings on the nature of scientific endeavour also provide a clear 
account of his conception of scientific discovery. The realist appearance of 
Ericsson and Simon's (1984/1993) work is consistent with Simon's (1991) 
broader writing. In fact, there is little, if anything, in Simon's (1991) writing that is 
at odds with a scientific realist position that permits the employment of qualitative 
research methods. In Simon's (1991) autobiography, he explains how he 
understands scientists as problem solvers ('Afterword', pp. 368-387). Simon 
suggests that in science, problems must first be properly and fully formulated 
then solved. The processes Simon (1991) uses in scientific problem solving are 
noticeably eclectic and creative. He has no particular preference for the use of 
qualitative or quantitative approaches to research, assuming either or both of 
these approaches can produce data that adhere to the traditional criteria for 
justifying knowledge claims (p. 371). Many of his examples of how the 
'discovery' of solutions occur are abductive in character, for example, how 
physicians make diagnoses (see p. 368). He also clearly supports the use of 
abduction when looking to construct explanatory models (p. 378), and 
138 
hypothetico-deduction in the testing of hypotheses within a broad explanatory 
theory (p. 380). However, Simon (1991) expresses considerable concern about 
the role of statistical significance tests in theory testing: 'When we test these 
stronger quantitative models, we must remember to throwaway the whole 
standard apparatus of statistical significance tests which is no longer applicable" 
(p.380). Typically, Simon uses an experimental approach in his research, but 
this approach can produce qualitative data, quantitative data, or both. He notes 
that he has frequently ignored experimental controls, and, more latterly in his 
career, the use of independent variables, in the pursuit of solving problems. 
Overall, he characterises his approach to science as discovery-oriented. 
Discoveries are achieved through seeking solutions to problems. Simon explains 
that problem solving is a "heuristic search through a maze" (p. 386), and this 
search is "the only fit activity for a creature of bounded rationality" (p. 386). 
The origins of VPA in psychology 
In psychology, the use of verbal data to understand cognition dates back to the 
methods used by the 19th century Introspectionists. In the early twentieth 
century, the perceived scientific worth of verbal reports began to erode. Ericsson 
and Crutcher (1991) cite the lack of objective methods used to elicit verbal 
reports as a key factor in their decline. The researchers who used verbal reports 
compounded this situation by being unable to come to agreement on a preferred 
method to study verbal reports (Ericsson & Crutcher, 1991). Therefore, verbal 
reports were discredited as scientific evidence for understanding psychological 
phenomena. It was not until the rise of cognitive psychology that verbal reporting 
re-emerged as an avenue for studying cognitive processes (Ericsson, 2002a). 
Through the work of Newell and Simon (1972), Simon (1979), and Ericsson & 
Simon (1980, 1984/1993), a new approach to using verbal reporting was 
developed to study cognition. This new approach, VPA, not only offered a 
methodological format broadly acceptable to cognitive psychologists, but it was 
also underpinned by a valid theory of information processing and a valid model of 
verbalization. The theory of information processing, the model of verbalization, 
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and the method of protocol analysis method combine to support the claim that 
verbal data can be collected and analysed scientifically. In psychology, the 
development of VPA confronted a long history of disregarding any 'introspective' 
verbal data as unscientific (Ericsson & Crutcher, 1991). The innovation of VPA 
re-energised the debate over the validity of methods that seek to use verbal data. 
Since Newell and Simon (1972), the debate about the validity of using verbal 
data and reactions for and against VPA has generated a considerable literature 
(e.g., Crutcher, 1994; Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Russo, Johnson & Stephens, 1989; Smagorinsky, 1998; Wilson, 1994). Ericsson 
and Crutcher (1991) note that although the use of verbal reports has encountered 
almost continuous theoretical and methodological controversy, critics of verbal 
reporting have never questioned the participants' ability to correctly recall and 
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verbalise thought sequences. For example, J. B. Watson (1913), a major critic of 
the Introspectionists, pioneered the use of the 'think aloud' prompt to elicit data, a 
feature that is ubiquitous in VPA approaches (Ericsson, 2002a, p. 1). It is when 
researchers go beyond the verbal data and infer underlying cognitive 
mechanisms for verbalizations that controversies emerge (Ericsson & Crutcher, 
1991). Despite the controversy, VPA it is now firmly established as a scientific 
method in cognitive psychology. 
The current use of VPA in psychology 
VPA is one of the key methods for studying thinking in cognitive psychology 
(Crutcher, 1994; Payne, 1994), where it has become closely associated with how 
people think when they solve problems (O'Hara & Payne, 1998; VanLehn, 1991). 
Within psychology, VPA has also been applied to: experts' thinking processes 
(e.g., Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Sonnentag, 1998), how people learn (e.g., Chi, 
Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989), exploring the structure of memory 
(Bellezza, 1986), as a complementary process for validating psychometric 
instruments (Green, 1995), and in behaviour analysis (Austin & Delaney, 1998). 
More broadly, VPA is used in a wide range of areas in a variety of ways (Wilson, 
1994), including, many areas of cognitive science (Simon & Kaplan, 1989), for 
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instance, human-computer interaction (e.g., Sonnentag, 1998), consumer 
judgments and decision-making (see Kuusela & Paul, 2000, p. 388)55, and 
medical research (e.g., Wilkinson & Murray, 2001). Crutcher (1994) notes that 
one of the key developments in the use of VPA is its application to help test 
psychological models, rather than just being employed to generate hypotheses 
for testing. The expansion of the uses and areas of use of VPA reflects a greater 
acceptance that verbal data is as scientific as third person observable 
behavioural data. 
VPA continues to develop both in its breadth of use and through improvements to 
its procedures. For example, VPA is well known for being extremely time-
consuming, particularly in its encoding process. Improvements to the encoding 
process, for instance the use of broader and more abstract codes when 
categorising verbal data, can considerably speed up a VPA study (Crutcher & 
Ericsson, 1992). This example is part of the active and diverse VPA literature 
that continues to debate and refine the method. Most recently, Yang (2003) has 
challenged Ericsson and Simon's support for localised context-free encoding and 
argues for a more context sensitive approach (p. 105). Taking a greater account 
of the context potentially provides a better understanding of some data, but may 
also increase the possibility of subjectivity when encoding. Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) clearly understand the dilemma of how much or how little of the context 
encoders should be exposed to. They conclude research is better served if the 
encoders are context-free because they are more likely to be objective. 
Is VPA really a qualitative method? 
There are no published references by qualitative researchers that identify VPA as 
a qualitative method. However, VPA is typically understood to be qualitative in 
nature by quantitative researchers, in the sense that statistical procedures cannot 
be directly applied until its data are encoded (Green, 1995). Once the VPA data 
55 Yang (2003, p. 96) offers a detailed list of published work in different research areas employing 
VPA. 
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are encoded, and VPA findings become quantifiable, then statistical procedures 
can be applied. However, within cognitive psychology, VPA is often referred to 
both as a qualitative and as a quantitative method in (e.g., Green, 1998). The 
fact that such a method has been actively used in psychology for over twenty 
years raises a number of questions. If the quantitative imperative is pervasive in 
psychology, how has VPA managed to prosper? If cognitive psychology can 
prosper using an approach based on the elicitation of verbal information, does 
that therefore mean that other qualitative methods can enjoy the same 
legitimacy? What is it that VPA does to meet the criteria of validity, and can 
those procedures be replicated by other qualitative methods? The answers to 
these questions are discussed in the following two sections. However, to 
anticipate briefly, VPA is generally understood to be scientifically legitimate 
because it employs rigorous and highly specific experimental procedures that 
fully account for the criteria of validity. The use of statistical procedures and strict 
procedures to control its participants has also helped legitimise VPA in a 
quantitative culture. Additionally, both a valid information processing theory and 
a valid model of verbalisation underpin VPA. VPA procedures do not readily lend 
themselves to typical qualitative approaches unless qualitative researchers adopt 
a laboratory setting. From this a general question arises: is VPA really a 
qualitative method? In short, the answer is that VPA is a successful combination 
of qualitative and experimental processes, which can also make use of 
quantitative methods. VPA's key virtue is its qualitative elicitation of verbal 
information, but this would be of limited value without VPA's extensive use of 
rigorous and systematic procedures. By employing these procedures, VPA 
shows that verbal reporting can be scientific. VPA also demonstrates the 
potential usefulness of combining qualitative and experimental research 
procedures, and both qualitative analysis and quantitative data analysis. 
5.5.2 The VPA research process 
There is considerable variation in how VPA procedures are used in research. In 
addition to the mUltitude of accepted procedural variations, there has been the 
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inevitable development of VPA beyond the methodological and theoretical 
boundaries set out by Ericsson and Simon (1980,1984/1993). However, it is 
possible to clarify the general nature of VPA by describing its standard sequence 
of procedures. This characterisation is based on Ericsson & Simon (1984/1993), 
and Green (1998), unless otherwise indicated. The sequence of procedures in 
the VPA method is listed in figure 5.1, which has been adapted from Green 
(1998, p. 15). 
-Task identification 
-Task analysis 
-Selecting an appropriate 
verbalization procedure 
-Selecting participants 
-Training participants 
-Collecting verbal protocols 
-Collecting supplementary data 
-Transcription 
-Developing an encoding scheme 
-Segmenting protocols 
-Encoding protocols 
-Calculating inter-coder reliability 
-Analyzing data 
Figure 5.1 The sequence of procedures in the VPA method 
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The VPA research process begins with researchers identifying a task they 
believe is suitable for VPA. This task usually involves a relatively simple and 
discrete set of behaviours that potentially create a clear sequence of thoughts, for 
example, trying to solve a problem (e.g., a maths problem, for instance, 35 
multiplied by 56). Tasks that are typically used in VPA include puzzles (e.g., 
Ericsson, 1975; Chi et aI., 1989), reading or writing comprehension tasks (e.g., 
Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Kobrin & Young, 2003; van den Bergh & Rijlaarsdam, 
2001), or some form of 'simple' behaviour such as card sorting (e.g., 
Zimmerman, Akerelrea, Buller, Hau & LeBlanc, 2003). Task identification, like all 
the procedures in VPA, contains a range of issues to consider and is not a matter 
of picking any relatively straightforward task. The researcher needs to consider, 
for example, the likelihood of the participants guessing the answer rather than 
working through the problem, past research successes and failures with the 
same or similar approaches, and the impact of the complexity or simplicity of the 
task. Task identification leads to task analysis. Task analysis involves the 
researcher specifying as succinctly, exactly, and comprehensively as possible 
the nature of the task that will be used, and all the alternative approaches 
participants could use to generate correct responses to the task (Ericsson, 
2002a). Therefore, before the data collection begins, the researcher will have 
thoroughly considered how participants may approach the task. 
A verbalization procedure is then selected. Most users of VPA strongly prefer 
employing a concurrent verbal protocol as their verbalising procedure (Le., the 
participant speaks aloud, or 'thinks aloud', as he or she completes a task) 
because it is widely understood to provide insights into thinking processes that 
are more valid than alternative procedures (Kuusela & Paul, 2000). Verbal 
protocols can be generated in a variety of different ways, although the main two 
approaches are concurrent verbal protocols and retrospective verbal protocols. 
Whereas the concurrent verbal protocol approach involves the research 
participants expressing their thoughts as they undertake the specified task, 
retrospective verbal protocols are less common and involve the research 
.:-. 
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participants completing the set task and then detailing their thought processes. 
There are several kinds of concurrent and retrospective verbal protocol 
procedures, which are distinguishable by the level of involvement of the 
researcher in prompting the participants, or the number of participants who will 
work on a given task, and how those participants are directed to interact. 
Ericsson and Simon stress their preference for concurrent verbal protocols 
because the retrospective approach involves time delays and the recall of 
information, which may introduce redundant knowledge or result in the loss of 
information. Studies carried out specifically to compare the two approaches 
(e.g., Kuusela & Paul, 2000) normally find concurrent verbalization produces a 
higher quality verbal protocol than retrospective verbalization. 
The next step is for partiCipants to be selected and trained. Typically, the 
samples in VPA studies are relatively small because the nature of the method is 
very labour intensive, and although the sample sizes vary considerably, they 
rarely exceed one hundred participants56. Participants are selected because 
they are broadly representative of a larger target group (e.g., a sample of first 
year psychology students at a particular university that is representative of the 
larger population of first year psychology students attending the same university), 
or participants are selected because they have a particular trait or ability (e.g., 
some form of expertise). VPA samples are not usually randomly selected. For 
example, to understand how students deal with new technology, Yang (2003) 
collected six sets of data from six students studying classical Greece who were 
representative of a much larger group of students undertaking classical Greek 
studies. Alternatively, Vangelisti, Corbin, Lucchetti & Sprague (1999) employed a 
sample of 71 heterosexual romantic couples (aged 17-31) to study the couples' 
positive and negative thoughts about each other to gain insight into a particular 
56 A survey of the Psych-Info database searching under 'protocol analysis' revealed the size of 
samples used in VPA studies over the last five years varied from four participants (Austin & 
Mawhinney, 1999) to one hundred participants (Colman & Stirk, 1998). Ford, Schmitt, 
Schectman, Hults, and Doherty (1989), in a more rigorous survey of protocol analysis studies, 
found a range of sample sizes from 1 to 99 over 18 studies, with a mean average of 22 
partiCipants. 
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cognitive process but not to extrapolate to a broader population. Like grounded 
theory, the VPA sample is selected for its ability to provide useful data in a 
particular area. Often VPA studies do not even reveal how or from where the 
sample was selected (e.g., Bellezza, 1986). They may involve any manner of 
selection procedures like peer-nomination (Sonnentag, 1998), or responses to an 
advertisement (Chi et aI., 1989). Given this ad hoc approach to sampling, VPA 
studies do not make probability-based claims about their external validity. 
Once selected, the participants are then trained. The training process in VPA is 
highly specific. It is crucial to the validity of VPA that the participants learn not to 
interpret their explanation but simply think aloud as they undertake the task. 
Green (1998) notes, "Without this sort of training and familiarisation, data are 
likely to be heavily flawed" (p. 17). The verbal protocols of the participants' 
explanations of how, for example, they solve a problem, are audiotaped or 
videotaped. Often there is supplementary data collection, for instance, following 
the task the researcher interviews the participant to gain information on how the 
participant carried out the task, or to clarify any part of the verbal protocol that is 
unclear to the researcher. Seeking supplementary information needs to be 
undertaken with great care, because participant information from the participant's 
long-term memory would be invalid according to the information processing and 
verbalization model promoted by Ericsson and Simon (1984/1993) (Crutcher, 
1994). The recorded verbal protocols are then fully transcribed to ensure that no 
information is omitted and that the protocol is unaltered by the process of 
transcription. In VPA, the transcription process is particularly detailed. It is 
normal for transcribers to place time markers (e.g., for every ten second period) 
in the transcription to indicate the length of pauses by participants or the time 
they take to complete each part of the task. 
The verbal protocol then undergoes three rigorous procedures to prepare it for 
data analysis. First, an encoding scheme is developed for the coding of 
segments of the verbal protocol. Based on a random sample of the verbal data, 
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the encoding scheme is used to create coding categories that represent the 
commonalities in the verbal protocol for a given task. This enables the encoders 
to assign each verbalization to a category. When developing the encoding 
scheme, the researcher needs to be alert to the fact that participants often 
verbalise similar things in different ways. The second procedure is the 
segmentation of the data. Segmentation involves the division of the verbal 
protocol into verbal segments that correspond to segments of the task behaviour. 
These segments become the units of analysis and are phrases, sentences, or 
series of sentences. Third, the data are encoded. Two independent encoders 
encode the verbal protocols into the coding categories. Every segment of the 
verbal protocol must be assigned to a code. It is unlikely that the encoders will 
encode all the segments without encountering some ambiguous data. 
Ambiguous data that appear to qualify for more than one coding category are 
typically assigned their own code. 
Before data analysis can begin, the inter-encoder reliability is calculated to 
ensure the data is reliable. The inter-encoder reliability is the extent to which two 
encoders assign the segments to the same coding categories. An inter-encoder 
agreement of 80% or more is necessary to claim the study's encoding process is 
sufficiently reliable (Green, 1995). The resulting encoded data can then be 
quantified for analysis with straightforward statistical procedures and tests of 
significance can be applied. For example, a chi-square test could be employed 
to study the relationship between two variables, or analysis of variance may be 
used to test the extent to which two groups are different in the frequency of 
particular verbal data. The most common data analysis techniques used in VPA 
are contrasting group designs (aiming to identify commonalities and differences 
within groups), profiling (Le., profiles of the thought processes of individuals), and 
errors analysis (which focuses on the patterns of errors made rather that the 
strategies employed to find solutions). Lastly, Ericsson and Simon (1984) 
strongly emphasise that the analysis of the verbal protocol, particularly the 
verification of hypotheses, is best undertaken within an explicit theoretical 
framework. 
5.6 The validity and reliability of VPA 
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The published literature on the validity and reliability of VPA is considerable. To 
argue for the scientific nature of a method that focuses on verbal reports courts 
controversy. In particular, the literature has taken time to overcome the 
erroneous belief that VPA is a modern variant of the procedures of the 
Introspectionists (Crutcher, 1994). Since the development of VPA, there have 
been many attempts by its critics to demonstrate that it is not scientific. For 
example, Nisbett and Wilson's (1977), cite criticism of retrospective protocol 
studies and argue that participants are unlikely to be able to concurrently obseNe 
and report on their 'higher order' thought processes. However, Ericsson and 
Simon's (1984/1993) texts on VPA provide an exhaustive and scholarly of this 
and related criticism. Since the revised edition of Ericsson & Simon's text 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993), criticism of VPA has been much reduced, although 
there are still regular attempts to challenge the validity of VPA. A recent example 
is Smagorinsky (1998), who directly questions much of the early evidence for 
VPA and Ericsson and Simon's (1980,1984/1993) model of verbalization. In 
response, Ericsson and Simon (1998) point out that this evidence is indeed from 
early VPA studies and has since been superseded by later studies by Ericsson 
and Simon or incorporated into reviews in the preface of the second edition of 
their text. 
5.6.1 The validity of VPA 
The validity and reliability of VPA each have two aspects that need to be 
considered: first, the validity and reliability of the technique itself, and second, the 
validity and reliability of the encoding process. The debate over the scientific 
worth of VPA has largely centred on the validity of the VPA technique. This 
criticism can be organised according to three questions: 1) Do verbal reports 
accurately reflect the participants' thinking? 2) Does asking participants to report 
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on their own thinking affect the nature of their thinking (Le., the problem of 
reactivity, see Russo et aI., 1989)? 3) Is it possible to research verbal protocols 
as objectively as other behavioural data (Crutcher, 1994, p. 241)? These 
questions are now examined. 
The validity of the VPA technique. 
The validity of the VPA technique is based on the ability of the VPA procedure to 
elicit verbal information without being confounded by research participants' 
interpretation or disrupted by the researcher. VPA aims to capture fluent, 
accurate, and 'uncontaminated' verbal information from participants' short-term 
memory as they complete a given task. Therefore, whether the VPA technique is 
valid or not rests on the extent to which the instructions the participant heeds 
when undertaking the task corresponds to what the participant then verbalises. 
Ericsson (2002a) expresses the central assumption on the validity of VPA when 
he states, "It is possible to instruct subjects to verbalize their thoughts in a 
manner that doesn't alter the sequence of thoughts mediating the completion of a 
task, and can therefore be accepted as valid data on thinking" (p. 1). For 
example, in a typical VPA task, the participant is asked to verbalise his or her 
'thinking' when completing a simple mathematical problem (e.g., 24 multiplied by 
36). This allows the researcher to capture the verbal expression of the 
participant's problem-solving processes. For instance, "I'm multiplying 6 and 4 to 
get 24, then carrying the 2, a zero down and 2 times 3", etc. These data can be 
compared to verbal reports that are confounded by a range of possible 
'contaminants', including participant interpretation, an incomplete expression of 
the problem-solving process, or some disruption by the researcher. For example, 
a poor verbal protocol would be, "I'm adding the two figures, but I've never been 
very good at maths, may I use a calculator? Gosh this is taking a while, do you 
think I should divide them? I remember this when I did maths as a child. Sorry, 
did you say something?" A valid VPA approach captures the verbal information it 
aims to capture with the minimum of involvement from the researcher and without 
the participants reflecting when they verbalise their thought processes. 
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Ericsson and Simon (1984) undertook an initial extensive review of the VPA 
literature to assess the validity of VPA, which they then updated in 1993, with the 
review of another thirty VPA studies. They found that when researchers used 
VPA in the correct manner (Le., as set out in Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984) the 
verbal protocols generated were valid, although Ericsson and Simon were also 
willing to accept some criticisms showing limitations to the applications of VPA. 
Ericsson and Simon (1984/1993, 1998), and Ericsson (2002a & b) provide a 
range of arguments to support the validity of the VPA technique. Essentially 
these arguments set limits on the uses of VPA. For instance, a key limitation is 
that VPA aims to access short-term memories about the task the VPA study 
focuses on (Crutcher, 1994). When VPA studies go beyond the constraint of 
short-term memories, verbal protocols can often fail to match observable 
behaviour (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In the same manner, Ericsson and Simon 
are less enthusiastic about VPA studies that use retrospective rather than 
concurrent verbal protocols, because the time delay between doing the task and 
speaking about the task may introduce confounding information. Ericsson and 
Simon have also been tireless reviewers of the exact procedures used in VPA 
studies, particularly research that produces results critical of the validity of VPA 
procedures. Typically, what Ericsson and Simon have found is that the 
procedures used in studies critical of VPA have been inconsistent with the 
specific procedures they support. This is not to say Ericsson and Simon 
(1984/1993) have resolved all criticisms of the VPA technique (cf., Russo et aI., 
1989), but they have certainly demonstrated that VPA is generally a highly valid 
technique when used appropriately. 
Support for Ericsson and Simon's position for the validity of VPA can be found in 
number of different studies. A key research finding of these studies is that 
verbally expressing thoughts when completing a task, or staying silent when 
completing a task has no significant impact on the sequence or content of 
thoughts (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). That is, the nature of the thoughts and their 
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structure are not corrupted by verbalization. Support for the validity of VPA also 
comes from the use of what is called 'intermediate results' that support the 
internal consistency of the verbal protocol (Ericsson, 2002a). In VPA, verbal 
protocols need to correspond to intermediate results from different strategies 
specified in a task analysis. For example, the sequence in the verbal protocol 
elicited for the problem 42 x 56 needs to correspond to the sequence of 
intermediate verbalizations specified by one of the possible approaches for 
calculating the answer in the task analysis (Ericsson, 2002b). Ericsson and 
Simon (1993) accept that the correspondence between the verbal protocol and 
intermediate results are not usually perfect, but that they are normally very 
similar, and sufficient to strongly support the validity of VPA (see Ericsson, 2001). 
Verification of Ericsson and Simon's belief about the way participants complete 
tasks also comes from sequences of eye fixations, patterns of brain activation, 
and reaction time measures (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Another potentially 
confounding influence of the VPA technique is the training of participants to think 
aloud. The training of participants to think aloud, or the instructions participants 
receive whilst they are completing the task, may introduce 'foreign' cognitive 
processes. Ericsson and Simon (1993) specifically examined this possibility and 
found that there were no systematic changes to participants' thought processes 
because of training or researcher instructions. 
The validity of the VPA encoding process 
The validity of VPA's encoding process is another concern. Ericsson and Simon 
(1984/1993) stress that the encoding process must be as objective as possible. 
They suggest, "Without appropriate safeguards, the encoder, exposed to a series 
of ambiguous verbal statements, may encode them with a bias toward his own 
preferred interpretation" (p. 287). To be valid, the encoder needs to strive to 
provide codes for the data that accurately reflect the cognitive processes and 
instructions given to the participant as the task is completed. The context of the 
verbal protocol provides the appropriate contextual cues for the encoder but may 
also provide misleading cues. Yang (2003) feels Ericsson and Simon advise 
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excessive control when faced with the dilemma between too little and too much 
context. Yang would prefer to allow the encoders to more fully understand the 
context within which they are working in order to improve the quality of the 
encoding. To assess the validity of the encoding process indirectly, Green 
(1998) suggests that the behaviour in the verbal data needs to be compared with 
some form of collaborating data. For example, "a record of key presses made 
while a computing task was carried out, or a videotape of eye fixations as a 
perceptual task was carried out" (Green, 1998, p. 12). Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) also warn against encoders knowing the hypotheses to be tested, or 
assuming participants share the encoders' view of the world. Ericsson and 
Simon suggest that the encoders are best kept unaware of hypotheses to be 
tested. 
5.6.2 The reliability of VPA 
As noted above, there are two elements to the reliability of VPA that need to be 
considered. First, the reliability of the VPA technique, and second, the reliability 
of the VPA data encoding. 
The reliability of VPA as a technique 
The reliability of the VPA technique centres on the likelihood of the same 
research participant producing similar verbal protocols in response to the same 
tasks on different occasions. Ericsson and Simon (1993) review the few studies 
on the reliability of verbal reports and the reliability of their own work using VPA 
(pp.356-372). They note that if the same participants are given the same tasks 
several times, then the participants' verbal data can be compared. However, 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) suggest that, "It is hard to produce identity in 
cognitive processes on two successive occasions" (p. 357). The potential lack of 
reproducibility stems from the fact participants can learn or partially learn the 
skills they need to complete a given task, or they can simply remember the task 
and therefore confound the test. Overall, Ericsson and Simon found that the VPA 
technique demonstrated considerable reliability (pp. 371-372), although this 
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conclusion, as Ericsson and Simon recognise, is based on the very few available 
studies using individual protocols (Le., the protocols of an individual on different 
occasions). 
The reliability of the VPA encoding process 
The reliability of the encoded data is based on the probability that two 
independent encoders using the same categories will encode the same data 
similarly, and achieve an inter-encoder agreement that is better than chance. 
Additionally, the inter-encoder agreement needs to show that differences 
between the encoders are not systematic (Ericsson & Simon, 1993, p. 293). 
Alternatively, the same encoder similarly coding the same set of data twice can 
establish the reliability of the encoded data. In a typical study, two encoders are 
used to encode all of the verbal protocol, although in many studies only a 
proportion of the data is encoded (Ericsson & Simon, p. 298). The level of 
agreement between the two independent encoders provides a measure of the 
reliability of encoding. If the level of agreement between the two encoders is 
high, then the encoding is understood to have good inter-encoder reliability. 
Researchers using VPA typically accept an inter-encoder reliability measure of at 
least 80% to demonstrate that the encoding process is reliable (Green, 1995). 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) highlight the fact that in the VPA literature there are 
notable similarities in coding categories between different researchers working on 
different studies but investigating the same task. In ensuring that the reliability of 
the encoded data is maximised, the researcher faces a range of potential 
problems. For example, both encoders need to have sufficient experience and 
ability at encoding. In addition, encoders should not be involved in segmenting 
the verbal protocols, because this may bias them to their own transcribing 
choices. Moreover, the transcriber needs to be very careful how she or he 
reproduces the verbal and non-verbal protocols (e.g., silences) for the encoders 
(Green, 1998, p. 13) because silences that are not transcribed convey a 
potentially misleading impression of how rapidly the task is completed. 
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5.7 Concluding comments on the validity and reliabiiity of VPA 
Whilst there have been ongoing criticisms of the validity and reliability of VPA, 
these criticisms have generally been satisfactorily addressed by Ericsson and 
Simon (1984/1993). Those criticisms that have not been directly rebutted have 
helped set boundaries for the use of VPA. When VPA adheres to the valid theory 
of information processing and model of verbalization, and the procedures set out 
by Ericsson and Simon (1984/1993), the acceptability of VPA's validity and 
reliability become difficult to challenge. It is fair to conclude that through 
employing rigorous experimental procedures, based on a clearly articulated 
information processing theory and verbalization model, VPA is a scientifically 
sound qualitative method. 
5.8 The theory of explanatory coherence 
The third qualitative method to be examined is Thagard's (1989a, 1992) theory of 
explanatory coherence (TEG). Like GT and VPA, TEG is considerably more than 
a qualitative method. TEG is another example of a fusion of ideas that 
challenges accepted methodological boundaries between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to create an effective method for evaluating theories. 
Otherwise, TEG appears strikingly dissimilar to GT or VPA. TEG is a 
controversial, but influential, account of theory evaluation in science and in 
everyday life (Haig, 1996)57. TEG represents a significant improvement in the 
understanding of the notion of inference to the best explanation (Haig, 1996). 
Inference to the best explanation refers to the idea that a great deal of what is 
known about the world is based on judging the explanatory worth of competing 
theories. Assessing the explanatory worth of a theory usually involves a process 
of evaluating it against one or more competing explanatory theories. TEG argues 
that the inference to the best explanation is centred on explanatory coherence. 
For Thagard (1989a) explanatory coherence is the extent to which a theory's 
explanatory relations cohere or hold together. When a theory is understood to 
57 Two other major approaches to theory evaluation are hypothetico-deduction and Bayesian 
statistical inference. 
provide a better explanation of the available evidence than alternative 
explanations, it is accepted as the best explanation (Thagard, 1989a). 
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TEC's constituent procedures for evaluating competing theories, which are both 
qualitative and computational, are highly relevant to this discussion. The 
practical application of TEC is based on Thagard's (1989a, 1992) connectionist 
computer programme ECH058. Using ECH059, TEC aims to evaluate competing 
theories, in a manner that is supported by historical or contemporary case studies 
(e.g., Darwinism versus Creationism), to establish which theory has the greater 
explanatory coherence. TEC does not use data as they are usually 
characterised (Le., some form of observable, behavioural data). The 'data' are 
evidence units and explanatory hypothesis units. ECHO computes the relative 
activation of evidence units, for which explanatory hypotheses units compete. 
The explanatory hypotheses units act for or against competing explanatory 
theories. The researchers undertake the formulation of the evidence units and 
explanatory hypothesis units based on the investigation of the relevant historical 
or contemporary facts. The formulation of units is therefore a qualitative process. 
It is more challenging to apply validity and reliability considerations to TEC. Such 
considerations are more easily applicable in probabilistic rather than explanatory 
approaches to theory evaluation. However, it is still possible to apply validity and 
reliability to TEC and ECHO as a qualitative method. Equally important and more 
relevant for TEC is the coherentist justification of knowledge claims. A 
coherentist justification centres on the idea that a knowledge claim is justified by 
its coherence with other knowledge claims. While the analyses of grounded 
theory and VPA have focused on a reliabilist justification of their knowledge 
claims, a coherentist justification is of equal importance. Indeed, any adequate 
58 ECHO stands for Explanatory Coherence by Harmany Optimization. The pun on 'harmony' is a 
salute by Thagard to Harman (1965) and his pioneering work on inference to the best 
explanation. 
59 Through revisions to the theory, the ECHO programme has evolved to ECHO.2, although it is 
still referred to as ECHO (Thagard, 1992). 
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conception of methodology should seek both a reliabilist and coherentist 
justification (Haig, 2002b). TEC and ECHO clearly offer a coherentist approach 
to validation. Before the qualitative mechanics of ECHO are examined, a fuller 
understanding of TEC is required. The three criteria TEC applies to evaluate the 
explanatory coherence of competing theories are introduced, followed by a 
characterisation of the seven principles that underpin the criteria. The 
clarification of the three criteria and seven principles are important in order to 
understand the design of ECHO. The reliability and validity of TEC and ECHO 
can then be considered. 
5.8.1 TEe's three criteria of theory evaluation 
TEe applies three criteria that operate together to establish which of two 
competing theories has the greater explanatory coherence. The criteria are 
explanatory breadth, simplicity, and analogy. The most important of the three 
criteria is explanatory breadth, which is also known as 'consilience'. Explanatory 
breadth refers to the range of facts a theory can explain. The more facts the 
theory can encompass the greater its breadth of explanation (Thagard, 1992). 
For example, Darwinism encompasses a greater number of facts, such as the 
geographical distribution of similar species and the existence of vestigal organs, 
than does Creationism. The criterion of simplicity requires that the theory's 
explanations are pithy, and that the theory does not indulge in ad hoc 
assumptions. For example, Darwinism provides a good example of a relatively 
simple set of cohypotheses that do not rely on additional assumptions. 
Darwinism can be constrasted with the need to generate further ad hoc 
explanations within Creationism, in order to explain the same set of facts. The 
third criterion, analogy, refers to the idea that a useful theory will be analogous to 
other accepted theories that explain similar data; i.e., the theory coheres with 
similar theories. For example, Darwin notes the analogous relationship between 
artifical selection and natural selection as support for his theory. In TEC, the 
criteria of explanatory breadth, simplicity, and analogy combine to assess the 
relative explanatory coherence of competing theories. 
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5.8.2 TEe's seven principles of explanatory coherence 
The three criteria are underwritten by, and embedded in, seven principles (8. D. 
Haig, personal communication, September 22, 2003). The principle of 'data 
priority' is different from the other principles, because it does not directly relate to 
explanatory coherence. As a group, the principles set out the local relations of 
explanatory coherence between a theory or hypothesis and other propositions 
(Thagard, 1989a, p. 435). Thagard (1992) also suggests that these principles 
provide a basis for judging the explanatory worth of individual propositions that 
comprise an explanatory system, as well as the explanatory worth of the whole 
theory. Thagard (1992, pp. 64-69) characterises the seven principles are follows: 
Principle 1: Symmetry 
The coherence or incoherence of propositions is expected to be symmetrical. 
Propositions that incohere are assumed to resist each other. Therefore, 
(a) If P and Q cohere, then Q and P cohere 
(b) If P and Q incohere, then Q and P incohere 
Principle 2: Explanation 
This principle explains the coherence relations between propositions in the theory 
that underpin explanatory coherence, making it the most important principle for 
selecting the best explanation (Thagard, 1978). Of the seven principles, the 
principle of explanation works hardest to meet the criterion of explanatory 
breadth. The principle of explanation can be stated as follows: two hypotheses 
are assumed to cohere if they work together to explain something. The cohering 
hypotheses are called 'co-hypotheses'. The more hypotheses that are needed to 
explain something the lesser the extent of the coherence between the 
hypotheses and what is being explained. Thagard (1992) expresses this 
principle thus, 
If P1 ... Pm explains Q, then: 
I 
" - I 
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(a) For each Pi in P1 ... Pm, Pi and 0 cohere. 
(b) For each Pi and Pj in P1 ... Pm, Pi and Pj cohere. 
(c) In (a) and (b) the degree of coherence is inversely proportional 
to the number of propositions P1 ... Pm. 
Principle 3: Analogy 
The principle of analogy is the same as the crite'rion of analogy. Analogous 
propositions or theories are taken to cohere if they explain analogous data. 
Therefore, 
If P1 explains 01, P2 explains 02, P1 is analogous to P2, and 01 is analogous 
to 02, then P1 and P2 cohere, and 01 and 02 cohere. 
Principle 4: Data priority 
In Thagard's words, this principle asserts propositions that describe the results of 
observation have a degree of acceptability on their own. However, Thagard 
. . 
(1992) notes the principle of data priority requires much "elucidation and defense" 
(p.68). A degree of acceptability does not mean that the proposition is beyond 
doubt, but it does mean that a proposition that can describe observations as well 
as explain them is better than a proposition that can only explain the results. 
Data priority is unlike the other principles, as it does not relate to explanatory 
coherence. 
Principle 5: Contradiction 
Principle five can be straightforwardly described thus: if two propositions 
contradict one another then they incohere, that is, if P contradicts 0, then P and 
o incohere. 
Principle 6: Competition 
The principle of competition is based on the assumption that propositions that 
endeavour to explain the same data are in competition, and if their explanations 
158 
are not connected then they are understood to incohere. However, if there is a 
reason to believe that the competing explanations are connected then they may 
cohere. Thagard explains principle six in these terms: 
If P and Q both explain a proposition Pi, and if P and Q are not explanatorily 
connected, then P and Q incohere. Here P and Q are explanatorily 
connected if any of the following conditions holds: 
(a) P is part of the explanation of Q, 
(b) Q is part of the explanation of P, 
(c) P and Q are together part of the explanation of some proposition Pj. 
Principle 7: Acceptability 
If theories have satisfied principles one to six, they therefore satisfy principle 
seven. Principle seven expresses the assumption that "we can make sense of 
the overall coherence of a proposition in an explanatory system just from the 
pairwise coherence relations established by principles 1-6" (Thagard, 1992, p. 
69). Thagard formulates this first part of principle seven as: 
(a) The acceptability of a proposition P in a system S depends on its 
coherence with the proposition S. 
The second part of principle seven relates to the situation where, if the available 
hypothesis explains a relatively small amount of the available data, then it is less 
acceptable. That is, 
(b) If many results of relevant experimental observations are unexplained, 
then the acceptability of a proposition P that explains only a few of 
them is reduced. 
5.8.3 The ECHO computational programme 
To apply the principles of TEC and allow the acceptability of competing theories 
to be obtained computationally, Thagard developed the connectionist computer 
programme ECHO (Thagard, 1989a), which has since been updated with the 
addition of the sixth principle, 'competition' (Thagard, 1992). Through ECHO, 
, 
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Thagard uses a connectionist algorithm to apply the principles of TEC. In ECHO, 
'units' represent propositions that in turn represent evidence or explanatory 
hypotheses. The links between units represent the relations of coherence or 
incoherence. These relations adhere to principle one in that they either cohere or 
incohere symmetrically. Principles two and three deal with coherence relations. 
Principles five and six deal with incoherence relations. 'Excitatory links' 
represent coherence relations and 'inhibitory links' represent incoherence 
relations. For example, an excitatory link will connect two units if the two 
propositions represented by the units cohere. Alternatively, an inhibitory link 
between units represents a contradictory or competitive relation between two 
propositions. Principle four is applied by connecting links between the units 
representing the propositions and a 'special evidence' unit that is given an 
activation of 1 , which supplies each unit with some acceptability. 
The conversion of the propositions into units with excitatory or inhibitory links 
creates a connectionist neural network. When the neural network is 'run', it is 
converted into a stable state as 'activation' spreads from the special evidence 
unit to all units. The theory or hypotheSis that has the greatest activation, that is, 
the most excitatory links and the least inhibitory links, will be the 'winner'. 
Activation starts with the special evidence unit and moves to the other evidence 
units (Le., E1, E2 etc.) and then the explanatory hypothesis units (Le., H1, H2 
etc.). The explanatory hypotheses compete for activation that stems from the 
evidence units. However, because there is an inhibitory link between the 
explanatory hypotheses, if one hypothesis gains the activation of an evidence 
unit, the other hypothesis will not receive this activation. As the explanatory 
hypotheses compete, ECHO employs a connectionist algorithm to compute the 
hypotheses' relative acceptability. The algorithm regularly adjusts the activation 
of all forms of units based on the units' excitatory and inhibitory links. This 
process of activation adjustment for each unit is continued until the network 
becomes stable, indicating that the units' activation has stabilised. The resulting 
activation levels of the units indicate the acceptability of the propositions they 
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represent. Those units with a positive activation (i.e., greater than 0) are 
accepted, and those units with negative activation (i.e., less than 0) are rejected. 
One of the two propositions emerges as active and the other is deactivated. The 
active proposition is considered to have the greater explanatory coherence 
because it can explain more facts than the alternative proposition, provide a 
simpler explanation, and is analogous to a similar theory that is accepted. 
5.9 The validity and reliability of TEC and ECHO 
It is possible to apply validity and reliability considerations to TEC and its 
qualitative and computational method ECHO. Whether TEC, through the 
application of ECHO, produces a reliable and valid outcome based on reliable 
and valid 'data inputs' has attracted a wide range of discussion (Thagard, 1989a, 
1991, 1992). The objections to TEC and ECHO are too numerous and diverse to 
be individually considered, but some of them can be structured into three relevant 
areas for examination: the reliability and validity of ECHO; concerns about the 
general approach of TEC; and, TEC and probability theory. 
5.9.1 The reliability and validity of ECHO 
Thagard (1989a, pp. 453-456) notes a number of limitations to the ECHO 
programme. The greatest limitation is that the researcher constructs the 
evidence and explanatory hypothesis units (see Dietrich, 1989; Downes, 1991, 
1993; McCauley, 1989; for criticism of this process). Although different 
researchers have used TEG in over a dozen cases, there has been no formal 
attempt to assess inter-encoder reliability in the construction of units (Thagard, 
1989a). TEC assumes the validity and reliability of the evidence and hypothesis 
units. For example, when Thagard evaluates Lavoisier's oxygen theory against 
the alternative phlogiston theory, the first evidence unit is, "In combustion, heat 
and light are given off" (Thagard, 1989a, p. 444). For ECHO to be a reliable and 
valid method, all evidence units need to be assumed to be accurate and 
consistent. The same question can be raised in relation to whether explanatory 
hypothesis units accurately represent the positions of Lavoisier and the 
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phlogiston theorists. Several critics of TEC have focused on what they feel is an 
inadequate representation of the historical facts in applications of ECHO (e.g., 
Dietrich, 1989; Roberts & Gorman, 1991). 
Similarly, McCauley (1989) argues that scientists are unlikely to agree about 
what constitutes an analogy (the third criterion), and McCauley's scepticism 
towards a likelihood of scientists agreeing is in fact extended by Thagard (1989b) 
to apply to any input into ECHO. However, Thagard does not feel the inevitable 
differences of opinion between scientists about, for example, what is the most 
appropriate evidence unit for phlogiston theory, should impede the 
implementation of ECHO. Thagard argues that the units as well as the links in 
ECHO are derived directly from "the level of the discourse at which scientists 
normally operate" (1989b, p. 498), and that he has not had to change them to fit 
ECHO. Moreover, Thagard (1989a) cites "scientific texts, newspaper reports of 
trials, and subject protocols" as sources for the units (p. 453). The specific origin 
of the units is not difficult to trace, although, TEC researchers may have also 
relied on their own scientific knowledge as well as specific texts. An inter-
encoder reliability experiment to assess how different researchers formulate units 
for the same case study would help clarify the claims of reliability for ECHO. 
Thagard (1989a) proactively suggests the need for such an experiment (p. 453). 
In a related concern, Thagard (1989a) does clarify the level of detail he feels is 
required in the units. The detail contained in units could be far too complex, or 
too simple to be useful in the neural network. Thagard suggests using 
approximately the same level of detail used by the main theorists of the 
competing theories. In fact, Thagard (1989a) offers a "Detail Maxim": 
In analyzing the propositions and explanatory relations relevant to evaluating competing 
theories, go into as much detail as is needed to distinguish the explanatory claims of the 
theories from each other, and be careful to analyze all theories at the same detail. (p.454) 
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For Thagard, this maxim avoids the potential arbitrariness when trying to 
establish a consistent level of detail in units, and highlights the potential need to 
work between different theories to construct units. There would seem to be 
considerable scope for different interpretations of detail by different researchers. 
This potential variation in interpretation is not worrisome as long as TEC 
researchers make the nature and level of detail of the units available for scrutiny. 
Thagard makes all the important procedures in ECHO, including the resulting 
evidence and explanatory hypothesis units, explicit in his applications of TEC6o• 
Other researchers should be able to follow the procedures and replicate 
Thagard's published case examples. No one other than Thagard and his co-
researchers have published examples of TEC. 
Other critics have proposed simplifications of ECHO. Hobbs (1989) suggests 
totalling the evidence units a theory explains and then subtracting the number of 
hypotheses it uses. The best theory will have the highest number and is free of 
contradictions. Chater (1991) proposes the even simpler approach of choosing 
the theory that explains the most evidence units. Both critics perceive the use of 
ECHO as cumbersome and unnecessary. Thagard (1989b, 1991) defends the 
use of ECHO as the practical application of TEC by demonstrating that the 
simpler methods do not provide the same degree of subtly and insight as ECHO. 
ECHO considers the worth of each unit, not just which theory is better (Thagard, 
1991). Explaining the most evidence does not necessarily mean a theory is 
better than the alternatives (Thagard, 1989b). Moreover, unlike the proposed 
simpler versions, TEC also aims to generate insights into scientific thinking that 
features explanatory coherence, as well as to evaluate competing theories. 
5.9.2 The general approach of TEe 
The broad criticisms of TEC's general approach are not particularly forceful, but 
are highlighted to demonstrate important virtues of TEC. Various critics have 
argued that the general approach of TEC is logical positivist (Dietrich, 1989), 
60 This includes access to ECHO software; see http://cogscLuwaterloo.ca/javaECHO/jecho.html. 
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logical empiricist (Downes, 1991), or sociological (Wetherick, 1989). TEC is 
neither logical (in the formal sense) nor positivistic. Unlike positivistic 
approaches, TEC focuses on "high level theories, not on observation, and data 
can be rejected" (Thagard, 1989b, p. 491). The claim that TEC is akin to logical 
empiricism is equally erroneous because TEC is centred on explanation and 
coherence and not on empirical adequacy (Thagard, 1991, p. 747). Wetherick's 
claim that TEC is sociological is difficult to substantiate given that TEC and 
ECHO are primarily informed by cognitive psychology, philosophy, and artificial 
intelligence. These three critics appear to struggle with the fact that TEC is a 
confluence of many different approaches that cannot be adequately captured by 
a single metatheory or discipline. TEC is meant to be a theory in the philosophy 
of science and a psychological theory, and aims to be both descriptive and 
prescriptive, or "biscriptive" (Thagard, 1989b, p. 491). TEC is also qualitative and 
computational. What TEC signals, amongst other positive contributions, is that 
the boundaries that separate methodologies, substantive disciplines (Chater, 
1991), and metatheories can be profitably ignored. 
5.9.3 TEe and probability theory 
There have been many objections to TEC by supporters of probability theory 
because it ignores this form of reasoning (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Papineau, 1989; 
Reggia, 1989). These critics usually prefer a Bayesian approach to probability 
theory. Their objections take a variety of forms but centre on the fact that TEC 
does not explicitly allow for probability theory. In response, Thagard (1989a, 
1989b, 1992, 2000, 2003) has made considerable efforts to compare and even 
integrate probabilistic approaches with TEC and its explanationist approach to 
causal reasoning. Thagard (2000) gives ECHO a probabilistic interpretation, 
although this proves computationally challenging. If appropriate probabilistic 
information is available, then ECHO can incorporate it. However, ECHO does 
not need probabilistic information to work, and such information is seldom 
available (Thagard, 2000, p. 113). Thagard (2003) compares four competing 
explanations of the jury's verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial, including explanations 
~ , I 
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based on explanatory coherence, probability theory (through the construction of 
Bayesian networks), wishful thinking, and emotional coherence. The outcome is 
that probability theory provides a considerably more complicated and artificial 
explanation using ECHO than the simple and natural explanation offered by the 
interaction between emotional bias and explanatory coherence. Thagard (1989b) 
maintains that researchers should "use statistical inference and probabilistic 
reasoning whenever possible" (p. 496), but that with the qualitative evaluation of 
theories this information is not often obtainable. As Thagard has regularly noted 
(1989a, 1991, 2000), there are limits to the scope of ECHO's application to 
reasoning. So far, TEC and ECHO have been developed to apply to only a small 
part of scientific thinking (Thagard, 1991, p. 747). 
5.10 Concluding comments on the validity and reliability of TEe 
Although TEC has faced considerable criticism about its scientific legitimacy, 
most of this criticism has not brought any needed change to TEC. Thagard has 
responded openly to the criticism and in part endeavoured to adapt TEC when 
there have been effective challenges. In particular, Thagard (2000) has tried to 
account for the probabilistic approach to causal reasoning using ECHO, although 
this has not required change to the central characteristics of TEC or ECHO. The 
only notable change has been a refinement to both TEC and ECHO between the 
original 1989 paper and its 1992 presentation in "Conceptual Revolutions" 
(Thagard, 1992) with the addition of a principle of competition. However, one 
concern remains, namely the reliability and validity of the construction of 
evidence and explanatory hypothesis units, which, as Thagard has noted, 
requires further examination. A procedure involving two researchers' 
independently constructing units may be a useful addition for the ECHO method, 
and would help to promote its reliability and validity. 
More importantly, Thagard (1989a, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2003) has provided a 
range of examples to support the viability of TEC and the application of ECHO to 
compute explanatory coherence and evaluate competing theories. Theories that 
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have been successfully evaluated using ECHO include Darwinism versus 
creationism, the oxygen theory of combustion versus the phlogiston theory, and 
alternative theories as to why the dinosaurs became extinct. TEC has also been 
applied beyond scientific contexts to problem solving in legal cases. Most 
recently, Thagard (2003) has applied TEC to the trial of O.J. Simpson to 
ascertain why the jury reached the verdict it did. The repeated success of these 
applications suggests that ECHO offers a viable qualitative approach to scientific 
theory evaluation that can be readily applied by scientists to many different 
situations where explanatory inferences are used. 
5.11 Conclusions 
Chapter five had two goals: to sh?w qualitative research can be as scientific as 
quantitative approaches and to build additional bridges over the qualitative-
quantitative divide. To achieve these goals, this chapter has examined three 
different examples of qualitative method. Each of these examples goes well 
beyond the parameters of a data collection and/or data analysis method, and 
each is unmistakably qualitative in nature. It is possible to understand how some 
authors might regard GT, VPA, or TEC as methodological oddities when they are 
compared to mainstream psychological research practice. The three methods 
are highly distinct, differ from mainstream psychological research practice; and 
seemingly from each other. However, the commonalities of, and differences 
between, these three methods make their examination instructive for the 
qualitative-quantitative debate. 
No qualitative or quantitative method is automatically valid or reliable. It is for 
researchers to demonstrate that their approach has the ability to bestow scientific 
warrant for justifying knowledge claims. The analysis of GT, VPA, and TEC has 
shown all three can adequately meet the criteria of validity and reliability as well 
as quantitative methods can, several issues notwithstanding (e.g., the need for 
some form of inter-rater reliability check on the construction of units in TEC). 
This conclusion is based on an examination of the rigorous and systematic 
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procedures used in GT, VPA, and TEG, plus the employment of specific 
procedures to enhance the methods' potential to be valid and reliable (e.g., 
negative c~se analysis). This is not to say all three methods do not need to 
improve their validity and reliability. All three methods are still developing and 
need to continue to do so in response to the increasing frequency and breadth of 
their use. Of course, the important proviso here is that the reliability and validity 
of these methods depends on their correct application. 
The artificial divide between qualitative and quantitative approaches can be 
profitably bridged by GT, VPA, and TEG. Each method crosses many different 
methodological boundaries. Although predominately understood as qualitative in 
nature, each method treats quantitative approaches as potentially 
complementary. If the metatheoretical positions that argue for the inherent 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research are correct, then these 
methods would be unable to generate or include quantitative data or procedures. 
Moreover, VPA is an experimental-based qualitative approach, TEG is qualitative 
and computational, and GT is primarily qualitative but can allow for quantitative 
procedures and data. These differences demonstrate that there are many ways 
to use qualitative methods that make use of 'quantitative' procedures. 
Although the three methods do not share a common metatheoretical position, it is 
plausible to suggest that a realist theme can philosophically underwrite all three. 
Thagard is a scientific realist (see Thagard, 1988, pp. 145-152). Simon is a 
realist (Simon, 1991), and Haig's reconstruction of GT is based on scientific 
realism. Interestingly, Simon, Thagard, and Haig all share a similar preference 
for casting the process of scientific explanation as problem solving, rather than 
literal discovery. These authors do not assume that qualitative approaches are 
unscientific, but instead regard them as useful methods that require rigorous and 
properly explicated systems to ensure they provide valid and reliable knowledge. 
,-. -.-, 
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Against a background of the need to be seen as scientifically legitimate, each of 
the three methods that have been examined has a highly developed 
methodological and philosophical justification. An information processing theory, 
a model of verbalization, and a very careful critique of the early use of verbal 
protocols underpins the application of VPA. GT is an outcome of the interaction 
between Lazarfeldian quantitative methods and qualitative methods from the 
Chicago School that specifically aimed to move beyond the use of hypothetico-
deduction. TEC and ECHO present the most complete formulation of the 
inference to the best explanation and its only usable method. Each method of 
these three methods has negotiated a range of criticisms and continues to 
prosper. These methods contrast with to other qualitative methods that are 
potentially very useful and effective methodological procedures but do not as yet 
have a properly formulated philosophical or even methodological justification. A 
good example of such a procedure is the focus group approach to research. A 
considerable amount is known about how to effectively organise and run focus 
groups, and what information focus groups are good at eliciting. However, there 
is almost no comment on the warrant of focus group procedures to make 
scientific claims, or explicit theories as to why the interaction of focus group 
participants produces useful information. Nor are there any systematiC analysis 
of the methodological weaknesses of focus groups and how they may be 
overcome. Trout's (1998) study of narrative methods provides strong evidence 
that qualitative methods like this are highly prone to unreliability and bias. This 
chapter has shown how three qualitative methods have made detailed and 
rigorous claims for the scientific nature of their approaches. These methods can 
be contrasted with other qualitative methods that have yet to properly consider 
the need to address these important issues. 
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Chapter Six 
Social Constructionism 
Rather than closing psychology's laboratory doors on the storms that rage around it, there is 
a greater strength to be gained through constructive dialogue. I have tried to demonstrate 
here that with judicious and careful sifting of the arguments, a far richer and more effective 
psychology may emerge than has ever been known. This will be a psychology replete with 
conceptual resources, sensitive to ideology and history, innovative in its methods of inquiry -
a continuing font of new and effective practices. It will be a psychology in which colonialist 
universalism is replaced by a global conversation among equals. (Gergen, 2001 a, pp. 811-
812) 
[T]here has been a scandalized outrage about social constructivism going well beyond 
normal intellectual disagreement. For example, Mario Bunge has described most of the work 
in the field as a "grotesque cartoon of scientific research" ... David Stove has written of these 
doctrines as a form of lunacy which is "so absurd, that is eludes the force of all 
argument" ... Larry Laudan has characterized [social constructivism's] "rampant relativism" as 
"the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time". (Slezak, 
2000, p. 92) 
6.1 Overview of chapters six and seven 
A key aim of this thesis is to argue for a scientifically sound and progressive 
postempiricist metatheoretical basis for qualitative research in psychology. 
Scientifically 'sound' refers to the ability of the proposed combination of 
metatheory, methodology, and method to provide qualitative research with a 
credible warrant for its knowledge claims and to promote rigorous and systematic 
research which strives for the 'truth'. 'Progressive' refers to the ability of the 
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proposed metatheory to adapt to the widespread criticisms of empiricism and 
allow for social influences on the participants and the researchers, the role of 
language in the construction of knowledge, and to consider the political 
implications of the research. In chapter five, examples of qualitative method 
were argued to be 'methodologically' scientific but they were not accompanied 
with an explicit postempiricist metatheory. This chapter examines social 
constructionism61 , which is the most popular metatheory employed in qualitative 
psychology. In particular, Kenneth Gergen's (e.g., Gergen, 1985), influential form 
of social constructionism will be considered. An alternative metatheory for 
qualitative research in psychology is set out in chapter seven. It comprises a 
specific type of scientific realism that is informed by Hooker (1987), Phillips 
(2000), and Haig (1996, 2002b). 
Social constructionism is one of a number of influences that has helped to 
facilitate the placing of a greater emphasis on the social context of research and 
the social and linguistic influences on the construction of knowledge. However, 
this thesis argues that radical social constructionism, and Gergen's form of 
radical social constructionism in particular, does not ensure qualitative research 
has a scientific warrant for knowledge claims. Gergen's (1985, 1994a) social 
constructionism does not endorse the search for 'truth', and claims that scientific 
values such as rigour are irrelevant goals in research. Alternatively, scientific 
realism can heed the importance of social influences and provide a scientific 
warrant for qualitative research to justify its knowledge claims. In addition, 
scientific realism accepts that 'truth' cannot be established, indeed that all 
knowledge is fallible, but that truth can be gauged indirectly by the use of the 
appropriate evaluative criteria for knowledge claims. 
The aim in the following two chapters is not to reject one metatheory in favour of 
the other, but to seek a position that accommodates what is best in social 
61 Following Gergen, the term 'constructionism' is preferred to 'constructivism'. However, either 
word is accepted in the various literatures in which these terms appear. 
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constructionism and scientific realism. However, a scientific realist approach 
does emerge as the dominant partner, and Gergen's form of radical social 
constructionism is largely rejected. It should be noted that the aim of developing 
a realist-constructionist 'hybrid' has attracted a few realist,s and social 
constructionists (Seck, 1996; Delanty, 1997; Gergen, 1998, 2001 c; Hammersley, 
1996; Seale, 1999b; Sismondo, 1996). The comparison and evaluation of the 
advantages of social constructionism and scientific realism requires the 
elaboration of how these metatheories view the nature of research and its 
relation to the world. In this chapter, social constructionism is examined. 
6.2 Overview of social constructionism 
In social science, constructionism's influence on researchers has been likened to 
a secular religion (Phillips, 2000, p. 1). One type of constructionism, social 
constructionism, appears rapidly to have become the dominant metatheoretical 
view held by qualitative researchers. Qualitative researchers are often assumed 
to adhere to a social constructionist ontology and epistemology (e.g., Henwood & 
Nicholson, 1995). In mainstream psychology, social constructionism has 
received far greater attention than realism in recent years, although the popularity 
of social constructionism relative to realism in psychology, and the degree of 
support in either camp for the use of qualitative methods, are questions for which 
there are no available empirical answers. The literature on constructionism is 
dauntingly large, growing with extraordinary speed, and contains a remarkably 
diverse spectrum of opinions. Constructionism is a very broad church that 
houses as much scholarly conflict amongst its different sects as it receives from 
opposing metatheoretical positions. Such is the "sectarianism" within 
constructionism that to say that a researcher is a constructionist it to reveal little 
(Phillips, 2000, p. 1). Phillips (2000) explains that the extraordinary conflicts that 
have arisen around and within constructionism in the last two decades are due to 
the anticipated potential negative effects of the more radical versions of social 
constructionism gaining sway. He cautions, "[t]he validity of the traditional 
philosophicall epistemological enterprise is effectively undermined, and so 
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indeed is the pursuit of science itself" (p, 189). Schwandt (2000) characterises 
qualitative research as a reformist movement against both positivism and 
quantitative research. In a similar way, radical social constructionism can be 
seen as a postmodernist-/poststructural-inspired rejection of traditional scientific 
institutions and epistemologl2 . Even within radical social constructionism, there 
is disagreement over how reality should be understood and qualitative research 
should be used. 
Constructionism can be very broadly characterised as the view that reality and 
knowledge are constructed but not discovered. People are continually creating 
ways to understand their experiences, and are always adapting and refining 
these approaches in the light of new experiences (Schwandt, 2001). The 
sociohistorical context is ever present and influential in the construction of 
knowledge. People are a key part of the sociohistorical context, sharing 
language and cultural practices, and agreeing or disagreeing with the meanings 
given to things63• In constructionism, reality cannot be pointed to or mirrored in 
everyday life, or in research. All knowledge is constructed or co-constructed. 
Beyond this commonsense characterisation of constructionism, the social 
constructionist qualitative literature, and the social sciences generally, have 
considerably more complex and extreme understandings of constructionism. It is 
still possible, however, to divide the thinking on constructionism in the qualitative 
literature and the social sciences into two main factions, although there are still 
considerable differences within these groups. These two groups are 
psychological constructionism and social constructionism64 (Phillips, 2000; 
62 The 'paradigm wars' discussed in the qualitative-quantitative debate can be seen as one part of 
the broader 'science wars' between constructionists and opposing metatheoretical positions. 
63 This commonsense view of constructionism is also known as 'perspectivism' (see Fay, 1996). 
64 Alternative classifications of social constructionism include 'light' and 'dark' social 
constructionism (Danziger, 1997), and 'macro' and 'micro' social constructionism (Burr, 2003). 
Light social constructionists positively emphasise the diversity of peoples' constructions, whereas 
dark constructionists focus on the power relations that stem from discourse (Danziger, 1997). 
Macro social constructionists focus on "the constructive force of culturally available discourses, 
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Schwandt, 2001). Psychological constructionism (which is very similar to 'radical' 
constructionism, e.g., von Glaserfeld, 1995, Steffe & Thompson, 2000; but should 
not to be confused with radical social constructionism) can be characterised as 
focusing on the inner construction of reality through individual cognition or "on 
how individuals learn" (Phillips, 2000, p. 6). Psychological constructionism 
denies it is possible to achieve an accurate representation of an external reality 
(Schwandt, 2001). The individual knower is perpetually developing his or her 
cognitions about 'reality'. The individual never discovers knowledge but 
constructs it from his or her 'internal' cognitions. Alternatively, social 
constructionism stresses that knowledge is created by social processes and 
interactions. The distinction Phillips (2000) makes between psychological 
constructionism and social constructionism is that the former emphasises the 
individual as the "creator" of knowledge, and the latter focuses on "the 
construction of the public bodies of knowledge" (p. 7), that is, knowledge is 
created through social interchange (Gergen. 1985). Social constructionism can 
be further divided into a 'strong' version (sometimes known as the 'strong 
programme', see Bloor, 1981), and a 'weak' version (Schwandt, 2000). The 
strong version of social constructionism can deny any reality at all (e.g., Gergen, 
1994a). The weak version does not deny reality and tends to focus on 
highlighting the role of social construction and its influence on how the world is 
perceived (Schwandt, 2000, 2001). 
This chapter will focus on the prominent strong version of social constructionism 
as set out by Kenneth Gergen (1973, 1978, 1985, 1992a & b, 1994a, b & c, 
1999, 2001 a, b, & c), and in relation to this, the view of qualitative inquiry by 
Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen (M. Gergen, 1992; Gergen & Gergen, 1983, 
1984, 1986, 1991, 2000; M. Gergen, Chrisler & LoCicero, 1999). Gergen's 
radical social constructionism is one metatheory with the potential to underpin 
qualitative research in psychology. The writing of other social constructionist 
and the power relations embedded within these" (Burr, 2003, p. 203), and micro social 
constructionists focus on "the construction of accounts and personal identities within interpersonal 
interactions" (Burr, 2003, p. 203). 
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authors will also be noted where relevant (e.g., Denzin, 1997), but the main foci 
are the metatheoretical writings of Kenneth Gergen, and the methodologically 
oriented writings of Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen. The strong version of 
social constructionism is preferred as the subject of this analysis because the 
weak version generally subscribes to little that scientific realism would normally 
challenge (Phillips, 2000), and psychological, or radical, constructionism have 
been comprehensively challenged by others (e.g., McCarty & Schwandt, 2000; 
Nola, 2003; Slezak, 2000). Gergen's metatheory is selected for examination 
because he provides a consistent body of scholarship on social constructionism, 
writes primarily for a psychological audience, and, typically with Mary Gergen, 
applies his radical social constructionism specifically to qualitative research in 
psychology. 
Chapter six therefore has three aims: first, to provide an accurate 
characterisation of Gergen's radical social constructionism, second, to establish 
how Gergen and Gergen apply this metatheory to guide qualitative research, and 
third, to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this social constructionist 
position. 
6.3 Gergen's radical social constructionism 
Social constructionism in psychology has a multitude of origins, including 
symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, critical theory (e.g., Marxism), and 
more recently postmodernism and poststructuralism. These influences have 
continued to develop separately as well as coalesce into what can broadly be 
called 'social constructionism'. For example, symbolic interactionism's influence 
on social constructionism is not difficult to discern, because it argues that the 
meanings of objects, people, and their identities are formed through social 
interaction (Blumer, 1969; Denzin, 1992). Berger and Luckmann (1966) arguably 
made the most important contribution to the early development of social 
constructionism with their book "The Social Construction of Reality" (Gergen, 
1985). In this work, Berger and Luckmann argue that people create and sustain 
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all social phenomena through the processes of externalisation, objectivation, and 
internalisation. Externalisation occurs when people create a new social practice 
or idea by talking or writing about it. This discussion becomes part of social life, 
and the social practice then 'lives'. Objectivation means the social practice has 
become an objective part of the world, and is no longer dependent on the social 
relations of people to sustain it. The social practice or idea is understood as a 
normal part of the world by future generations and therefore has become 
internalised (Burr, 1995). For example, social constructionism has been 
externalised by Berger and Luckmann, among many others, and is now an 
'object' to many social scientists. Berger and Luckman's (1966) position is still 
attractive to some current social constructionists because it maintains an 
objective relationship with reality (e.g., Burr, 2003). 
It was with this background that Gergen's writing on social constructionism in 
psychology began over thirty years ago. Gergen's view of social constructionism 
developed under a number of influences, although more latterly it has been 
heavily influenced by postmodernism and poststructuralism65• Indeed, Gergen 
has come to believe social constructionism is a result of postmodernist thinking 
and that the rise of qualitative methodology is also a positive effect of 
postmodernism (Gergen, 2001a). The development of Gergen's social 
constructionism begins with Gergen's (1973) paper "Social psychology and 
history". In this article, Gergen argues that knowledge is a product of social, 
historical, political, economic, and cultural influences. For him, the individual 
should not be the focus of psychological study because these broader influences 
provide a better understanding of social life. What is more, social life is 
constantly changing, and therefore psychology needs to act as a form of 
historical analysis. This viewpoint is reinforced in Gergen (1982) where he 
rejects endogenic (rationalist) and exogenic (empiricist) epistemological 
perspectives in psychology and argues for an epistemology grounded in social 
65 Although, Gergen and Gergen (2000) claim that we are in a post-postmodern and post-
poststructural era where reconstruction, not deconstruction, has become the focus. 
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relations (also see Gergen, 1994c). Empiricism is understood to protect a host of 
methodologically and politically retrograde elements (e.g., treating participants as 
objects66, assuming an objective, 'god's eye view' of research, and viewing the 
self as mechanistic) and does not allow for the role of language or social relations 
in the construction of knowledge (Gergen, 1992b). Gergen also sees the 
alternative realist-oriented metatheory proposed by Manicas and Secord (1983) 
as sharing the same problems of empiricism, and this too is rejected (see 
Gergen, 1985, footnote 3, p. 272). Gergen has also specifically rejected scientific 
realism (Gergen, 1994a, pp. 75-76). Gergen (1994a) refers to Manicas and 
Secord, Greenwood, Harre, and Bhaskar as 'transcendental' realists, which 
illustrates Gergen's somewhat loose understanding of the different forms of 
realism. Manicas and Secord (1983), Greenwood (1992), and Harre (1986) are 
scientific realists, but they have different interpretations of scientific realism. 
Bhaskar (1989) is better known as a 'critical' realist, although he could be, and 
often is, labelled a scientific realist. Recently, however, Gergen has offered a 
conciliatory understanding of the role of realism, and of the potential of social 
constructionism and realism to work in a more collaborative, less annihilistic 
manner (see Gergen, 1998, 2001 c). This conciliation is explored later in this 
chapter. However, Gergen is still highly critical of any foundationalist stance67, 
because he does not accept that researchers can report reality with any clarity or 
degree of certainty (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). This rejection of 
foundationalism is widely accepted by scientific realists in favour of non-
foundationalist forms of justifying knowledge claims (Greenwood, 1991). 
66 Gergen specifically rejects the subject-object dualism of thinkers (subject) and what the 
thinkers think about (object). Subject-object dualism is strongly criticised in the qualitative 
literature, which generally prefers the reflexive view that subjects can be the objects of thought 
(Schwandt,2001). Gergen would argue that the subject is never separate from the objects they 
think about. 
67 Foundationalism is the belief that there is a foundation that all knowledge and truth are based 
on. Foundationalists' believe that there is absolute truth or a real world that we do not construct 
and that it is possible to know anything rationally. Foundationalism is usually associated with 
empiricist or rationalist epistemologies. 
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Gergen (1973, 1985, 1994a & c) sets out a mandate for social constructionism in 
psychology as an alternative to empiricism. He advances many reasons for 
supporting his form of social constructionism, but two of these are central. First, 
social constructionism represents a combination of four contemporary critiques of 
the practices and metatheory of social science and psychology. These are the 
demonstration of the impact of social influences on the production of knowledge, 
for example, such studies such as Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (198368), the highly 
influential role of language as expressed by postmodern and poststructural 
writers, where all is text or discourse and reality can only ever be a rhetorical 
creation (see Rorty, 1982)69, an emphasis on the political nature of research and 
metatheory promoted by critical theory, in particular, Marxism and feminism, and 
critiques of mainstream psychology by psychological researchers (e.g., Bruner, 
1990; Danziger, 1990; Koch, 1985; see Misra, 1993 for a brief overview of these 
critiques) (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). Gergen is seeking to directly challenge 
the relevance of psychology's existing 'individualistic' epistemological stance and 
replace it with a social epistemology. Second, Gergen's social constructionism 
promises to democratise and reconstruct the social sciences through new 
practices and a new participative understanding of reality (McCarty & Schwandt, 
2000). Gergen (1985, 1994a & c) therefore sets out clear political and 
methodological agendas for his radical social constructionism. 
68 The social constructionist viewpoint has been applied to the study of scientific conduct. The 
focus of such research is to show that facts are the products of social processes within the 
'laboratory'. Much research has been undertaken to demonstrate that experimentation conducted 
in laboratory settings is as prone to bias as any other form of research (e.g., Knorr-Cetina & 
Mulkay, 1983; Mulkay, 1979), although one noted example of this research (i.e., Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979) has been shown to be far from rigorous and highly questionable as a piece of 
scientific investigation (see Phillips, 2000; Slezak, 1994, 2000). This matter is discussed in detail 
in chapter seven. 
69 It is important to note that Gergen (1989) characterises discourse or text not as descriptive but 
'performative', that is, it performs social functions, including for example supporting and rejecting 
ideas (Greenwood, 1992, p. 139). 
6.3.1 Four assumptions of Gergen's radical social constructionism 
Know/edge is socially constructed 
177 
Four overlapping assumptions that underpin Gergen's radical social 
constructionism need to be closely considered in characterising his position. 
These metatheoretical assumptions are to be found in Gergen (1985, 1994a, b & 
c, 1999, 2001 a, b & c), but can be offered ideas that most followers of a strong 
form of social constructionism would agree with. 
Gergen (1985) rejects the idea that knowledge can be discovered because he 
believes there is no determinable nature to the world70. Moreover, knowledge 
cannot be induced or deduced from the world. Gergen argues that people 
construct their own versions of knowledge through their social relations in the 
world. Therefore, in social constructionism, knowledge cannot be independent of 
the mind71 , and the existence of latent variables or theoretical entities (e.g., 
mental states) are denied. It is "the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g., 
communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric)" that create knowledge (Gergen, 
1985, p. 268). The concept of validity is seen as a changeable social construct 
and prone to the vagaries of historical development and cultural variation. 
Therefore, knowledge claims cannot be justified for they are based on 
changeable concepts operating in dynamic social settings. 
Social constructionists focus on social relations, in particular the nature of 
language as the main conduit for creating knowledge. As people grow up, they 
are socialised into a set of cultural rules expressed by language. Therefore, the 
basis of categorisation and meaning has already been established in language. 
In Gergen's (1985, 1994a) radical social constructionism, there is no objective 
understanding of a material world, just a socially constructed understanding of 
70 In this sense, Gergen's radical social constructionism is antiessentialist. He does not believe 
there are 'essences' in the world, including people, to be discovered. 
71 Mind-independence, that is the view that entities can exist independently of observing them, is 
a key tenet of most forms of scientific realism (often known as metaphysical realism). Gergen's 
emphasis on mind-dependence means he is an anti realist. 
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the world. Ultimately, the nature of 'truth' will depend on the relevant cultural, 
historical, and linguistic context (Gergen, 1985), although Gergen does not wish 
to burden his understanding of social construction with an explicit ontology 
(Gergen, 1994a). Gergen argues that his form of social constructionism is 
"ontologically mute" (Gergen, 1994a, p. 72)72, where knowledge stems from 
collective understandings within linguistic communities. The realist notion of truth 
as correspondence between language and the world is rejected. 
All knowledge is embedded in culture and history 
Gergen (1973, 1994c) asserts that knowledge of the world is always specific to a 
cultural and historical setting, which means that facts are constantly changing as 
cultures change. The concepts people use in the world are socially constructed 
depending on their history and current cultural context. For example, the 
understanding of tennis in 12th century France (when it was known as 'jeu de 
paume' and later 'tenez') involved a quadrangle inside a castle where the tennis 
players used their hands to strike the ball (Collins, 1997). In 21 st century 
Australia, tennis players use rackets, play on grass, and even advertise toilet 
paper. The meaning of 'tennis' is understood to be relative and specific to 
cultures and periods in history. The concept of 'tennis' is therefore a product of 
language, culture, and history. The same argument can be applied to 
psychological constructs such as the concepts of romantic love (Averill, 1985), or 
the self (Verhave & van Hoorne, 1984). Unlike tenniS, the psychological 
constructs do not materially change, but appear dependent on their cultural and 
historical context for their changing construction. Gergen (1985) considers such 
concepts social 'artifacts' that are "products of historically situated interchanges 
among people" (p. 267). Psychological concepts are also understood to vary 
across cultures. For example, the notion of 'self' in Western cultures is different 
from how the Maori have traditionally seen the 'self' (Smith, 1981). 
72 Gergen shares this view of ontology with Potter (1996) and Denzin (1997), who also argue that 
reality resides in social relations and discourse. 
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Gergen's (1973, 1994c) view that psychological phenomena are always changing 
due to historical and cultural relativism has been strongly challenged by Gage 
(1996). Gage (1996) demonstrates that through the widespread application of 
meta-analysis73 , psychological studies regularly provide stable main and 
interaction effects. Although Gergen (1994c) challenges the accuracy of meta-
analysis, the extensive use of the method has shown it to be highly effective 
(Meehl, 1991). It is likely that some phenomena are more durable and others 
less so, but Gage (1996) shows that phenomena are not created solely by 
theorists influenced by their particular time in history and social influences, and 
they are certainly more stable than Gergen takes them to be. A problem for 
Gergen here is that he does not distinguish between phenomena and data. Data 
are 'lower level' pieces of information that do not involve inferences and are 
idiosyncratic to time and place. Data are collected and analysed to form claims 
about phenomena which are stable and recurrent patterns. Data will change, but 
phenomena are relatively stable (Woodward, 1989). 
Gergen (1985) goes beyond recognising that cultural and historical influences are 
important in the construction of knowledge and he argues that researchers can 
never stand outside their cultures and histories and objectively reflect or map 
reality. Instead, researchers are directed to investigate how they can account for 
the multitude of cultural, moral, political, and economic influences on their 
research and their participants' perspectives. From this point of view, Gergen 
maintains that what is understood by researchers and their participants cannot be 
understood normatively as better or worse than what is perceived in other 
cultures or in other periods of history. 
In combination, the first two assumptions - that knowledge is always social 
constructed and the importance of culture and history - have led to the assertion 
that Gergen's social constructionism is morally, epistemologically, and 
73 Gage (1996) defines meta-analysis as "the quantitative synthesis of research results across 
replications" (p. 9). 
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ontologically relative (e.g., McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). However, just how 
relative Gergen's social constructionism is cannot be easily ascertained. Misra 
(1993) asked Gergen about his response to the charge of "extreme" relativism 
(see pp. 408-409). The response to this qu"estion, and taking into account 
Gergen's other writing on relativism, is somewhat ambiguous. He remains 
positive about the possibilities that relativism could lead to, supports pluralism, 
but does not endorse relativism. Gergen does specifically reject the politically 
damning claim that his social constructionism is morally relative (Gergen, 1994a, 
pp. 79-82, also pp.111-112), but regularly advances a position that is peppered 
with relativistic moral or political statements, that he maintains is intended to 
allow for a range of opposing moralities (Gergen, 1994a). Gergen (1994a) offers 
more than one defense against the charge of moral relativism. First, he argues 
that because asserting a single moral ideal inevitably means an alternative moral 
position is "obliterate[d]" (p. 81), this position, which Gergen strongly associates 
with empiricism, is unacceptable. So the question is posed, which is the lesser of 
two evils, moral relativism or a single moral standard? Gergen does not answer 
this question. Second, Gergen (1994a, p. 58) argues that social constructionism 
is a "scholarship of dislodgement", that is, it acts to question traditional 
conventions and facilitate change without a commitment to a specific moral 
position (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). Gergen's social constructionism therefore 
aims to be inclusive of many pOints of view and disruptive and transformative of 
any standard view, but Gergen does not offer this position as necessarily 
supporting relativism. Gergen's (1994a) defense against ontological relativism 
also utilises both of these arguments (pp. 76-79). 
Overall i Gergen supports pluralism rather than relativism. However by not 
accepting any criteria for knowledge claims, his position can be interpreted as 
relativistic. Pluralism is a highly desirable feature for sCience, but unavoidably 
exists in tension with the need for some form of common understanding of how 
knowledge claims can be evaluated. 
,--,' 
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Knowledge compels social action 
For Gergen (1985), understandings of knowledge are "negotiated" between 
people, inevitably leading to many different constructions of the world (p. 268). 
Knowledge of the social construction of social issues, particularly social 
problems, are understood to compel, or at least allow for, the possibility of 
innovative social action by revealing alternative constructions and therefore 
alternative ways of addressing those constructions. When conducting social 
constructionist research, the researcher and participants co-construct knowledge. 
Different research projects will afford the construction of different knowledge, and 
potentially new constructions may offer those involved new ways to act. A 
different research interpretation of a social issue can potentially lead to a more 
efficacious social action. Research, as with any activity, is seen as inherently 
connected with social activity, and is therefore unavoidably sociopolitical in 
nature. Gergen (1985) notes, "Descriptions and explanations of the world 
themselves constitute forms of social action" because they will "serve to sustain 
and support certain patterns to the exclusion of others" (p. 268). Language can 
therefore be seen, not as an uninvolved means of expression, but as an 
unavoidable form of social action. Changes in the way drink-driving, domestic 
violence, and smoking are now perceived has led, it can be argued, to a more 
progressive attitude, and more effective social action74• In New Zealand, 
domestic violence was once a low priority for the police, drink-driving was not 
though to be dangerous, and smoking was fashionable, whereas the perception 
of these issues is now very different. Gergen would argue that as the 
understanding of the social constructions of domestic violence, drink-driving, and 
smoking have changed, opportunities for different social actions to address these 
problems have arisen. 
The emphasis Gergen (1978, 1994c) places on 'generative theory' to support 
reconstructions of social issues is a key part of the drive for practical social action 
74 Although alternative constructions of social problems can just as easily lead to ineffective social 
actions. 
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to be based on research. Typically, Gergen characterises empiricism and 
realism as data-centric and unconcerned with promoting the construction of 
generative theory (Gergen, 1978, 1994c). Gergen's social constructionism aims 
to put theory above data and he advocates that an emphasis be placed on 
theoretical innovation and pluralism (Gergen, 1994c). Gergen hopes that if 
psychology can be more theoretically pluralistic and innovative, new ways of 
addressing old problems will emerge. However, scientific realism can adopt an 
equally generative understanding of theory (Hooker, 1987). Hooker (1987) 
conceives theories as "epistemically appropriate risk-utility trade-off structures" 
(p. 24), which encapsulates Gergen's notion of generative theories, amongst 
other positions, and allows the scientific realist to understand theories as 
"expressions of possibility structures" (B. D. Haig, personal communication, 
October, 7'h, 2003). 
An active critique of traditional ways of understanding knowledge 
Gergen's radical social constructionism is largely based on the rejection of 
selected metatheories (Gergen, 1998, 2001 c). In particular, empiricism and 
positivism are rejected for their acceptance of the view that knowledge can be 
objectively acquired from an observable reality without recourse to the influences 
of history, culture, and ideology (Gergen, 2001 c). Social constructionism is 
characterised as being more suspicious about the world and assumptions that 
can be made about the world, than these 'two traditional' viewpoints. Gergen 
~ 
(1985) states that, "What we take to be experience of the world does not in itself 
dictate the terms by which the world is understood" (p. 266). Both induction and 
hypothetico-deduction are rejected as viable methods for creating knowledge. 
Gergen contends further that how "taken-for-granted" knowledge has been 
categorised may not represent 'real' divisions (p. 267). For example, Maori and 
Pakeha, normal and abnormal, and male and female are categories that social 
constructionists would strive not to take for granted, and would seek to cross-
examine them. Gergen raises the question, "How can theoretical categories be 
induced or derived from observation ... if the process of identifying observational 
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attributes itself relies on possessing categories?" (p. 266). For Gergen, the 
traditional empiricist or .positivist metatheories do not have adequate answers to 
these questions and in this view this leaves them without a credible justification 
for their approaches. In contrast, Gergen emphasises the constraints of 
language, where everything in the world is discourse or text, and should be 
researched as such. Gergen (1985) urges us to adopt a strong scepticism about 
the "taken-for-granted world" (p. 267). In particular, he maintains that knowledge 
based on 'objective' observation of the world can lead to categorisations that are 
not 'real' but are just products of ever changing historical and cultural social 
construction. 
Gergen has also rejected realism, but as noted, above he has revised his 
understanding of this alternative postempiricist metatheory, and recently has 
begun to moderate his view about it. Although previously highly critical of realism 
in a general sense (Gergen, 1985), and scientific realism in particular (Gergen, 
1994a), Gergen (2001 c) seriously considers the necessity of overcoming what he 
sees as the unproductive science wars between, on the one side 
constructionism, and on the other, realism even though he perceives the realists 
and constructionists as "inherently incommensurable" (p. 14). His focus is on the 
potential of realism and constructionism to work together in some fashion. The 
option of "divid[ing] ourselves into fragmented, hostile and self-satisfied enclaves" 
is rejected (Gergen, 2001c, p. 13), although this is a fair description of the current 
state of affairs in the science wars. Gergen (2001c) argues that the retreat into 
enclaves 
[U]ltimately deadens those within the contentious enclaves. Because this option thrives on 
separation - on processes of solipsistic self-gratification - there is little means of resolving 
conflict, no catalytic confrontation that might press the issues forward or offer new insights 
and potentials. (pp. 13-14) 
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Gergen (2001 c) is equally pessimistic that the traditional academic process of 
"argumentative confrontation" will lead to a positive resolution of the science wars 
(p. 14). Gergen wishes to avoid the demise of either position by searching for 
common ground. For example, in the commonsense uses of realism and 
constructionism, he contends a common understanding of each side's position is 
not hard to find. If alerted to an oncoming lorry careening wildly, with the driver 
visibly incapacitated, and goods afire, most constructionists and realists would be 
comfortable following a realist framework and not wish to pause and challenge 
the nature of this reality as a debatable construction. Similarly, the infamous 
Auchtermuchty joke, "have you heard about the magic tractor? It went down the 
lane and turned into a field", would have realists and constructionists alike 
muttering about the localised nature of wit in rural Scotland. 
As Gergen (1998, 2001 c) also argues, realists and constructionists frequently 
use the other side's arguments to further their critiques. For example, realists 
can point to the material nature of the evidence used by researchers such as 
Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983) as indicating a connection with the material 
world. Likewise, realists have regularly critiqued constructionism by employing 
the constructionist argument "that constructionist arguments are themselves 
constructed" which Gergen (2001 c) sees as a form of acceptance of his social 
constructionist position (p. 17, see also Gergen 1994a, p. 76-77). Gergen (1998, 
2001c) now proposes that there is in fact an important role for both realism and 
constructionism in research and the world. Realism offers "unity and solidarity", 
whereas constructionism is "unsettling and creating" (Gergen, 2001c, p. 18). For 
Gergen both positions become 'discursive resources' for the researcher. Gergen 
(2001 c) concludes by offering four implications of his recent decision to stop 
criticising realism. First, there should be a shift in the "discursive register" from 
arguing against realism to reformulating the science wars as the problem to be 
mutually addressed (p. 19). Second, there should be a separation of realist or 
constructionist arguments from the people who make these arguments to avoid 
the "psychological essentializing of evil" (p. 21) and allow for a more productive 
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discussion (Le., the focus should be on the arguments, which can be shared, not 
on specific people or groups). Third, the exploration of the potential of realists 
and constructionists needs to be polyvocal, that is, both realist and 
constructionists should aim to express themselves in a multitude of ways and 
therefore provide more conduits to the identification of commonalities and the 
engagement of innovative thinking. Fourth, Gergen (2001 c) argues that realism 
and cOhstructionism have become interdependent, and "require each other for 
intelligibility" (p. 22), otherwise neither could exist. 
Gergen's (1998, 2001 c) papers, although arguing for detente with realism and 
offering positive ways to progress that detente, demonstrate very little 
I 
understanding of realism in any of its forms, and do not offer any substantive 
comment on how realism and constructionism might 'work together'. This thesis 
fully supports Gergen's positive approach to seeking a common ground between 
realism and constructionism, but favours an approach to this discussion that 
specifically examines how these metatheories can allow for each other or be 
shown to be compatible. It is in the spirit of this detente that this thesis argues for 
a scientific realism, augmented by aspects of constructionism, to underpin 
qualitative inquiry in psychology and aid movement beyond the science wars. 
Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen's belief that qualitative researchers can take 
progressive action in the science wars by following their radical social 
constructionist metatheory will now be examined. 
6.4 Gergen and Gergen's radical social constructionist approach to 
qualitative research 
Kenneth Gergen's radical social constructionist view of the role of qualitative 
methodology is available in several related papers. These papers typically 
involve the co-authorship of Mary Gergen (see Gergen & Gergen, 1983, 1984, 
1986, 1991, 2000), although there are individual papers relevant to this 
discussion written by both authors (K. Gergen, 2001 a; M. Gergen, 1992; M. 
Gergen et aI., 1999). A great deal of the Gergens' writing can be taken as 
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relevant to the conduct of qualitative research because of their focus on the 
unacceptabilityof empiricism, foundationalism, and their promotion of a social 
epistemology over an individual epistemology. Gergen and Gergen (1983, 1984, 
1986) have also promoted narrative methods as social constructionist qualitative 
approaches to investigating the self and 'helping relationships'. These papers 
clearly reflect the four social constructionist metatheoretical assumptions 
discussed above. In Gergen and Gergen (2000) they specifically set out how 
their radical social constructionism informs qualitative research. This paper is 
therefore the main focus of the present analysis, although other papers are 
considered where relevant. 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) are extremely positive about the ,place of qualitative 
research within a social constructionist framework. Qualitative inquiry is seen as 
providing a research process that is potentially more "tolerant and mutually 
reflexive" of the key influences of language and social relations (p. 1034) than 
quantitative and empiricist approaches. Gergen and Gergen (2000) believe the 
current confluence of a number of factors has created a context whereby 
"qualitative research offers some of the richest and most rewarding exploration 
available in contemporary social science" (p. 1025). These are: a movement 
away from empiricism, positivism, and foundationalism; an increased recognition 
of the link between research and social action; an acceptance of multiple forms of 
expression for research; the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism, in 
particular the emphasis on language as the main conduit to the social 
construction of the world; and, the understanding that knowledge is culturally and 
historically situated. The diversity of qualitative approaches, the lack of certainty 
that qualitative inquiry affords, the rejection of the need for rigour and systematic 
logic, and the unqualified mixing of methods are all not just accepted, but 
celebrated. The disunity and conflicts that abound in the qualitative literature are 
also viewed positively because Gergen and Gergen do not to wish to place any 
structure on these "tumUltuous dialogues" lest they inhibit the "vitality" of 
qualitative research (p. 1026). 
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Gergen and Gergen (2000) select three contentious areas of qualitative inquiry in 
which to apply their social constructionism and examine how it promotes, and is 
promoted by, qualitative inquiry. These areas are the 'crisis of validity', the rights 
of representation, and the role of politics in qualitative inquiry. The first two areas 
are more commonly known as the crises of legitimation and representation 
(Denzin, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Each area will 
be critically examined in turn. 
6.4.1 The 'crisis in validity' 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) believe the crisis in validity has arisen through the 
apparent demonstration that validity is dependent on language and its social 
context and therefore does not reflect any 'truth' in a material world but only its 
own linguistiC community's construction of 'truth'. In particular, Gergen and 
Gergen (2000) point to developments in poststructural semiotics, literary theory, 
and rhetorical theory to demonstrate that language cannot be used to represent 
the world in an objective manner. Gergen and Gergen see 'truth' and 'falsity' as 
nothing more than linguistic artifacts (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). As Gergen 
and Gergen (2000) express it, "there is no means of matching word to world" (p. 
1026). For Gergen and Gergen, therefore, all empiricist or realist warrants for 
valid knowledge claims are undermined because even socially situated language 
cannot be made to reflect or map the world. Hence, the criteria and procedures 
used to promote validity are merely rhetorical devices to convince readers of the 
research's legitimacy. 
Social constructionist qualitative researchers view the crisis in validity as a key 
problem (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1026). Gergen and Gergen endeavour to 
overcome this crisis in good measure through the promotion of social 
constructionist-oriented qualitative methods. Although there does not seem to be 
a way of escaping language as the means of expressing research claims, 
Gergen and Gergen believe social constructionism and qualitative research 
provide better opportunities and potentialities than empiricism to 'represent' the 
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world in a way that promotes the acknowledgement of social processes. For 
them, the use of language is so deleterious to validity that the empiricist, realise5 , 
and the social constructionist views of science are all put in doubt. 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) recognise that this emphasis on language leaves all 
warrants for knowledge claims in qualitative research in equally precarious 
positions. It follows that if qualitative researchers cannot use language to 
express reality, then they have no mandate to suggest their methods should be 
used instead of quantitative approaches. Qualitative research may focus on the 
meaning of the language of participants, and language itself, and it can be 
sensitive to social relations, but this does not avoid the problems of language. 
For the Gergens, the crisis in validity means they have been 'freed' of the need to 
be valid in the way quantitative researchers need to be valid, and their focus has 
moved toward how research can be legitimised, or given authority, through 
rhetorical devices and political positioning, which may allow a different 
conception of validity (Denzin, 1997). 
Within the qualitative literature, the response to the 'crisis of validity' has been 
highly varied. There is considerable scepticism about the actual value of moving 
away from the traditional use of validity. Some qualitative researchers strongly 
dismiss the overriding power of language as radical social constructionist rhetoric 
(Clough, 1992; Silverman, 2000). These authors perceive the 'crisis in validity' 
as a passing phase, or simply a 'socially constructed' issue without substance, 
and maintain the relevance of validity (e.g., Hammersley, 1996; Morse, 1999b). 
As argued in this thesis, some believe qualitative research should strive to be 
valid because validity is still the best available indicator of 'truth' (e.g., Morse et 
aI., 2002), even though all knowledge is regarded as fallible. Both qualitative 
researchers and quantitative researchers generally understand the need to 
appreciate and allow for social and personal influences on choices and 
75 In this paper, Gergen and Gergen (2000) do not treat realism as meaningfully different from 
empiricism. 
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interpretations in research, and the problems that language can introduce. 
However, such influences do not provide good reasons for abandoning the 
traditional scientific values of rigour, logic, and systematic analysis, or to favour 
qualitative research over quantitative research. Gergen and Gergen (2000), 
however, see the difficulties of language, and the need to embed research in 
specific linguistic communities, as offering a greatly expanded role to qualitative 
inquiry. 
In their analysis of the crisis in validity, Gergen and Gergen (2000) reach an 
impasse. They understand that many qualitative researchers see their criticism 
of validity as highly detrimental to the promotion of qualitative approaches. They 
appreciate that the emphasis on the power of language and situated knowledge 
means qualitative research based on this form of social constructionism does not 
offer a 'solid' alternative warrant for knowledge claims. Not surprisingly, Gergen 
and Gergen are positive about this impasse and what they see as the "generative 
tension" that it creates (p. 1031). Because there is no going back to empiricism, 
they embrace the possibly useful conflict that has arisen out of the crisis of 
validity. Ultimately, they do not wish to abandon the idea of validity, but aim to 
reframe it in order to demonstrate the potential of moving beyond its traditional 
conception. Gergen and Gergen do not offer a better conception of validity, or 
clearly specified ways in which researchers may successfully work within the 
influences of language or situated knowledge without validity. Gergen and 
Gergen (2000) see their social constructionism as emphasising the ontological 
complexity of 'discourse' or 'text' as an interrelated mix of many factors including 
language, social relations, particularly SOCiopolitical influences, and many other 
environmental factors76, and they believe that from this textual soup an 
understanding of a better form of validity may emerge. This argument has its 
origins in Rorty's (1982) 'text' metaphor where everything is text, and validity can 
only be an interpretation acceptable to a specific community of knowledge. 
76 Gergen and Gergen's (2000) argument is based on an email from Frow (April 5, 1998, see 
Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1031). 
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Gergen and Gergen (2000) state that they wish to avoid reducing all knowledge 
to questions of language or social relations and wish to try to generate a different 
view of validity from the 'everything is text' metaphor. In this argument, they 
implicitly recognise that relying on language and social relations is a 
metatheoretical dead-end (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1031). 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) turn to the work of Lather (1991, 1993) as a good 
example of the potential to reconstruct validity. Lather (1991, 1993) offers as 
components of her "'transgressive validity checklist" (Lather, 1993, pp. 685-687), 
ironic validity (which allows for the limits of language and representations when 
conducting research), paralogical validity (which acts to challenge heterogeneity 
and foster differences), rhizomatic validity (which aims for local, contextualised 
understanding, but is also hermeneutic and critical), and voluptuous validity 
(which embodies several ambiguous extremes that can be applied in research, 
and, concurrently, combines ethics and epistemology). However, as Lather 
(1993) argues, transgressive validity is "an incitement to discourse" (p. 673), not 
an end in itself. She sees these conditions for validity as conditions that 
simultaneously make validity impossible (p. 687). Her goal is very simi.lar to 
Gergen and Gergen (2000), that is, to open up other possibilities beyond science 
by demonstrating the impossibilities currently being practiced in science, in 
particular the impossibility of conducting research that has traditionally been seen 
as valid. 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) offer four qualitative methodological innovations as 
the 'fruits' of qualitative researchers' efforts to subvert the concept of validity and 
therefore allow for its reconstruction. These innovations are reflexivity, multiple 
voicing, literary representation, and performance. Each of these innovations 
aims to break down the 'artificial' divisions between the researcher and the 
participants, and observation and reporting, and promote the social nature of 
research (Gergen et aI., 1999). These innovations are presented and then are 
critiqued as part of the examination of the 'crisis in validity'. 
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Reflexivity 
As discussed in chapter two, reflexivity is considered to be a key concept in 
qualitative research. The notion of reflexivity directs researchers to be critically 
self-aware of their subjective interpretations of all parts of the research process. 
From a social constructionist viewpoint, reflexivity also emphasises that the 
researchers should account for the historical, cultural, as well as their personal 
influences on the research. For Gergen and Gergen (2000), reflexivity extends to 
include all of the researchers' subjective biases, which are considered as data to 
be analysed as part of the research. For example, the qualitative method of 
autoethnography combines the autobiographical study of the researcher's 
personal history in a given context with the ethnographic study of the same 
context (see Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Ellis & Bochner, 2000). An autoethnographic 
study aims to overcome the subject-object dualism by simultaneously addressing 
the subject (researcher) and object (participants) (Schwandt, 2001). An 
emphasis on reflexivity is also intended to remove the privileged status of the 
researcher as one who looks down on the research participants (from 'on high') 
and from outside the social processes that impact on the participants and the 
researcher. For Gergen and Gergen, reflexivity can be fully explored in 
qualitative research, but within the processes and beliefs of empiricism and 
quantification, they believe only a limited form of reflexivity is possible. According 
to Gergen and Gergen, the greater access to reflexivity provides qualitative 
research with a substantial advantage in the appreciation of social and linguistic 
influences, and an ability to adapt to the dynamic social nature of research. 
Multiple voicing 
The second methodological innovation Gergen and Gergen (2000) advance in 
order to reconstruct validity and promote qualitative inquiry is multiple voicing. 
Multiple voicing seeks to "relativize" the researcher within the research process 
and the researcher's linguistic context (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1028). From 
a social constructionist view, the researcher's voice is only one of many, and 
therefore this social 'reality' needs to be incorporated into the research. For 
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Gergen and Gergen, multiple voicing can be promoted by including the 
participants in any or all of the research processes, and the whole research 
process can be framed as a co-operative act from initial conception to final 
reporting. This can even include participants expressing themselves as part of 
the reporting of the research (Reinharz, 1992). Researchers can also seek 
divergent opinions to ensure a variety of viewpoints are represented. Here the 
researcher is directed to avoid forcing the different views that are collected into a 
coherent, single theme, thus representing the diversity of opinion. Gergen and 
Gergen (2000) argue that multiple voicing helps to disclaim validity in its 
traditional sense by promoting the voices of all those relevant to the research as 
part of the researchers' need to reflect their cultural and historical community. 
Literary styling 
The third methodological innovation is literary styling. In order to transcend the 
validity crisis, Gergen and Gergen stress that the reporting of research should 
move away from traditional, 'falsely' objective reports to forms of reporting or 
literary styling that best convey the meaning of the research in its linguistic, 
cultural, and historical context. This view legitimjses the use of any approach, 
including poetry (e.g., Richardson, 1998; Weems, 2003) and fiction (e.g., Davis, 
2003; Dunbar, 1999) to represent research findings. This view is intended to 
signal that any reporting is potentially acceptable because no specific reporting 
style can provide a more accurate reflection of reality than any other style of 
reporting. Many qualitative researchers revel in the freedom of expression that 
literary styling offers, although others perceive literary styling as undermining the 
credibility of qualitative research as a scientific endeavour (Silverman, 1997). 
Performance 
The last methodological innovation from Gergen and Gergen (2000) is 
performance. Performance has the same rationale as literary styling, but moves 
beyond the written word to the use of drawings, pictures, photographs, drama 
(Mullen, Diamond, Barone, Mirochnik & Finley, 2000; Pifer, 1999) dance (Ylonen, 
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2003), and videotaping (Ajwang' & Edmondson, 2003), and any other 
performance method that is deemed useful by researchers in the reporting of the 
research (for overviews of performance methods see Carlson, 1996; Denzin, 
1997; or Mullen, 2003). Gergen and Gergen (2000) argue that, "The distinction 
between fact and fiction is largely a matter of textual tradition ... [therefore] forms 
of scientific writing are not the only mode of expression that might be employed" 
(p. 1029). Using videotaping as a data gathering procedure is common. For 
example, it is widely used in verbal protocol analysis. Gergen and Gergen see 
the use of videotaping to report findings as equally useful (see Gergen & Gergen, 
1991). Moreover, Gergen and Gergen (2000) suggest that other new 
performance styles be used as methods for collecting data. They argue that the 
performance approaches (e.g., dance, drama) will draw in participants not 
attracted by traditional research involvement and provide a basis for new and 
difference expressions of participants' experiences. As with all the 
methodological innovations suggested by Gergen and Gergen, performance 
clearly moves away from any claims of traditional validity, representation and 
'truth' towards focusing on language and social influences in specific contexts. 
6.4.2 A critique of the 'crisis in validity' and the methodological 
innovations 
The main criticisms to be made of Gergen and Gergen's (2000) discussion of the 
crisis in validity are, first, it overlooks how forms of realism have developed to 
provide alternatives to empiricism, second, it provides no alternative warrant for 
knowledge claims, third its 'agnostic ontology' is not really agnostic but instead is 
situated in social relations (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000), and fourth, the 
methodological innovations cannot plausibly be shown to cohere with Gergen 
and Gergen's social constructionism. 
For Gergen and Gergen there are the options of rejecting validity (and accepting 
anything goes), returning to empiricism (which is not considered a viable option), 
or adopting a social constructionist-oriented, but underdeveloped, framing of 
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validity, which has received its fullest expression with Lather's assorted validities, 
and is strongly associated with Rorty's textual metaphor. Although Gergen 
(1998, 2001 c) has recently argued for greater dialogue between constructionism 
and realism, he has yet to consider realist alternatives and how they might adapt 
to the critiques of validity. For example, Guignon (1991) argues that validity is 
not made redundant by the recognition of the important influences of language 
and social relations. Scientific realists generally accept truth can only be 
approximated, and that it can never be reflected. Under this view, validity can be 
seen as the most useful indicator of truth but not a constituent of truth (Haig, 
2002a). Scientific realists argue that retaining truth as an idealised goal serves to 
direct the research enterprise whilst accepting that all knowledge is fallible (Haig, 
2002a). 
The second criticism of Gergen and Gergen's (2000) crisis in validity involves 
pointing out their failure to offer an alternative system for justifying knowledge 
claims. In the qualitative literature, much of the criticism of radical social 
constructionism stems from the judgment that it fiercely attacks existing 
structures and systems without offering any usable alternative. Lather (1993) 
offers a typical justification for this aggressive but seemingly nihilistic approach: 
It is my hope that such a disjunctive affirmation of incommensurates has rendered 
contradictory claims productive in finding a way of putting into play the loss of the possibility 
of science, and of opening its practice to other possibilities .... Such an effort is more about 
"the changing shape of the thinkable" (Gordon, 1991, p. 8) than it is about the actually 
existing practices of validity". (p. 687) 
Many qualitative practitioners argue that this rejection of any approach to 
justification leaves them, and radical social constructionism, without a way of 
justifying knowledge claims. How, therefore, can their own work be judged? 
How can they judge others' work, or argue their interpretation has merit? How 
can radical social constructionism make any claims, including the claim that a 
' ... : 
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system of justification is not warranted? Even if Gergen's criticisms of validity, 
empiricism, and foundationalism are accepted, this does not mean there is not a 
need for a system of justification for knowledge claims (McCarty & Schwandt, 
2000). Gergen (1994a) argues that the rejection of the current notion of validity 
is part of the process of seeking superior ways of understanding validity not just 
rejection for the sake of rejection. The onus is therefore on Gergen and his 
supporters to provide a superior form of validity. 
The third criticism of the crisis of validity leads to the rejection of Gergen's belief 
that social constructionism is ontologically mute (Gergen, 1994a). Gergen can 
be interpreted as offering an explicit ontology based on the social interchange of 
linguistic constructions. Although Gergen (1985, 1994a) consistently works hard 
to avoid any direct ontological commitments, he is in fact "substituting the 
metaphysical category of relation for the metaphysical category of substance" 
(McCarty & Schwandt, 2000, p. 60). Validity might therefore be promoted by 
those research procedures that were most sensitive to the relevant social 
processes and linguistic constructions. Alternatively, if Gergen does not in fact 
have any ontology, or rather, neither accepts nor rejects any ontology, then it 
becomes difficult to understand how social relations that spring from a world that 
is indeterminate can be held to be important, or relate to any future form of 
validity. The claimed disconnection with all ontologies leaves Gergen struggling 
to provide a rationale for his form of social constructionist research beyond 
calling for the need to challenge the status quo of research approaches in order 
that something 'better' may evolve. 
Moreover, the methodological innovations explored by Gergen and Gergen 
(2000) do not offer convincing evidence that social constructionism underpins 
critical developments in qualitative research, or vice versa, or that these 
innovations preclude realist interpretations of qualitative research. It is 
suggested here that these innovations can be incorporated into scientific realism 
without having to reject the notion of traditional understanding of validity. 
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Reflexivity is the most important of the four developments, and presents all 
researchers with a significant challenge, but it does not have to be taken as an 
aspect of the crisis in validity. Honouring reflexivity does not mean that rigorous, 
systematic, or logical research, where the researcher strives to limit biases, is 
misguided. Scientific realism can incorporate reflexivity by appreciating how 
personal, cultural, and historical factors affect the research. It can do this by 
adhering to the common scientific realist position that observation is theory-
laden, because it is influenced by the researcher's metatheoretical beliefs, prior 
knowledge, and values. However, with scientific realism, unlike social 
constructionism, observation does not overwhelm theory construction but 
interacts with it. As a number of commentators in the qualitative literature have 
noted, a focus on reflexivity does not necessarily improve the ability of research 
to better appreciate subjective biases or promote greater equity between the 
researchers and participants (Parker & Burman, 1993). This thesis maintains 
that from within a scientific realist framework validity can be profitably applied 
with a concurrent concern for reflexivity. 
The social constructionist enthusiasm for the use of literary styling and 
performance in research appears to have a number of origins, of which the need 
of researchers to express themselves beyond the strictures of formal scientific 
writing seems paramount. There is a convincing argument that participants can 
more freely and accurately express themselves without the constant and direct 
involvement of the researcher, particularly if the means of expression are more 
culturally appropriate, although the data this generates needs to be sensitively 
managed. The need for the researcher to re-express the participants' views in a 
particular literary or performance style can be difficult to evaluate because the 
interpretation the researcher provides is often difficult to discern. Gergen and 
Gergen (2000) recognise this problem and point to collaborative research 
between participants and researchers as one positive solution. It is 
acknowledged that presenting research in interesting styles does potentially 
attract different audiences, and can make the research accessible to different 
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groups. Literary and peliormance styling can also help participants become 
involved in research. It can also aid the dissemination of research findings but 
the styles employed need to be carefully monitored to ascertain whose 
interpretations are being represented, and whose need for creative expression is 
being fulfilled. 
Multiple voicing is a somewhat self-evident suggestion that already has many 
non-social constructionist manifestations. The main problem with Gergen and 
Gergen's (2000) promotion of this innovation is that they do not seem to allow for 
the fact that seeking multiple voices or conflicting opinions does not necessarily 
improve insight, and may in fact hinder it. Moreover, as Gergen and Gergen 
note, who is to decide whose views are included, and to what degree? There are 
situations in qualitative research where seeking the opinions of all the relevant 
stakeholders, and then comparing their views in conjunction with the other 
stakeholders are the appropriate foci. Here the idea of multiple voicing is highly 
relevant but hardly innovative. The evaluation research literature has argued for 
multiple voicing for over two decades (Patton, 1978), while at the same time 
placing considerable stress on the need to be systematic, rigorous, fully 
informed, and impartial when balancing one's own opinions with those of the 
evaluation stakeholders. 
The methodological innovations Gergen and Gergen (2000) discuss do warrant 
serious consideration and they do lend support the use of qualitative research in 
some situations. However, these innovations are certainly not the exclusive 
preserve of social constructionism, and do not serve to reinforce the radical 
social constructionist argument that validity is in crisis. 
6.4.3 The rights of representation 
The second contentious area Gergen and Gergen (2000) discuss is the 'rights of 
representation'. This involves an examination of who has the right to represent 
others in research. Consideration of the rights of representation are typically 
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included in debates about the 'crisis of representation' (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; 
Marcus & Fischer, 1986), which originally challenged the ability of western 
anthropology to represent non-western cultures. The crisis of representation 
makes the now widely accepted point that research cannot completely account 
for experience. More radically, Gergen and Gergen (2000) argue that a direct 
link between experience and the text of the social world is impossible. They 
contend that in attempting to explain experience, researchers can only ever 
misrepresent the world because researchers are constructing the world through 
their own idiosyncratic language and culturally dependent views. For Gergen 
and Gergen (2000), psychiatrists and social scientists have long employed labels 
that disempower those whom these professionals label (see also Burr & Butt, 
2000; Gergen, 1999). Gergen and Gergen ask, "To what extent does research 
convert the commonsense, unscrutinized realities of the culture to disciplinary 
discourse?" (p. 1034). Research certainly does apply a multitude of labels, many 
of which have had to be revised or abandoned to reflect the reality of those 
labelled more accurately. Social research has also challenged the 
appropriateness of particular labels and strived to promote accurate descriptions 
of groups. Gergen and Gergen argue that researchers and laypeople cannot be 
prevented from using labels because this would be as unjust and arbitrary as the 
use of inaccurate labels. Moreover, if everyone labels in their own fashion, then 
who has the right to comment authoritatively on others? Because language is a 
shared enterprise, the use of others' labels and language is inevitable. These 
questions and concerns are taken by Gergen and Gergen to be starting points 
from which qualitative approaches can offer progressive developments. 
Gergen and Gergen (2000) offer three overlapping qualitative-based research 
developments to demonstrate how the rights of representation can be 
approached without recourse to the traditional dependence on politically 
inequitable representation. These approaches are empowerment research, 
conjoint representations, and distributed representation. 
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Empowerment research 
Research that aims to empower its participants, where the researchers typically 
view themselves as flexible resources to be employed by the participants, can be 
called 'empowerment research'. This type of research is common in community 
psychology (Rappaport & Seidman, 2000), and evaluation research (Patton, 
2002), and has several manifestations in the qualitative literature (e.g., 
McTaggart, 1997). The best known and most developed version of research that 
has the empowerment of its participants as its central value is cooperative inquiry 
(Heron, 1996; Reason, 2003). The values of such approaches are typically said 
to be: providing participants with the opportunity to set and drive the agenda of 
the research, generating findings that are closer to the experience of the 
participants, being more reflective of the participants' 'language', and creating a 
sense of involvement that makes it more likely participants will act on the 
research findings. It is claimed that whether the research is actually empowering 
is not guaranteed, and often co-operative research can reflect the specific 
agenda of certain participants. Here, the researcher can also face a challenging 
task in 'facilitating' the use of his or her resources whilst guiding an equitable 
process within the research. 
Conjoint representations 
In empowerment research, the researchers offer themselves as 'undirected' 
resources. Alternatively, in Gergen and Gergen's (2000) approach to conjoint 
representation, the researchers have a more directive role to play. Conjoint 
representations focus on ensuring that the researchers and participants work 
together to collect data, conduct data analysis, and negotiate how the research is 
represented. The researchers are expected to guide the research process, 
represent their own experiences within the research, but at the same time place a 
priority on the experiences of participants (Lather & Smithies, 1997). 
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Distributed representation 
'Distributed representations' is the term Gergen and Gergen give to reporting 
research in terms of several viewpoints. In order to break down the typical 
subject-object relationships in research, researchers are encouraged to use a 
variety of approaches, but some of the most effective involve the blending of 
multiple viewpoints relating to a relatively discrete issue. For example, Fox 
(1996) simultaneously reports the viewpoint of a sexually abused child, the 
abuser's perspective, and her own account of her experiences of being abused in 
three columns. From this, the reader can investigate each perspective and look 
to understand how it interrelates with the others. 
6.4.4 Critique of the rights of representation 
Research that aims to empower, promote collaboration between the researcher 
and participants, and explore innovative multiple reporting is unquestionably 
useful, interesting, and could be considered socially progressive. However, it is 
not unique to social constructionism. Here, Gergen and Gergen are in danger of 
co-opting concurrent methodological developments that have stemmed from 
different metatheoretical origins, albeit origins that share many ideas with social 
constructionism77. Moreover, many of the developments cited were in evidence 
well before the current focus on social contructionism (Harre & Secord, 1972). 
Nor are such methodological ideas incompatible with a scientific realist position. 
For example, a scientific realist approach to grounded theory could employ the 
use of multiple perspectives when eliCiting data, reporting findings, and arguing 
for the validity of the research findings. Again, the researchers and the 
participants working together on different aspects of the research is compatible 
with scientific realism. Adopting scientific realism and using empowerment 
research is a more challenging combination, because it is often participants 
driving this research process and they are unlikely to have a developed 
77 Notable is Gergen and Gergen's (2000) use of cooperative inquiry as a form of empowerment 
research. The developers of cooperative inquiry, Heron and Reason, are strong critics of radical 
social constructionism (see Reason, 1994). 
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metatheoretical position. From which they can make methodologically informed 
judgments. However, the developments indicated by Gergen and Gergen do 
provide a very important reminder that researchers can work more directly with 
participants to gain greater insight into the participants' lives through an 
empowering research process. 
6.4.5 The role of politics in qualitative inquiry 
The third contentious area examined by Gergen and Gergen (2000) is the role of 
politics in qualitative research. This matter is strongly related to both the crisis in 
validity and the rights of representation. For Gergen and Gergen (2000, p. 1036), 
methods cannot be separated from political positions, just as concepts cannot be 
separated from their linguistic communities. It is generally assumed in radical 
social constructionism that knowledge is inevitably political and value-laden 
(Rouse, 1996). Gergen and Gergen argue that methods are inevitably tied to 
metatheories, which are in turn tied to ideological traditions. It had been 
previously thought that research could be politically neutral, and more latterly that 
even if it is accepted that the researchers have political agendas and used 
research findings to pursue those agendas, their methods were politically neutral 
instruments. Gergen and Gergen deny this, arguing that every method is 
embedded in a culture of use and meaning that unavoidably represents a political 
stance78• For them, to use experimentation, for example, dictates that 
researchers have a certain political understanding of the role of research, and 
how knowledge is created. Gergen and Gergen (2000) see experimentation as 
focusing on the individual and making a clear distinction between the researcher 
(who is in control of the research process) and the object of study (the 
participant, who has little power). By contrast, Gergen and Gergen assume that 
qualitative researchers focus on the participants' experience in a way that 
undermines the distinction between the researcher and the 'object' of study. 
78 A commonly cited idea in this context is Denzin's (2000) argument that ''the next moment in 
qualitative inquiry will be one when the practices of qualitative research finally move, without 
hesitation or encumbrance from the personal to the political" (p. 261). When this 'moment' 
occurs, qualitative researchers will no longer focus on personal experiences but on political 
agendas. 
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Some qualitative writers understand the acceptance of the inevitability of politics 
to mean that researchers should pursue research that best furthers their political 
agendas (e.g., Smith, 1999). Gergen and Gergen (2000) agree, and suggest 
that, "If science is pOlitics by other means, then we should pursue the inquiry that 
most effectively achieves our ends" (p. 1036). The key advantage in using 
qualitative inquiry in this way is the diversity of metatheory and methods that 
provides qualitative researchers with a wide range of flexible options with which 
to pursue their political ends. By contrast, quantitative researchers are perceived 
to be tied to a much narrower range of metatheoretical and methodological 
options, and therefore are less capable of tailoring research to their political 
stances. 
In the qualitative literature, the role of politics in qualitative research is 
contentious. Many qualitative researchers do not see research as inevitability 
political, although it is the majority position. However, many qualitative 
researchers do not believe that the inevitability of politics in their research 
provides a mandate to act politically, or to use the research to act politically, in a 
proactive manner. The perception of the need for political action will typically 
depend, amongst other things, on the outcome of the research, the views of the 
participants, and whether it is pragmatic to act politically. It is much more typical 
of qualitative research in social science to focus on the needs of specific groups, 
or to work to inform institution-based decision-makers, rather than to specifically 
set out to act politically through research. A research project might have no 
obvious political agenda, and while not acting politically may serve to support 
existing institutions, to insist that researchers must act politically can be regarded 
as being political for the sake of being political. The radical social constructionist 
view of Gergen and Gergen (2000) represents the extreme end of the qualitative 
political spectrum where researchers frequently assert the need to research 
politically. 
203 
How these political battles should be fought is also contentious. Those in 
qualitative research, who choose to understand any research as an opportunity 
to further their political agendas, often have different stances, including Marxist, 
feminist, postmodernist, and viewpoints that represent different ethnic groups. 
Interestingly, some qualitative researchers have called for a united front based on 
a specific metatheoretical position for the 'qualitative paradigm'. For example, 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) called for a post-Marxist and feminist "poststructural 
social science project" (p. 579). This is a surprising stance for those who are 
usually understood to support a relativistic view of metatheory, and a pluralistic 
orientation toward qualitative research. Moreover, Gergen and Gergen's (2000) 
rejection of the traditional view of validity without offering any form of 
replacement, suggests that those who seek to assert the rights of others, or point 
out deficits in the welfare of certain groups, are merely offering rhetorical 
arguments. This is deeply unacceptable to many qualitative researchers 
concerned with inequalities, who now form a critical opposition to radical forms of 
social constructionism (e.g., Atkinson et ai, 2001; Porter, 2002; Reason, 1994). 
Again, amidst this conflict over the role of politics in qualitative research, Gergen 
and Gergen (2000) see a greater potential for the use of qualitative inquiry. They 
argue that to overcome the partisan conflicts in qualitative research, its 
researchers need to strive to represent the polyvocality of partiCipants using 
qualitative methods, and avoid focusing on the monovocal representations of an 
individual researcher79• Polyvocality does not just involve seeking multiple voices 
but also the multiple opinions Gergen and Gergen believe are present in each of 
us. Each partiCipant's voice is assumed to contain a range of contradictions and 
opinions that should not be falsely condensed into a coherent and singular 
expression. Gergen and Gergen (2000) cite proto-examples of this form of 
methodology (e.g., Richardson, 1998), although there are now many recent 
examples of polyvocality (e.g., Gatson, 2003, Richardson, 2003; VanderStaay, 
79 Gergen and Gergen (2000) do not discuss the implications of avoiding individual representation 
for autoethnography, which is largely based on a monovocal approach. 
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2003). The implied argument appears to be that if qualitative researchers can 
appreciate such a diversity of conflicting opinion, then the conflict in qualitative 
research becomes a virtue. 
Gergen and Gergen emphasize the pOint that the political implications of 
research is an important issue for researchers. Researchers need to consider 
the political ramifications of their findings, what their methods reflect about their 
understanding of people, and how the research affects those people. 
Researchers also need to be explicit about their metatheoretical beliefs. This 
does not mean, however, that all research should be used proactively to 
challenge what is assumed to be a positivist or empiricist-supported status quo in 
psychological science. In fact, there are a number of problems with this position. 
First, the radical social constructionist emphasis on the politicization of research 
overlooks the support that exists for qualitative research amongst postempiricist 
metatheories for example some versions of scientific realism. Second, the 
radical social constructionists have yet to provide a plausible and scientifically 
credible alternative to the metatheories they wish to 'overthrow'. Third, acting 
politically because every act is understood to be political, and therefore subject to 
political manipulation, does not serve as a justification for promoting qualitative 
methods. Qualitative methods are better promoted because they are effective 
and valid ways of gaining knowledge. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The main problems with Gergen's radical social constructionism are: first that 
much of it is based on criticisms of postempiricism that can be effectively 
countered; second, it does not offer any explicit or convincing alternative to what 
it believes is unacceptable; and third, radical social constructionism does not 
offer qualitative research in psychology many advantages that are not to be 
found elsewhere. Therefore, Gergen's radical social constructionism is rejected 
in this thesis as a basis for qualitative inquiry in psychology. As has been 
discussed in this chapter, Gergen goes too far in arguing that his ontology of 
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social relations successfully excludes other causal forces, in his reactions against 
empiricism and realism, in the rejection of all form of criteria to justify knowledge 
claims, and in his, and Mary Gergen's, belief that qualitative research can 
prosper in the conflict and nihilism that his radical social constructionism appears 
to support. 
This thesis acknowledges that social factors can strongly affect knowledge. 
However, social factors do not overwhelm other forces of causation (such as the 
psychological forces of internal causation). Researchers can also act voluntarily 
even though internal and external forces are influencing them. A view of 
causation which incorporates internal forces, external forces, voluntary action, 
and their interaction, would appear more useful than one that just attends to 
external forces, or internal forces (Phillips, 2000, pp. 206-207). As Phillips (2000) 
notes, social constructionism runs the risk of presenting a model of human 
behaviour that removes any sense of human agency. Gergen's (1997) strong 
rejection of the 'cult of the individual', most particularly in his dismissal of an 
individual-based epistemology (Gergen, 1985), his emphasis on accepting the 
self as relational and interdependent on others, and his argument for a de-
psychologised account of human behaviour all have the potential effect of moving 
the agency for behaviour away from people to reside solely in interactions 
(Phillips, 2000). 
Criticism of Gergen's promotion of the 'relational self' is not confined to writers of 
realist persuasion. Other social constructionists take exception to this apparent 
disempowerment of the individual and overly strong emphasis on social relations 
(e.g., Burr, 2003, p. 190-196). In contrast to empiricism, and providing a stance 
that accommodates many of Gergen's concerns, Hooker (1987) argues that 
scientific realism properly assumes an anti-anthropocentric position that takes a 
privileging focus away from humans. He rejects a privileged position in science 
for humans, but argues that humans do have "special characteristics", although 
these characteristics exist independently of our claims about them. 
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Similarly, McCarty and Schwandt (2000) question Gergen's (1985) denial of any 
ontological commitments, on the grounds that Gergen's view reduces research to 
the level of studying word play. McCarty and Schwandt endorse the view that 
there are influential social forces acting on reality. However, they do not believe 
this understanding prevents researchers from an "interest in how and why we 
form accounts to explain our actions, and how and why meanings are modified, 
transformed, and evolve through encounters" (p. 60). 
A great deal of Gergen's promotion of his radical social constructionism is based 
on critiques of empiricism, individualism, and realism. However, there is now a 
belief expressed by Gergen (1998, 2001a, 2001c), realists, and other social 
constructionists, that these critiques have gone too far in discarding important 
beliefs and values about science on the basis of the rejection of outdated 
metatheoretical ideas. Recently Gergen (1998, 2001 c) has sought to move the 
focus of the relevant debates to a point where both constructionism8o and realism 
are seen as different but useful complementary resources for researchers. 
However, Gergen (1998, 2001c) seems to be motivated by the political need for 
mutual self-preservation and does not provide any philosophical discussion as to 
how this constructive detente might occur. This thesis agrees that both 
constructionism and realism offer valuable metatheoretical and methodological 
emphases. Kitcher (1993), for example, has identified the unconsidered middle-
ground between the overpowering influence of social factors and the focus on 
empirical knowledge. A scientific realist theory of science offers one middle-way 
that appreciates the balanced influence of social forces and empirical knowledge. 
Moreover, because Gergen rejects all criteria that serve to justify knowledge 
claims, he creates difficulties for his own aim of improving social conditions. As 
discussed earlier, Gergen (1994a) argues that judgments of 'right' and 'wrong' 
80 Gergen (2001c) refers only to 'constructionism' and not 'social constructionism' in this paper, 
presumably to stress the point that all forms of constructionism are being included in his 
argument. 
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are always based in perpetually evolving cultural, historical, and linguistic 
communities. How, therefore, can one evaluate the efforts to frame better 
conditions if 'right' and 'wrong' conditions are indeterminable (Schwandt, 2000)? 
If research conclusions lose their force beyond their own narrow contexts, how 
then can Gergen claim a basis for broadly suggesting the need for 
democratisation and reconstruction of research? Gergen (1994a) is threatened 
with the spectre of self-refutation by suggesting that judgments can be usefully 
made when also arguing that any criteria on which to base judgments are invalid. 
Similarly, Gergen and Gergen's application of radical social constructionism to 
qualitative inquiry, although indicating some innovative developments in the 
qualitative field, over-states the ability of qualitative research to be the 
methodological frontline for the postmodern and poststructural agendas of radical 
social reform. This thesis contends that Gergen's radical social constructionism 
creates considerably more difficulties for qualitative researchers than solutions. 
The three crises of validity, representation, and politics in the qualitative literature 
are largely self-generated and self-sustained by radical social constructionists 
(Denzin, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; Gergen, 2001 a; Gergen & Gergen, 
2000). They do not support the view that qualitative research needs to reject 
realism and strive for the possibility of reconstructing a more textually acceptable 
metatheory. 
Whilst Gergen's radical social constructionism is rejected here, and Gergen and 
Gergen's application of social constructionism to qualitative inquiry is judged 
unconvincing, there are several elements in social constructionism that can be 
usefully retained. These include the acceptance of the influences of history, 
culture, politics, language, but not the view that these factors determine facts. 
Social constructionists have also helped create a useful debate on the nature of 
epistemology and ontology in research (Phillips, 2000). A social constructionist 
approach which incorporates these influences, but which can also relate to the 
empirical world, appears a more useful metatheory for qualitative researchers. 
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For example, Longino's (1990, 1993, 1996) 'contextual empiricism' aims to retain 
objectivity but also recognises social and political influences on the research 
process. Longino stresses that for epistemology to be useful, it requires both 
prescriptive and descriptive elements (Longino, 1993; see also Hooker, 1987, pp. 
15-16). Longino can be interpreted as seeking a middle ground that includes 
elements of what can be broadly labelled constructionism (or postmodernism) 
and realism, as do a variety of qualitative writers (ct., Hammersley, 1996; Kvale, 
1996; Madill et aI., 2000; Rennie, 2000; Seale, 1999b). 
The form of scientific realism set out in the next chapter rejects Gergen's radical 
social constructionism but still strives to incorporate the well-founded criticisms of 
empiricism, while acknowledging the influences of sociality, politics, and 
language alongside an acceptance of scientific objectivity and validity 
(Greenwood, 1992). There it will be argued that the metatheoretical basis 
stemming from the commitments of scientific realism better serve qualitative 
research in psychology. 
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Chapter Seven 
Scientific Realism 
7.1 Overview 
The main metascientific options available to psychologists are empiricism, social 
constructionism, and scientific realism (Greenwood, 1992). Generally, 
empiricism is no longer considered an acceptable account of science (e.g., 
Feyerabend, 1975; Harre & Secord, 1972; Kuhn, 1970; although see van 
Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism', 1984), and for some time now, the focus 
has been on what to replace it with (Greenwood, 1992). Social constructionism 
is one alternative. In the previous chapter, it was argued that Gergen's 
formulation of radical social constructionism (Gergen & Gergen, 2000), is an 
inadequate metatheory with which to underpin qualitative research in psychology. 
A less radical form of social constructionism that maintains a strong epistemic 
relationship with reality appeared more promising (e.g., Longino, 1990, 1993, 
1996). 
The other major postempiricist metascientific alternative to empiricism is scientific 
realism. Scientific realism is a broad school of thought with many differing 
formulations (e.g., Hooker, 1987; Leplin, 1984; Manicas & Secord, 1983), 
although there is perhaps less overt conflict and sectarianism within scientific 
iealism than within social constructionism. This chapter presents a set of five 
strongly interrelated doctrines that are central to a credible realist metatheory that 
can helpfully underpin qualitative research in mainstream psychology. The form 
of scientific realism to be proposed is based on the writings of Hooker (1987), 
Phillips (2000), and Haig (1996, 2002a & b) but is also informed by overviews of 
scientific realism by Boyd (1984, 1996), Greenwood (1987, 1992, 1998), 
McMullin (1984), and Sankey (2000). An important part of the application of this 
form of scientific realism to qualitative research in psychology is the adoption of a 
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general abductive account of scientific method (Haig, 1987, 1996, 2002a & b, 
2003; Ward & Haig, 1997; Ward et aI., 1999). Within the philosophy of science, 
there is growing interest and support for abductive method as a more complete, 
inclusive, and satisfying account of scientific inquiry than hypothetico-deductive 
or inductive approaches. Haig's (2002b) abductive theory of method provides a 
promising framework for qualitative inquiry within psychology, and affords a new 
perspective on some of the outstanding issues in qualitative methodology. In this 
chapter, the proposed scientific realist doctrines are related to the overall 
argument for a broader role for qualitative research in psychology. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the nature of this role. 
7.2 One form of scientific realism 
Scientific realism is best characterised as a family of related doctrines (Sankey, 
2000). There is no unifying characterisation of scientific realism, and several 
versions of scientific realism co-exist in the published literature. Moreover, 
different scientific realists tend to emphasise different combinations of doctrines 
as central to their preferred theory of science. The number of key tenets in these 
different expressions of realism also varies. In the version of scientific realism 
adopted in this thesis, five interrelated tenets are included. Once these doctrines 
have been briefly introduced below, each will be examined in more detail and 
related to qualitative inquiry and psychological science. 
First, this version of scientific realism is committed to a metaphysical stance that 
accepts mind-independence as its central tenet. The second claim is fm an 
epistemic realism where objective knowledge can be gained about the world, 
including the unobserved, while a belief in systematic fallibilism is maintained. 
The third claim also relates to epistemic realism where a collection of validity 
criteria are proposed as the best available criteria for justifying knowledge claims. 
Fourth, this approach to scientific realism adopts a correspondence theory of 
truth where 'truth' is understood as an important orienting ideal for researchers 
that at best can only be approximated. Fifth, the thesis that methods are critically 
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important in science is advanced. Each of these claims is discussed in turn, 
along with related claims from radical social constructionism, and, when relevant, 
other metatheoretical positions. The five doctrines are considered central to this 
brand of scientific realism but they do not represent a comprehensive 
characterisation of scientific realism. Taken together, however, they are 
proposed as a coherent if partial account of a metatheory for qualitative research 
in psychology. 
7.2.1 Mind-independence 
Arguably, the most central tenet of scientific realism is the metaphysical and 
ontological commitment to mind-independence (Hooker, 1987; Manicas & 
Secord, 1983; Sankey, 2000). The thesis of mind-independence maintains that 
the world and its objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of one's 
construction of them. However, this is not to claim that how one conceives or 
theorizes about the world does not have any influence on how the world is 
experienced, or that social and linguistic relations are not influential in scientific 
processes (Greenwood, 1992). For both scientists and laypeople, it is useful to 
presuppose a reality that exists beyond one's construction of the world. The 
assumption of an independent reality allows the realist to hypothesize theoretical 
entities that exist beyond one's senses. 
With scientific realism, theoretical entities or underlying causal mechanisms, 
sometimes known as latent variables in psychology, are not directly observable 
but can, according to the tenet of mind independence, exist in the same sense as 
the directly observable entities. Psychologists sometimes aim to generate 
explanatory theories about underlying causal mechanisms in order to explain 
empirical phenomena. With scientific realism, claims about theoretical entities 
are treated as genuine attempts to make approximately true claims about reality 
(Sankey, 2000). Both psychological scientists and qualitative researchers are 
often explicitly concerned with postulating theoretical entities to explain empirical 
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phenomena. Indeed, as Hacking (1984) argues, most scientists tend to be 
realists in the sense of postulating unobserved entities as part of their thinking. 
An important part of generating theoretical explanations from a scientific realist 
framework is the view that phenomena are distinct from data (Haig, 2002b, 2003; 
Woodward, 1989). Phenomena are understood as relatively stable, recurrent 
features of the world that scientists seek to explain. Data are idiosyncratic, 
ephemeral pieces of information, which function as observable evidence for 
phenomena (Haig, 2003). 
By contrast, empiricists accept the directly observable, but generally reject the 
existence of theoretical entities (e.g., Kimble, 1989; van Fraassen, 1984). From 
a radical social constructionist position, Gergen (1985) argues that theoretical 
inferences can only provide unintelligible portrayals of an independent reality 
because there is no way reality can be can compared with how one has 
described it. Radical social constructionists typically argue that reality is only 
ever constructed within social interchanges (Gergen, 1985; Latour & Woolgar, 
1986). However, scientific realists are not claiming that they can directly describe 
reality. This debate is taken up in the discussion of the correspondence theory of 
truth later in this chapter. Suffice it to say, for a scientific realist the quality of a 
description typically depends on how well it satisfies its truth conditions 
(Greenwood, 1992). 
Both the empiricist and the radical social constructionist metatheories typically do 
not aliow the researcher to hypothesize theoreticai entities in order to explain 
empirical phenomena. The scientific realist doctrine of mind-independence 
permits the use of theoretical entities and therefore helps to provide a significant 
explanatory advantage to scientific realism over its metatheoretical rivals. The 
acceptance of mind-independence also places qualitative researchers in a 
stronger position to detect and explain phenomena. Grounded theorists benefit 
from being able first to detect empirical phenomena and then explain them 
through the postulation of theoretical entities. Mind-independence allows other 
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qualitative approaches the same opportunity to make inferences and construct 
theories about unobservable entities in order to explain phenomena. The use of 
unobservable theoretical entities is a strategy that has proved successful in many 
areas of psychology and science more generally. Successful claims for their 
existence are a feature of many successful theories (Hacking, 1984; McMullin, 
1984). The radical social constructionist position that all facts are constructed 
does not allow for the postulation of theoretical entities. 
Through its use of theoretical entities based on the belief in a mind-independent 
world, scientific realism takes a greater 'cognitive risk' than empiricism. Scientific 
realists are prepared to take this risk in hypothesizing about the unobservable 
realm in order to be free from the strictures of being confined to the observable 
realm. The cognitive risk is, however, typically undertaken in the context of 
rigorously controlled methods, such as grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, 
and the theory of explanatory coherence, which are considered in this thesis. 
The success of science in invoking theoretical entities to explain phenomena 
supports this realist strategy of taking controlled cognitive risk. 
Lastly, one important example of the controlled application of such cognitive risk 
to qualitative research in psychology is Haig's abductive account of scientific 
method. The abductive method provides a broader framework for the 
scientifically credible use of qualitative methods in psychology than both 
inductivism, which stresses generalization from observational data, and 
hypothetico-deductivism, which emphasises the empirical testing of theory. The 
abductive method provides a framework that encompasses the detection of 
phenomena from data through inductive generalisation, and then the abductive 
construction of explanatory theory to explain phenomena. In psychology, this 
typically takes the form of inferring the existence of underlying causal 
mechanisms from manifest effects. A model or theory of the causal mechanisms 
can then be developed and evaluated. 
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The framework provided by the abductive method helps to. overcome a number of 
specific problems within grounded theory (Haig, 1996), which are discussed 
below. Qualitative research methodology often struggles to characterise how it 
develops explanatory theory. For example, users of the grounded theory 
approach have yet to properly elucidate how data is transformed into explanatory 
theory. A variety of inductive and hypothetico-deductive approaches, or 
combinations of both, have been forwarded to explain how grounded theorists 
build their theories, but as discussed in chapter five, these arguments are less 
than convincing. The exact nature of inductive inference and deductive 
inference, are not clarified in either the Glaserian or the Straussian versions of 
grounded theory (Haig, 1996). This leaves a substantial question mark over how 
grounded theory emerges from data (Dey, 1999, p. 104). According to Haig's 
(1996) application of the abductive method to grounded theory, data ground 
phenomena through inductive generalisations, but the explanatory move from 
phenomena to causal mechanisms or theoretical entities is characterised as 
abductive. The abductive move accurately characterises the grounded theorist's 
'discovery' of key categories, or the core category, that underpins the grounded 
theory. This abductive framework can incorporate the processes of induction 
(i.e., inductive generalisations) and hypothetico-deduction where appropriate 
(i.e., the consequential testing of hypotheses to assess the theory's empirical 
worth) and allows for the use of abductive reasoning to promote the explanatory 
power of a theory. The inductive and hypothetico-deductive approaches to 
causal reasoning in grounded theory do not allow for the intelligent application of 
the three forms of reasoning, and are therefore severely restricted in scope. The 
use of the abductive method in grounded theory, and more broadly in qualitative 
research, is facilitated by the acceptance of the doctrine of mind-independence. 
This is because of the critical role played in the abductive method by the 
postulation of the existence of unobservable theoretical entities to explain 
phenomena. 
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In conclusion, the mind-independence doctrine supports the employment of 
unobservable theoretical entities, which can be a highly useful approach to 
explaining phenomena that is not available under alternative metatheories. The 
adoption of a metatheory that allows the use of theoretical entities provides 
qualitative inquiry with a potentially stronger explanatory role in psychological 
research. In particular, Haig's abductive method provides grounded theory with a 
promising framework for invoking theoretical entities in a mind-independent 
world, thus overcoming its current inability to use explanatory reasoning 
processes. 
7.2.2 Epistemic realism and systematic fallibilism 
There is less agreement within scientific realist writing about epistemology than 
about ontology. Epistemic realism has been regarded as an important non-core 
doctrine of scientific realism by some (e.g., Sankey, 2000), and often it is an 
implicit part of the characterisation of scientific realism. However, epistemic 
realism would appear to be vital to scientific realist thinking because it fits closely 
with a belief in mind-independence and reasoning about theoretical entities. In 
any case, to be an epistemic realist generally means to accept that objective 
knowledge can be gained about both observable and unobservable aspects 
(theoretical entities) of the world. According to epistemic realism, it is possible to 
have rationally supported beliefs in the approximate truth of claims about 
theoretical entities. It follows therefore that the best theories can be considered 
our best guides to reality. The criteria of validity, and their role in the justification 
of knowledge ciaims under epistemic realism, are discussed later in this chapter. 
Epistemic realism is strongly at odds with the prevailing epistemic beliefs in the 
literature on qualitative methodology. This literature, presented in chapter two, 
typically rejects objectivity and appeals to a subjective and often social 
epistemology grounded in the perspectives of the researcher, the partiCipants, 
and the socio-political context of both. This thesis argues that the doctrine of 
epistemic realism is a better alternative to a subjective and social epistemology. 
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The superiority of an epistemic realist stance follows from its acceptance of 
objective knowledge of the world, coupled with an attitude of systematic fallibilism 
toward all knowledge claims. According to fallibilism, there is no privileged 
knowledge. Knowledge is always. uncertain, debatable, open to criticism and 
revision, and alternative knowledge claims can always be adopted (Hooker, 
1987). Moreover, any epistemic realist stance in science needs to allow for the 
decided limitations of human sensory and cognitive capacities (Hooker, 1987, p. 
21). The acceptance of fallibilism means that scientists accept the epistemic 
limitations of ourselves as knowers but this is not an acceptance that the world is 
unknowable or that there is no world to be known. Fallibilism accepts that 
knowledge of the world is never certain. Therefore, cognitively and sensorily 
limited scientists can strive for corrigible objective knowledge, of mind-
independent phenomena, including theoretical entities. 
With the form of epistemic realism adopted here, the notion of objective 
knowledge is troublesome, and requires clarification. 'Objectivity' can have a 
number of distinct meanings, but it is used here to refer to the ability of the 
scientist to know things "as they really are" by employing procedures that limit 
personal bias and other forms of subjectivity. However, it is accepted that no one 
can ever know things as they really are, because no fail-safe procedures or 
efforts to be perfectly objective,. can be realised. What is emphasised is that 
scientists strive to be as objective as possible. 
Psychological researchers typically stress the need for epistemological 
objectivity. This thesis argues that the goal of avoiding potentially confounding 
biases and striving to maintain objectivity is also highly appropriate in qualitative 
research, even if it is difficult to attain. Phillips (2000) argues that objectivity is a 
"regulative ideal that underlies all inquiry" (p. 114). That is, objectivity helps us 
strive for the best possible research, but "does not guarantee truth" (Phillips, 
2000, p. 114). The rejection of the worth of objectivity means the acceptance of 
any standards of inquiry. If a personal or subjective analysis is taken to be on an 
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epistemic par with an analysis based on extensive and painstaking research, it 
will undermine the worth of social science (Phillips, 2000, p. 123). Neither 
objectivity nor subjectivity provides a clear route to the 'truth', but objectivity 
provides a better standard to follow in aspiring to achieve the 'truth'. 
This emphasis on objectivity is not meant as a criticism of current qualitative 
approaches, some of which can be said to be highly objective in the sense that 
they employ painstaking validation and reliability procedures, for example, verbal 
protocol analysis. Rather, it is to stress the virtue of being objective in a 
qualitative setting. Epistemic realism does not deny that subjectivity plays a role 
in the production of knowledge, but that objectivity, for the reasons stated, 
promotes a better and more functional goal for researchers. For example, 
qualitative researchers who adopt Marxist, feminist, and cooperative paradigm 
approaches, or indeed all qualitative researchers who aim to identify problems in 
the world, need some form of epistemic objectivity, otherwise what they are 
producing can be considered no more than subjective rhetoric. 
Radical social constructionists (e.g., Gergen, 1985), who argue that knowledge is 
always subjectively known and SOCially constructed, challenge the value of 
epistemic realism. Latour and Woolgar's (1979,1986) acclaimed book 
"Laboratory Life" has been taken by many as providing important support for the 
radical social constructionist view that scientific knowledge is socially 
constructed, and it has helped raise new criticisms of scientific realism (Harre, 
1986). More recently, however, strong criticisms have been directed against the 
quality of Latour and Woolgar's study (see Weinert, 1992; Phillips, 2000; Slezak, 
1994, 2000). These criticisms support the conclusion that while the construction 
of scientific facts involves the social interaction of scientists, social interaction is 
not solely responsible for the production of scientific facts. The production of 
knowledge also involves, for example, the non-social judgment of individual 
scientists, and a multitude of objectivity - and rigour-enhancing procedures. 
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Latour and Woolgar (1979, 1986) appear to have ignored most of the 
conventions for rigorous ethnographic study, including the rejection of an emic 
stance. An emic stance is where the researchers becomes an 'insider' through 
fully involving oneself with the group under study in order to better understand it 
(this role is otherwise known as participant observation). Latour and Woolgar 
take an etic stance, which means they stay an 'outsider' to the group under study 
and therefore relying mainly on observational data. Woolgar (personal 
communication, October 9th , 2003) explains that this approach was deliberately 
and "provocatively signalling the attempt to resist adopting the natives' [the 
sCientists'] beliefs". Latour and Woolgar did not even employ the basic quaiitative 
procedure of asking participants to discuss their scientific behaviour, including 
the intent of their behaviour, which would have provided them with considerably 
greater insight into both the non-social and social construction of facts. 
Moreover, they did not place their own interpretation and the participants' 
interpretation within their appropriate social contexts. Latour and Woolgar (1979) 
insist that they were avoiding the dangers of an extreme emic approach but still 
treating the discourse of the participants "as a social phenomenon" (p. 39). This 
would seem to be a deliberate interpretation of social phenomena without a 
social context, which is an implausible stance for social constructionists to take. 
Arguably, the most remarkable and legitimate complaint that can be made 
against this study was that Woolgar was not there. Woolgar explains: "Bruno did 
the fieldwork for Lab Life and I visited and we wrote it up together" (Woolgar, 
personal communication, October 9th , 2003). Only slightly less noteworthy are 
the points raised by Slezak (1994) that, by Latour's own admission, his English 
was very poor at the time of the study, that he had no knowledge of experimental 
SCience, and that he had yet to encounter any studies in the sociology of science 
(see Latour & Woolgar, i 986, p. 273). From the position of a qualitative 
researcher, "Laboratory Life" can be fairly characterised, not as ethnography, but 
as a somewhat loosely structured observational study that lacks most procedures 
for ensuring validity checks on the word of Latour. These criticisms raise severe 
doubts about the validity of the study's support for the view that facts are socially 
-,- : 
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constructed. Inexplicably, Latour and Woolgar argue that the problems they 
faced (e.g., a poor grasp of English) were actually advantages because they 
afforded uniqueness in their perception and interpretation of scientific behaviour. 
Slezak (1994) concludes that "Laboratory Life" "reads more like a parody than a 
serious inquiry" (p. 336). 
The well-researched work of other sociologists of science (e.g., Knorr-Cetina & 
Mulkay, 1983; Mulkay, 1979) supports the view that social and non-social factors 
influence the rational decision-making of scientists - for example, factors such as 
the political agenda of scientists, their personal ambition, or the lure of greater 
funding. Based on their laboratory studies, Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983) raise 
two key arguments, which are regularly used against forms of positivism, 
empiricism, and scientific realism. These arguments stem from the debates 
about the theses of the theory-Iadenness of observation and the 
underdetermination of theories by data. 
The theory-laden ness of observation and the underdetermination of theory by 
data are each substantial methodological topics in their own right. A full analysis 
of the debates around these complex areas is not appropriate here; however, 
each requires a brief characterisation to better assess their specific impact on the 
credibility of epistemic realism. Although there is considerable controversy as to 
what the theory-Iadenness of observation means, it is reasonable to suggest that 
it is based in part on the assumption that observation is understood to always be 
influenced to some degree by prior knowledge, theory, and metatheoretical 
beliefs. SOCiologists of science, such as Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983), use 
their research to support a strong interpretation of the theory-Iadenness of 
observation thesis. They argue that data is never neutral and that the models 
and theories that develop from data are accordingly biased and represent the 
researchers' values, or other sociological influences. 
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From a broad postempiricist view of science, it is typically accepted that 
observation should not be given priority over theory but be on a par with theory in 
terms of its evidentiary worth. This position challenges the logical positivist view 
that makes a clear distinction between theory and observation, with the epistemic 
priority being accorded to observation. The logical positivist position is that 
theoretical terms are dependent for their meaning on the observation on which 
they are based. As the logical empiricist Feigl (1970) argued, theories grow 
inductively in the "soil" of observation (Schwandt, 2001, p. 253). More recently, 
the separation of observation and theory has been challenged by realists and 
social constructionists, amongst others, both of whom generally accept that both 
observations and the general production of knowledge are influenced by 
scientists' existing understandings, the theoretical frameworks being used, and 
scientists' explicit or implicit metatheoretical positions (Hooker, 1987). Typically, 
scientific realists argue that theory and observation dynamically interact. 
The underdetermination thesis has a number of formulations. Very broadly, 
however, the argument for the underdetermination of theories by the available 
evidence supports the view that any given theory lacks sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that it is conclusively 'proven' or 'unproven'. However, theories can 
also be made to fit the available data. Sociologists of science, amongst others, 
therefore argue that the decision to accept or reject scientific theories depends 
on sociological factors, not the empirical adequacy of data. However, scientific 
realists tend to the view that the generation and evaluation of theories is not just 
an empirical matter, and so are not determined by the data alone. For scientific 
realists, empirical adequacy is part of the overall epistemic value of a theory, 
which involves a number of evaluative criteria. 
A more justifiable position than the empiricist view that scientific facts are simply 
discovered, or the social constructionist view that scientific facts are socially 
constructed, is the understanding that scientific facts are constructed under very 
specific conditions but these constructions are constrained by multiple influences 
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from the world. For scientific realism, the knower (e.g., a researcher, or subject) 
and the known (e.g., the participants or objects) are understood to be causally 
related. As Hooker (1987) expresses the point, "humans are parts of the world, 
knowing it through interactions (both within and without them) that permeate it" 
(p. 6). Facts and theories interact but are always fallible and constrained by the 
world. Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay are correct in stating that social and political 
factors influence theory construction and appraisal, but while the influence of 
these factors will vary depending on the situation, they do not determine facts or 
theories. 
By contrast, radical social constructionists (e.g., Gergen, 1985; Woolgar, 1988a) 
take the theory-Iadenness of observation and the underdetermination of theories 
by data as strong evidence for a relativist epistemology. They reason that if all 
data are value-laden, then data depend on the researcher's tacit knowledge, 
theory, and values. They reason further that the researcher's view is situated 
within a particular social and linguistic community, and different communities are 
understood to have different and irreconcilable views. From this they conclude 
that all knowledge is relative to particular communities and cannot be compared. 
Stated in its strong form, epistemic relativism holds that all aspects of research 
need to be tailored to a specific context and the findings of research only apply to 
that context. Many qualitative writers distance themselves from such relativism 
(e.g., Schwandt, 2000). Further, relativism is usually rejected by psychologists. 
For example, Fletcher (1995) describes relativism as self-refuting, whereas 
Rennie (1999, p. 4) simply calls it "futile". 
This thesis adopts an epistemic realism that qualitative researchers can employ 
in mainstream psychological research - a realism that is consistent with mind-
independence, strives for objective knowledge, and can invoke theoretical 
entities in the construction of explanatory theories to explain phenomena, but 
accepts a systematic fallibilism at all levels of knowledge and knowledge 
production. This realist position is considered more consistent with a good deal 
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of psychological science and more defensible than a radical social constructionist 
epistemology that potentially accepts any subjective standard, often believes in 
epistemic relativism, and rejects the appeal to theoretical entities thought to 
reside in a mind-independent world. It is particularly important that qualitative 
research reassert its relationship with epistemological objectivity in order to gain 
credibility in mainstream psychology. 
7.2.3 Epistemic criteria for justifying knowledge claims 
An important question prompted by the proposed form of epistemic realism is, 
how are the knowledge claims generated by qualitative research in psychology to 
be justified? As discussed in chapters two, five, and six, qualitative and radical 
social constructionist approaches to epistemic appraisal tend to use criteria that 
deliberately move away from validity and reliability criteria (e.g., Lincoln & 
Guba's, 1985, 'trustworthiness criteria') or employ rhetorical and aesthetic criteria 
(e.g., Lather, 1991, 1993). They consistently reject the orthodox approach to 
validity and reliability that is employed in psychological science. 
The search for alternative epistemic criteria to validity and reliability started a 
process that has led to an "epistemological quagmire" in the qualitative literature 
(Whittlemore et aI., 2001, p. 523). There is now a very wide range of different 
and opposing positions on the nature and place of the different epistemic criteria 
within qualitative research (Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Seale, 1999b). However, 
it is generally accepted in the qualitative literature that the struggle to find 
appropriate criteria continues, with no particular set of criteria gaining 
ascendance (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Seale, 1999b). 
This thesis adopts the view that the criteria of reliability and vaiidity are still highly 
relevant to qualitative research. The use of notions of reliability and validity offers 
the best way forward for qualitative research in the criteriology debate. It should 
also help legitimise qualitative research in psychology, and ensure the rigour of 
qualitative research. However, criteria that need to be used comprise a broader 
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set of well-accepted validity criteria which includes the following: the 'mainstream' 
understanding of validity and reliability; validity criteria commonly used to 
evaluate scientific theories - recall, Kuhn (1977) suggests these are accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. 
The employment of this collection of epistemic criteria is consistent with the 
position that acceptable scientific research should seek both a reliabilist and 
coherentist justification for its knowledge claims (Haig, 2003). Reliabilism is the 
view that a knowledge claim is justified if it has been derived from reliable 
processes or methods. Verbal protocol analysis is a good example of a 
qualitative method that typically satisfies a reliabilist approach to justifying 
knowledge claims because it uses a series of strict procedures to ensure its data 
is reliable. Alternatively, coherentism argues that a knowledge claim is justified if 
it coheres with other knowledge claims. Thagard's (1992) theory of explanatory 
coherence is a qualitative method that makes provision for the assessment of 
competing theories based on criteria that comprise explanatory coherence. 
Although reliabilism and coherentism are contrasting approaches to justifying 
knowledge claims, they can be used in complementary fashion in psychological 
and qualitative research (Haig, 2003). 
The validity criteria that Kuhn suggests are commonly used to evaluate theories, 
can be briefly characterised as follows: accuracy is the predictive accuracy of the 
theory; consistency is the requirement that the theory is internally consistent and 
coheres with other relevant theories; scope is the explanatory breadth of a 
theory; simplicity brings order to phenomena; and lastly, fruitfulness is the ability 
of a theory to lead to new ideas in research. Like many broadly acceptable ideas 
in the philosophy of science, Kuhn's evaluative criteria are rarely mentioned in 
the qualitative literature. Consequently, Kuhn's full range of criteria are not 
considered in the debate between the 'traditional' criteria of reliability and validity 
and the new alternative criteria that abound in qualitative methodology. The 
criteria of theory evaluation just described constitute a useful set of criteria that 
would allow both qualitative and quantitative research to move beyond the 
traditionally heavy focus on the criterion of empirical adequacy. 
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The collection of epistemic criteria proposed above is considered better than the 
many alternative criteria proposed in qualitative research to replace validity and 
reliability. There are a number of arguments to be noted in support of this 
position. First, when directly compared, the alternative criteria are not found to 
be as epistemically strong as the so-called 'traditional' criteria because they can 
potentially support any and all knowledge claims (Phillips, 2000). Phillips (2000) 
demonstrates the weakness of the new criteria when he compares 'credibility' 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 301) with 'validity'. As discussed in detail in chapter 
five, credibility is a weaker concept because of its uncritical acceptance of any 
research under certain circumstances. 
The second argument in support of the proposed epistemic criteria, is that they 
have not helped resolve the legitimisation crisis in qualitative research (Denzin, 
1997), and do not appear to have promoted the use of qualitative research in 
psychology. For non-realist qualitative researchers, the crisis over how to assess 
the adequacy of qualitative work is recognised as unresolved with no foreseeable 
resolution (Angen, 2000; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Schwandt, 1996). Qualitative 
writers have been unable to generate better criteria despite the considerable 
attention and energy given in the qualitative literature to their development. In 
the qualitative literature, the need for alternative criteria is driven by the belief that 
qualitative research faiis if evaluated by the 'traditional' validity criteria; that the 
concepts of validity and reliability are too narrowly operationalised by quantitative 
procedures to be useful in qualitative research (Altheide & Johnson, 1994). 
Moreover, the qualitative 'paradigm' is seen as distinct from metatheories, such 
as positivism, that are presumed to support validity and reliability and therefore 
are seen to require different evaluative criteria. Consequently, there has been a 
remarkable proliferation of alternative criteria with which to evaluate knowledge 
claims made by qualitative researchers, but with no alternative set of criteria 
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being widely adopted by qualitative researchers (Seale, 1999a), a pointthat has 
been noted before. A lingering difficulty here is that qualitative researchers have 
not been able to explain their inability to address the supposed inappropriateness 
of the validity and reliability criteria (Banister et aI., 1994). 
The third argument in favour of the proposed epistemic criteria is that the goal of 
promoting qualitative research in psychology is best served by returning to the 
use of the criteria of validity and reliability when assessing the empirical 
adequacy of knowledge claims (Morse et aI., 2002). It is also argued that 
qualitative research needs to evaluate theory by using the seven criteria noted 
above, or a set of criteria like them. A concern with validity and reliability, and the 
specific criteria of accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness are 
stronger criteria than any alternative criteria proposed for qualitative research. 
The application of these criteria has the potential to promote the use of qualitative 
research within psychology because it brings to qualitative research and 
quantitative research a shared set of evaluation criteria. The proposed use by 
qualitative researchers of the same criteria and associated terminology as used 
by mainstream science is to be seen as more than a cosmetic change (Forbes et 
aI., 1999). Sharing the same terminology and the same set of criteria should 
encourage greater interaction between researchers, and the complementary use 
of qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as promoting the funding of 
qualitative research by enhancing its scientific legitimacy (Morse et aI., 2002). 
Qualitative researchers do face a special challenge in demonstrating to their 
readership, and themselves, that their conclusions are the result of critical and 
rigorous investigation, and are not merely anecdotal (Silverman, 2000). 
However, qualitative research can adhere to the proposed criteria through the 
use of the multitude of rigorous and systematic procedures that have been 
developed by qualitative researchers (e.g., constant comparison analysis, 
negative case analysis, theoretical sampling). When the most systematic and 
rigorous qualitative and quantitative methods are compared, it is not easy to 
discern which is the more rigorous (Azar, 1999). 
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The proposed scientific realist epistemology therefore argues that the evaluative 
criteria for justifying knowledge claims centre on validity and reliability. These are 
empirical adequacy, and the four remaining commonly accepted criteria of theory 
evaluation identified by Kuhn. Taken together, these criteria can provide 
qualitative researchers in psychology with a resource that provides a better 
justification for knowledge claims and theory evaluation than their own word, and 
which is superior to any alternative set of criteria proposed in the qualitative 
literature. 
7.2.4 The correspondence theory of truth 
With its commitment to semantic realism, the form of scientific realism adopted 
here takes the correspondence theory as its preferred theory of truth. Unlike 
alternative theories, such as the coherentist and pragmatist theories, the 
correspondence theory of truth exploits the tenet of mind-independence. The 
correspondence theory of truth maintains that for a claim about the world to be 
considered true it must correspond to the relevant facts about the world. That is, 
a claim about an entity, obseNable or unobseNable, is true only if that entity 
exists as the theoretical claim states it does. Expressed more formally, the 
correspondence theory of truth holds that the truth of a proposition 'p' requires 
the following two conditions to be met. First, p is a fact, and second, the 
proposition corresponds to that fact. The correspondence theory of truth 
maintains that truth is a correspondence relation between language and 
cognition, and the world (Hooker, 1987). Language is understood both to 
operate within, and constantly refer to, the world. 
It is important to emphasise that correspondence truth is to be understood as 
something that can never be attained, but that it has a critical role as an orienting 
ideal for researchers to strive for (Phillips, 2000). As Haig (2002a) remarks, truth 
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"is a highly valued, though unattainable, goal that helps make sense of science 
as an attempt to represent and intervene in the world" (p. 457). Similarly, 
McMullin (1984) describes 'truth' as a useful metaphor that offers "an idealized 
"horizon-claim", which would be quite misleading if applied to the actual work of 
the scientist" (p. 35). 
Gergen (1985, 1994a, 1994c, 2001 a) has repeatedly dismissed the view that 
science should aim to represent the truth. For Gergen and radical social 
constructionists, language cannot reflect or map the world because the use and 
meaning of language is situated in specific social contexts. The nature of 'truth' 
will ultimately depend on the cultural, historical, and linguistic contexts (Gergen, 
1985). Gergen and Gergen (2000) see 'truth' and 'falsity' as nothing more than 
linguistic artifacts (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). As they express it, "there is no 
means of matching word to world" (p. 1026). For Gergen and Gergen, therefore, 
any empiricist or realist warrant for valid knowledge claims is undermined 
because SOCially situated language cannot be made to reflect or map the world. 
Hence, the criteria and procedures used to promote validity are seen as merely 
rhetorical devices to convince readers of the research's legitimacy. Gergen 
(1985) offers no alternative truth criteria, but argues that alternative criteria are 
required that "might reasonably take into account existing needs for systems of 
intelligibility, limitations inherent in existing constructions, along with a range of 
political, moral, aesthetic, and practical considerations" (p. 272). 
In response to Gergen's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, Haig 
(2002a) argues that Gergen inaccurately portrays the scientific realist position on 
'truth'. Haig presents three arguments to support a defensible use by realists of 
the correspondence theory of truth: first, that Gergen conflates the concepts of 
'truth' and 'acceptance', second, that Gergen incorrectly argues that 
correspondence theorists adhere to a mirroring and mapping understanding of 
correspondence relations, and third, Gergen misunderstands that the 
correspondence theory of truth can act usefully as a theoretical posit in the broad 
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scientific realist theory of science. Each of Haig's (2002a) three arguments are 
considered in turn. 
First, Gergen (2001 a) does not believe that the correspondence theory of truth 
provides the evaluative criteria that can justify knowledge claims, although he 
offers no alternatives beyond asserting the importance of intelligibility rather than 
objectivity. Haig agrees that correspondence with reality cannot provide criteria 
for the justification of knowledge claims, but that this does not mean that 
correspondence theory is useless. Haig argues that what is vital is the distinction 
between 'truth' and 'acceptance'. 'Truth' cannot be guaranteed through the 
application of any theory of truth, but serves as a regulative ideal that is important 
to strive for (Phillips, 2000, p. 184). The ideal of truth, although not achievable as 
a goal, helps explain why science endeavours to represent the world. Truth is an 
unattainable ideal that is only accessible indirectly through the criteria employed 
to evaluate and accept theories. That is, criteria of theory acceptance such as 
empirical adequacy and coherence are indicative of truth but they are not 
constitutive of truth (Haig, 2002a, p. 457). 
Second, Gergen (2001 a) argues that realists support both a mirroring and 
mapping correspondence relation, when in fact the former is strongly rejected by 
scientific realists and the latter is considered highly functional. Scientific realists 
argue that language does not aim to mirror the world because this is impossible, 
but that the correspondence theory stands in a mapping relation to the world 
(Haig, 2002a). Mapping serves as a useful metaphor for the approximation of 
truth that scientific claims actually achieve (Hooker, 1987). Maps provide 
guidelines, indicators, and rough contours of an actual reality just as science 
provides an indirect approximation of reality. The mapping metaphor provides 
insight into the nature of the correspondence relation, and helps to explain how 
scientists approximate the world (Hooker, 1987). 
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Finally, Haig argues that the correspondence theory of truth is not only part of 
semantic realism but is also an important part of a broader framework of 
cognitive theory (c.f., Hooker, 1987). Viewed in this light, correspondence truth is 
fundamentally a relation between cognition and the world. In this light, 
correspondence truth can help explain of why scientists endeavour to represent 
reality as accurately as possible. 
Haig's arguments demonstrate that Gergen's rejection of the correspondence 
theory is ill-founded. Again, Gergen offers no concrete alternative to the 
approach he criticises. Qualitative researchers are better served by employing 
the correspondence theory of truth, which provides them with the guiding ideal of 
'truth', but allows them to aim at achieving the acceptance of knowledge claims 
through the employment of various criteria of validity. 
7.2.5 Methodism 
Methods are understood to have a central role in the proposed form of scientific 
realism. Scientific realism, psychology, and qualitative research are all strongly 
concerned with methods, both for the detection of empirical phenomena and for 
the generation, development, and evaluation of theories. At a functional level, 
methods are recognised as playing a vital role in science by ordering and 
directing inquiry. More importantly, however, almost all knowledge that has been 
generated by science has come by way of methods, and evolving theories of 
methods. Science clearly involves many important aspects other than methods, 
such as aims, presuppositions, theories, and institutions. However, it is a basic 
commitment of the scientific realist position adopted here that it is through 
methods scientists have gained most knowledge about substantive areas, 
theories, and the development and refinement of methods themselves (Haig, 
2002a). Without evolving theories of method, it is difficult to see how science 
would progress. 
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This thesis accepts the general abductive framework as a useful methodological 
theory of method (see Haig, 2002b). It provides a framework for the 
complementarily of quantitative and qualitative approaches to research whilst 
encouraging methodological pluralism. It also offers a much broader 
understanding of scientific reasoning than the hypothetico-deductive and 
inductive methods, which it can usefully subsume. The abductive theory of 
method provides a holistic conception of method that allows methodologists 
greater freedom to move between qualitative and quantitative methods. But this 
general theory of scientific method also offers advantages as discussed in 
chapters two, five, and earlier in this chapter. For example, the abductive 
method provides a scientific characterisation of the hitherto unexplained move 
from phenomena to explanatory theory, which, very helpfully for qualitative 
researchers, resolves the inexplicable production of a core category in grounded 
theory (Haig, 1996). Haig's (1996) discussion of problem-solving in the context 
of grounded theory also places grounded theory on a more credible 
methodological footing. It is also important to note that what helps grounded 
theory is also likely to be helpful to the many hybrid qualitative approaches that 
are derived from grounded theory, or are strongly characterised by components 
of grounded theory. 
Some qualitatively-oriented writers object to what they see as 'methodolatry', that 
is, the perceived overemphasis on methods in social science, particularly in 
psychology (e.g., Chamberlain, 2000; Gergen, 1994a; Reicher, 2000). However, 
qualitative research is deeply involved in the generation and refinement of 
method, particularly methods of data collection and data analysis. It would be 
more accurate to characterise the criticisms from qualitative writers as 
expressions of concern not with the overuse of methods, but the lack of use of 
qualitative methods in psychology relative to quantitative methods. Gergen, in 
particular, has challenged the focus on method in psychology. However, in two 
recent papers (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, and Gergen, 2001 a) he strongly 
advocates qualitative methods as an innovative way forward for psychological 
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researchers. For example, Gergen and Gergen's (2000) application of their own 
brand of radical social constructionism to qualitative inquiry, discussed in detail in 
chapter six, advocates a number of methods, including multiple voicing, literary 
styling, and performance. By arguing that quantitative methods should be 
replaced, or at the very least complemented, by qualitative methods, Gergen can 
be seen as supporting a method-oriented view of science. 
An alternative, less method-centred science has not been clearly articulated by 
critics of methodolatry, and it is difficult to imagine a plausible approach to 
qualitative research or psychological research generally, where data collection 
and data analysis methods are assigned a peripheral role. What is more, 
Gergen's criticisms of the quantitative methods of experimentation and meta-
analysis have been effectively countered (e.g., Gage, 1996). 
Chapter five demonstrated that qualitative research can be scientific and fit into a 
scientific realist framework. Moreover, that chapter showed that there are 
specific qualitative methods that are scientifically credible and valuable in 
psychological research (namely, grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and 
the theory of explanatory coherence). However, the credibility of these methods 
highlighted the fact that there are many other qualitative methods that have not 
shown themselves to be reliable. For example, while narrative methods have 
become very popular in qualitative research (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1984, 1986, 
2000), Trout (1998) systematically documents the lack of reliability of narrative 
methods as used in a variety of different contexts such as, motivational 
psychology, and social history. Trout's reasoning can readily be generalised to 
the use of narrative methods in qualitative research generally. Trout argues that 
narrative methods, by which he means the use of anecdote and subjective 
judgment of data to make claims of causal dependence without reference to the 
quantitative parameters of reliability, are epistemically weak. The multiple biases 
of human perception that have been well established by psychological study 
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(e.g., confirmation biases81 , the base-rate fallacy82 and the availability bias83) are 
not allowed for in narrative methods. Trout's (1998) criticisms apply to more 
qualitative methods than just narrative methods, but as argued in chapter five, 
the methods of grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and the theory of 
explanatory coherence employ reliability procedures to counter these problems. 
Importantly, Trout does not aim to dismiss the use of narrative methods outright. 
He argues that narrative methods have considerable methodological virtue 
(principally the sensitivity that they have for the close examination of human 
nature, language, and the methodologically flexibility they can afford; see Fogel, 
1982), but he also claims these methods can be weak and misleading, 
particularly when used in isolation from quantitative approaches. Trout's 
argument, then, can be taken as another reason to break down the qualitative-
quantitative divide, and use qualitative and quantitative methods in a 
complementary manner. 
As discussed in chapter four, both quantitative and qualitative methods are 
important in science. The artificial barriers between quantitative and qualitative 
research can be characterised as value positions that tend to support political 
rather than scientific aims. As detailed in chapter three, the qualitative literature 
constructs these barriers by providing caricatures of positivist, postpositivist, and 
realist metatheory (Michell, 2003a) which do not take into account the alternative, 
81 Trout (1998) notes two forms of confirmation bias. First, the typical understanding of 
confirmation bias that people interpret information in a way that is consistent with their existing 
beliefs (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). Second, there is what is sometimes called 'hindsight bias', 
where people reinterpret their previous beliefs to be consistent with new information (Fischoff, 
1975). 
82 It is common for those using narrative methods to support a causal claim about a certain 
behaviour or event by employing simple frequency data without reference to a base rate for the 
general population. 
83 The availability bias refers to the well researched phenomenon that people rely most heavily on 
the information that is most available to them (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Whether the 
information that is most available is the most representative of the relevant issue under study is 
not generally considered for in the use of narrative methods. 
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highly developed and different forms of postpositivism. Importantly, scientific 
realism typically supports methodological pluralism as an appropriate strategy for 
advancing knowledge. Both qualitative and quantitative methods have a role 
within scientific realism if they can be shown to be reliable generators of 
information. Empiricists, however, strongly favour quantitative methods, and tend 
to reject qualitative methods as pre-scientific, or accord them a highly limited 
preliminary or adjunctive role in research. Radical social constructionism 
forcefully rejects the metatheoretical thinking that underpins quantitative 
approaches, and sometimes rejects quantitative methodology outright. 
The analysis of qualitative research in chapters two and four made it clear that 
. there is a pressing need to move beyond the qualitative-quantitative debate and 
conceive qualitative and quantitative methodologies as allies, not opponents. 
This need is particularly evident in psychology. The potential role of qualitative 
methodology in psychology is broadened if it is characterised as generally 
complementary to quantitative methodology, or if quantitative methodology is 
characterised as complementary to qualitative methodology. There is 
considerable evidence to support the view that the metatheoretical and 
methodological gaps between qualitative and quantitative research are not as 
large as is normally supposed. These gaps have already been bridged by 
specific qualitative methods that meet the traditional criteria of research 
evaluation (e.g., grounded theory, Glaser & Strauss, 1967; verbal protocol 
analysis, Ericsson & Simon, 1993). The existence of a substantial overlap of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies supports the position that qualitative 
and quantitative research can be used within the same metatheory and as 
complementary approaches in certain research situations. It should be clear by 
now that there is more to gain in psychology by breaking down the barriers 
between qualitative and quantitative research than in maintaining their dubious 
separation (Greene & Caracelli, 1997). 
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This is not to say that an informed qualitative-quantitative debate does not still 
have a useful place in science. As with theories, the advancement of knowledge 
is aided by generating competing methodologies, which are developed through 
critical interplay. Social sciences such as anthropology, sociology, and education 
have generally reached the conclusion that, although many of the key issues in 
the qualitative-quantitative debate have not been fully resolved, the value of 
methodological pluralism is more important than the debate itself. Psychology, 
however, has yet to fully engage with the qualitative-quantitative debate, let alone 
look beyond it. 
7.3 Conclusions: Scientific realism as a framework for qualitative 
research in psychology 
In chapter three it was concluded that, although qualitative research historically 
lacked a clearly articulated metatheoretical basis for its wider application in 
psychology, this is no longer the case. There are now several metatheoretical 
options available to psychologists who wish to employ qualitative methodology. 
However, none of these metatheories appear broadly acceptable in both 
mainstream psychology and domains where qualitative research is employed. 
Qualitative researchers are reluctant to employ what they understand as the 
mainstream psychological metatheories of positivism, empiricism, and realism as 
frameworks for their research. The epistemic demands of these metatheories 
are considered too 'quantitatively' oriented, and symptomatic of a hegemony that 
does not properly appreciate the social, political, and linguistic influences on 
science. PSYQhological scientists tend not to accept qualitative research methods 
as sCientifically credible because these methods are generally understood to be 
unreliable (Haig, 2002a). In this chapter, a set of scientific realist doctrines was 
proposed that aims to provide a coherent and usable metatheoretical framework 
for those wishing to use qualitative research in psychology. 
The first of these doctrines is the assumption of a mind-independent world. This 
doctrine has the advantage of allowing the postulation of theoretical or 
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unobservable entities based on observed data to detect and explain phenomena, 
and therefore endeavours to gain an understanding beyond what is simply 
observable. The use of theoretical entities is a feature of many successful 
scientific theories (Hacking, 1984; McMullin, 1984), and it is an approach that has 
provided some success in psychology. 
By contrast, the radical social constructionist position advanced by Gergen 
(1985) denies that any knowledge claims about reality can be established by 
research because of the "vicissitudes of social processes" (p. 268). McCarty and 
Schwandt (2000) argue that Gergen's view reduces research to the level of 
studying word play. McCarty and Schwandt fully support the idea that culture, 
history, and language are strong influences on reality, but do not accept that this 
alienates them from an "interest in how and why we form accounts to explain our 
actions, and how and why meanings are modified, transformed, and evolve 
through encounters" (p. 60). They charge that by seeing all as text, Gergen's 
radical social constructionism severs sociality from the world. In a similar vein to 
Phillips (2000), McCarty and Schwandt (2000) argue that Gergen's (1994a) 
radical social constructionism in effect removes human agency from the world 
and from the research process. 
In this thesis it is accepted that social forces strongly influence knowledge, but 
that this acceptance does not lead to the conclusion that social forces have an 
overwhelming power over the construction of knowledge or the values of science 
(Phillips,2000). Non-social or internal forces such as psychological drives (e.g., 
ambition, intellectual curiosity) can be just as important. Equally, researchers 
can act voluntarily, based on the beliefs they adhere to, but still be aware of the 
internal and external forces that are acting upon them (Phillips, 2000). A model 
of knowledge construction that allows for internal forces, external forces, 
voluntary action, and their interaction, would seem superior to one that solely 
focuses on external forces (e.g., Gergen's radical social constructionism) or 
internal forces (Phillips, 2000, pp. 206-207). 
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It has been suggested that a significant accompaniment in the proposed 
acceptance of mind-independence is the employment of the abductive theory of 
method (Haig, 2002b), which is based on a scientific realist outlook on scientific 
inquiry. The abductive method facilitates the qualitative researchers' study of 
theoretical entities (Haig, 1996), allows for the three major forms of scientific 
inference - induction, abduction, and deduction - and also offers productive 
solutions to specific problems in grounded theory. To only rely on the radical 
social constructionist position that all facts are socially constructed bars one from 
learning about the world in which we live, including its unobserved parts. 
I 
Epistemic realism is the second scientific realist doctrine to be proposed. 
Epistemic realism understands that objective knowledge can be gained about 
both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. This form of epistemic 
realism is consistent with mind-independence, strives for objective knowledge, 
and can employ theoretical entities to construct explanatory theories. It also sees 
theory and observation in a dynamic relationship, while always accepting a 
systematic fallibilism at all levels of knowledge and knowledge production. 
Epistemic realism is considered to be broadly consistent with a good deal of 
mainstream psychological science and more supportable than a radical social 
constructionist epistemology that potentially accepts any subjective standard, 
often believes in epistemic relativism, and rejects the appeal to theoretical 
entities and a mind-independent world. This epistemic realism is not at odds with 
qualitative methodology, although it does strongly suggest that qualitative 
research needs to realign itself with epistemological objectivity. 
The third of the proposed scientific realist doctrines is a collection of epistemically 
realist validity criteria, including: validity and reliability; five standard criteria of 
theory evaluation: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. This 
collection of validity criteria is suggested because it is believed to be 
epistemically more robust than any set of alternative criteria offered in the 
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qualitative literature. The alternative criteria proposed for evaluative research do 
not apply well to mainstream psychology whereas the use of the 'traditional' 
criteria can serve to promote qualitative research in psychology, particularly 
those qualitative methods that have been shown capable of adhering to the 
demands of validity and reliability (methods that include grounded theory, verbal 
protocol analysis, and the theory of explanatory coherence). Moreover, the 
alternative criteria proposed by qualitative methodologists, have not been 
consistently used in qualitative research. Within the qualitative literature they are 
generally understood to have failed to address the legitimisation crisis, that is, 
they do not serve to legitimise knowledge in a postmodern or poststructural 
sense. What is more, proponents of the alternative criteria cannot explain why 
these criteria offer a better alternative to knowledge evaluation than traditional 
validity and reliability considerations. Lastly, the use of the most well known of 
the alternative criteria, 'credibility' (Lincoln & Guba,1985), is likely to promote the 
uncritical acceptance of all knowledge claims, thus seriously casting doubt on its 
ability to perform useful validation work (Phillips, 2000). 
Ironically, the rejection of all types of criteria for the justification of knowledge 
claims by Gergen threatens his sociopolitical ambitions for improving the lot of 
people. Gergen (1994a) argues that knowledge stems from social relations and 
therefore 'good' and 'bad' judgments depend on the constantly changing specific 
cultural, historical, and linguistic communities around those judgments. However, 
Gage (1996) convincingly shows phenomena are far more stable than Gergen's 
judgment allows for. This raises the question of how there can be a comparison 
and evaluation of conditions to allow improvements to be made in the world if 
good and bad conditions cannot be determined (Schwandt, 2000). If judgments 
are invalid outside of very specific contexts, then it seems there can be no basis 
for democratising and reconstructing research. Gergen (1994a) creates 
something of a paradox in arguing that a post-criterial world can also make 
judgments. Specifically, Gergen does not overcome the inability of his radical 
social constructionism to justify its knowledge claims beyond the word of the 
researcher. 
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The fourth scientific realist doctrine endorses the correspondence theory of truth. 
Correspondence theory fits considerably better with the doctrine of mind-
independence, the use of theoretical entities, and the proposed epistemic realism 
and its validity criteria, than alternative theories of truth. The correspondence 
theory of truth maintains that for a claim about the world to be considered true, it 
must correspond to the facts. In this form, 'truth' is understood as something that 
can never be attained, but it does have a critical role as an orienting ideal for 
researchers to strive for (Phillips, 2000). Qualitative researchers are better 
served employing the correspondence theory of truth, which provides them with 
an important guiding ideal, but which allows them to employ validity criteria to 
judge the acceptability of knowledge claims. The arguments in the qualitative 
literature against the correspondence theory of truth, particularly by Gergen 
(2001 a), are unconvincing because they misrepresent the best scientific realist 
use of that theory. Haig (2002a) argues that Gergen (2001 a) conflates 'truth' and 
'acceptance', and unfairly attributes to realists the view that the correspondence 
relation is a mirroring relation. Again, Gergen offers no constructive alternative to 
the approach he criticises. 
The final doctrine of the proposed form of scientific realism is methodism, or the 
strong belief in the scientific efficacy of research methods. Methodism maintains 
that it is through methods that scientists have gained their knowledge about 
substantive areas as well as methods themselves (Haig, 2002a; Hooker, 1987). 
This thesis endorses the abductive theory of method as a useful general theory 
of scientific method (Haig, 2002b). Importantly, the abductive method provides a 
framework for the complementary understanding and use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, and the many methods within those methodologies, 
but its framework also offers a much broader understanding of scientific 
reasoning than hypothetico-deductive or inductive methods, which it usefully 
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subsumes. The abductive theory of method provides a holistic conception of 
method and more clearly sets out the research process from initial data analysis 
through phenomena detection to the generation, development, and evaluation of 
theories (Haig, 2002b). 
The use of the abductive method within a scientific realist framework allows the 
use of either, quantitative or qualitative methods or both, and thereby overcomes 
a key barrier to preventing the development of a fuller and broader relationship 
between psychology and qualitative research. The proposed realist framework 
allows for a carefully considered mix of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodology, but still adheres to the validity criteria for justifying knowledge 
claims. Chapter five demonstrated that qualitative methods can generate data in 
accordance with the methodological commitments of scientific realism. It also 
established that there are specific qualitative methods that are already 
scientifically credible and valuable in psychological research. This chapter 
examined grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and the theory of 
explanatory coherence. However, the credibility of these methods highlights the 
fact that there are many other qualitative methods that have yet to show 
themselves to be reliable. A viable alternative to a less method-centred science 
has not been clearly expressed by critics of methodism, and it is difficult to 
imagine a productive approach to qualitative methodology, or psychological 
research more generally, where data, analytic and theory construction methods 
do not have a prominent place. 
It is equally important to conceptualise qualitative methodology as not being 
implicitly or explicitly opposed to quantitative methodology and its metatheoretical 
underpinnings. The view that qualitative methodology is better than quantitative 
methodology is both mistaken and unhelpful, because it obscures the relative 
strengths of each methodology. Adopting qualitative methods does not 
automatically solve the problems faced by quantitative methods, and risks 
overlooking positive metath~oretical and methodological developments made by 
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quantitative researchers in psychology. The greater employment of qualitative 
methodology is unlikely to be achieved by attacking psychology's quantitative 
culture and promoting qualitative methodology as an alternative. The 
'quantitative imperative' can be better faced by demonstrating that non-
quantitative data can be scientific (Michell, 2003b). This can be achieved by 
showing that there are examples of qualitative methods that meet the evaluative 
criteria of validity. This was the strategy adopted in chapter five which examined 
the methods of grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and the theory of 
explanatory coherence. 
Although psychologists have viewed the recent return of qualitative research to 
psychology with due caution (Haig, 2002a), the form of scientific realism 
discussed in this chapter addresses psychologists' main concerns about whether 
qualitative methodology can operate within an acceptable metatheoretical 
position. It has been suggested that this form of scientific realism includes a 
scientifically credible ontology, epistemology, theory of truth, and methodology for 
justifying knowledge claims. It is important to reiterate that only one particular 
form of scientific realism is being advocated here, and that it relates to a diverse 
collection of methodological positions and approaches understood as 'qualitative 
research'. 
One indication that qualitative researchers and psychological scientists need not 
be so far apart in their views of science is that the current gap between the 
essentially realist metatheory of mainstream psychology and the social 
constructionist metatheory of much qualitative research is exaggerated by the 
adoption of incorrect assumptions on both sides (Michell, 2003b). This argument 
is addressed in chapters two, three, and four. One striking assumption in this 
regard is the belief that positivism, empiricism, and scientific realism support 
quantitative, not qualitative, research. At an empirical level, the methodological 
gap between qualitative and quantitative research has already been bridged by 
the three qualitative methods of grounded theory, verbal protocol analysis, and 
, -'~ ! 
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the theory of explanatory coherence. In chapter five it was shown that these 
methods overcome the assumed inability of qualitative approaches to address 
the validity criteria for evaluating the worth of scientific knowledge claims. 
What also needs to be considered is that the form of scientific realism proposed 
in this thesis places pressure on qualitative research in psychology to adhere to 
its ontological and epistemic commitments. Qualitative methods such as verbal 
protocol analysis and the theory of explanatory coherence can fit into a scientific 
realist framework without any difficulty because they have been developed and 
refined by methodologists of a scientific realist persuasion. Verbal protocol 
analysis is generally used for phenomena detection. Ericsson and Simon (1993) 
strongly support the empirical gathering of observable data for the fashioning of 
empirical regularities from which subsequent unobservable, underlying 
mechanisms can be inferred. They are deeply concerned with meeting the 
validity criteria for knowledge claims and devote much of the first and revised 
editions of their texts on protocol analysis to this end. 
The relationship between the theory of explanatory coherence and scientific 
realism is straightforward. Thagard built the theory of explanatory coherence 
from within a scientific realist metatheory (Thagard, 1988, pp. 145-152). The 
theory of explanatory coherence is a method of theory construction that functions 
to evaluate theories, and has been found to be both valid and reliable. Some of 
the epistemic criteria proposed by this version of scientific realism can be 
accommodated by the theory of explanatory coherence. Moreover, the theory of 
explanatory coherence provides a sound embodiment of the coherentist 
justification of knowledge claims endorsed earlier. 
Other qualitative methods, for example, grounded theory, are placed under 
considerably greater epistemic pressure to conform to the proposed form of 
scientific realism. One particular pressure relates to how grounded theorists 
justify their knowledge claims. Specifically, grounded theorists need to 
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demonstrate that their approaches to data collection, data analysis, and theory 
construction are valid and reliable. One approach is to use the extensive set of 
rigour-enhancing procedures (e.g., negative case analysis) set out in chapter five 
that help the researcher strive for valid and reliable findings without altering 
grounded theory's powerful analysis procedures. Based on the application of 
these procedures, it is contended that grounded theory can produce valid and 
reliable data. 
As previously noted, an important part of a credible scientific realist approach to 
grounded theory in psychology is the abductive account of scientific method 
(Haig, 1996, 2002b, 2003; Ward & Haig, 1997; Ward et aI., 1999). The abductive 
account of scientific method provides a clear investigative structure that 
researchers can employ to overcome some of the methodological 'looseness' of 
the Straussian or Glaserian approaches to grounded theory. Haig (1996) has 
already provided strong direction to how this may occur with the application of his 
abductive theory of scientific method. The abductive theory of scientific method 
is particularly helpful to grounded theory in moving it away from producing a 
systematic inductive theory in just describes data, or just describes and verifies 
data, to abductively creating a theory that explains the relevant empirical 
phenomena. This improvement on the original formulation of grounded theory, 
considered in chapter five, makes it considerably more useful as a generator of 
plausible explanatory theories. 
Other popular qualitative approaches, such as focus groups, autoethnography, 
and narrative methods have yet to demonstrate that they provide comprehensive 
and systematic approaches to justifying their knowledge claims, although it is 
acknowledged that they are potentially very useful for eliCiting inSights. It is not 
known yet whether these methods can be applied in such a way as to meet 
reliability and validity concerns. Narrative methods have been closely examined 
by Trout (1998) and found to be highly unreliable. Like most qualitative methods, 
the focus group method, autoethnography, and narrative methods have generally 
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grown out of attempts to create data collection methods that suit the participants. 
The data analysis methods that are then applied could be a mixture of any 
number of approaches (e.g., the constant comparison method, discourse 
analysis, conversation analysis, content analysis). Typically, by using videotapes 
and transcripts of the focus groups, the verbal and non-verbal data are analysed. 
There are no firm rules or guidelines about which data analysis and data 
collection methods should be combined in qualitative research. For example, a 
focus group approach is essentially a data collection method that makes use of 
any number of data analYSis procedures (Wilkinson, 2000, 2003). The potential 
for biased information in an interactive group context is considerable. However, 
focus groups can serve to provide a supportive and challenging context that 
generates very useful information (Basch, 1987; Frith, 2000). The application of 
the validity procedures set out previously for grounded theory in chapter five 
could be applied to a focus group approach to increase the validity of its data. 
Indeed, the abductive account of scientific method could also be used to give 
scientifically structure to the focus group method. However, neither of these 
additions, although useful, would address the concern thatthe focus group 
method has yet to show that its method of data collection does not simply 
produce interesting, but biased, information. This contrast with verbal protocol 
analysis, for example, which has undergone strenuous examination to 
demonstrate its eiicitation of information reliably operates within a valid 
theoretical framework (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993). The focus group 
approach, although proliferating rapidly in the social sciences (Wilkinson, 2003), 
has yet to demonstrate such credentials. 
Gergen and Gergen's application of radical social constructionism to qualitative 
inquiry in psychology and elsewhere, although providing some innovative 
developments for qualitative inquiry, over-states the ability of qualitative research 
to effectively function at the methodological frontline for the postmodern and 
poststructural agendas of social reform. Moreover, Gergen does not convincingly 
indicate why qualitative research should reject realism and strive for 
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reconstructing a more textually acceptable metatheory. This thesis contends that 
Gergen's radical social constructionism creates considerably more difficulties for 
qualitative researchers than solutions, mainly because its supporting arguments 
are problematic. For example, the three "crises" of validity (or legitimation), 
representation, and politics in the qualitative literature are largely generated and 
sustained by radical social constructionists themselves. Denzin (1997; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, 2000) and Gergen (2001 a; Gergen & Gergen, 2000) do not 
provide solutions, or conduits to potential solutions, to these problems for 
qualitative researchers. Gergen goes too far in several aspects: in arguing that 
his ontology of social relations successfully excludes other causal forces, (thus 
severely limiting human agency), in his ambiguous relationship with relativism, in 
his overreaction to empiricism and realism, and in the rejection of any form of 
criteria to justify knowledge claims. 
Much of Gergen's argument for radical social constructionism relies on the 
considerable body of criticism directed at empiricism, individualism, rationalism, 
and more latterly, scientific realism. Aside from the argument and evidence that 
realists have reacted constructively to these criticisms, there is a genuine 
concern from realists, other social constructionists, and now Gergen himself 
(1998, 2001 a, 2001 c), that these criticisms have gone too far, and risk "throwing 
the baby out with the bath water" (Gergen, 200ic, p. 10). Gergen (1998, 2001c) 
seeks to move beyond what he sees as the unproductive science wars to a point 
where both constructionism and realism are seen as differing but useful 
resources for researchers. However, Gergen (1998, 2001 c) does not provide 
any substantial philosophical analysis to underpin how this complementary 
reconciliation might occur. More generally, Gergen fails to appreciate how 
realism, and scientific realism in particular, have adapted to the critiques of 
empiriCism. Gergen's argument that realism and constructionism can co-exist is 
based on a political argument of mutual self-preservation, not a developed view 
of what each can offer an enriched metatheory. 
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However, it is accepted by this thesis that a form of social constructionism that 
acknowledges social influences but advocates some engagement with the 
empirical world appears a more plausible and applicable metatheory. For 
example, Longino (1990, 1993, 1996) offers one such approach that can be 
regarded as a form of 'weaker' social constructionism (Schwandt, 2000). Like a 
variety of qualitative writers (e.g., Hammersley, 1996; Kvale, 1996; Madill et aI., 
2000; Rennie, 2000; Seale, 1999b), Longino can be seen as seeking a middle 
ground that includes elements of what can be broadly labelled 'constructionism' 
(or 'postmodernism') and 'realism'. Furthermore, a number of authors in a variety 
of literatures have noted the potential of exploring what lies between realism and 
constructionism, or realism and relativism, or realism and antirealism (e.g., 
Kitcher, 1993; Rennie, 2000). This thesis supports the position that the broadly 
framed, fallibilistic scientific realism presented here can incorporate the role of 
social influences on knowledge, while maintaining an objective epistemology 
(Greenwood, 1992). What the present thesis also demonstrates is that the 
boundaries between different metatheories, methodologies, and methods can, 
and have been to some extent, profitably bridged to create innovative and 
insightful ways of understanding the world. This thesis agrees that both social 
constructionism and realism offer valuable metatheoretical and methodological 
insights. In particular, social constructionism offers a valuable emphasis on 
generative theory, the acceptance of the infiuences of history, culture, politics 
and language, and it has helped create a useful debate on the nature of 
epistemology and ontology in research (Phillips, 2000). However, scientific 
realism can accommodate these positives features of social constructionism. 
The form of scientific realism proposed in this chapter aims to appreciate the 
influence of social forces but also retain a strong emphasis on the grounding of 
empirical knowledge. 
In sum, the scientific realist metatheory presented in this chapter is preferred to 
Gergen's radical social constructionism because it offers a more plausible and 
resourceful view of methods, methodology, and the relationship between 
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researchers and the mind-independent and dependent world. It allows for the 
use of both qualitative and quantitative methodology. It emphasises the 
importance of criteria of validity and reliability criteria, and therefore places 
considerably greater epistemic pressure on qualitative methods, ensuring that 
qualitative research is not just reliant on the word of the researcher. It also 
allows researchers to maintain an epistemically objective view of the world, but 
accepts that all knowledge is fallible. A complex and diverse range of influences 
are assumed to act on the researcher, but this does not exclude the successful 
pursuit of scientific values and the freedom of the researcher to act voluntarily 
(Phillips, 2000). 
Scientific realism supports the investigation of unobservable, as well as 
observable, entities, both of which are central to psychological science and 
important in qualitative research. What is more, the qualitative scientific realist is 
encouraged to pursue generative and explanatory theories. Particularly 
promising is the orienting framework of Haig's (1996) abductive account of 
scientific method which is based on a commitment to scientific realism. This 
method provides promising solutions to a number of concerns in the ambiguous 
and unresolved processes of grounded theory. In particular it helps facilitate 
grounded theory's development of explanatory theories. Both qualitative 
researchers and psychological scientists would be well served by scientific 
realism's joint emphasis on phenomena detection and theory construction within 
an epistemically objective and fallibilistic framework that allows the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Finally, in pursuing the goal of providing qualitative researchers with a 
scientifically credible metatheory in psychology, this thesis has argued its case 
with respect to a limited number of qualitative methods. However, the scientific 
credibility of those methods indicates the potential of qualitative research to 
contribute considerably more significantly to psychological science than it 
currently does. 
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